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# West Europe Report

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19 February 1986

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY CHIEF BACKS ALLIANCE WITH SDP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 24 Dec 85 p 7

[Editorial by Thorkild Dahl: "SF will Support S-Government in Minority"]

[Text] SF [Socialist People's Party] leader Gert Petersen welcomes Social Democrat [S] Mogens Lykketoft's offer of a Social Democratic minority government supported by the Socialist People's Party and says that he has a "greater liking" for such cooperation in a labor majority than for the Social Democrat's policy of twisting the SF's arm.

It is a step forward in the Social Democrat's relations with the Socialist People's Party that former tax minister Mogens Lykketoft is opening things up for a formal parliamentary cooperation. The SF is willing to join in such cooperation but we want discussions begun before a parliamentary election.

So says SF leader Gert Petersen after Mogens Lykketoft in yesterday's BERLINGSKE TIDENDE indicated that after a parliamentary election "a Social Democratic government could be formed with the SF as a supporting party either within or without the government."

Tax Reform No Obstacle

"Lykketoft's comments are gratifying, and it's news to me that the Social Democrats are ready to be a minority government and be supported by us," says Gert Petersen to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. He adds that he has "a greater liking for such a solution where arms are not twisted and the SF must simply accept Social Democratic policies."

Disagreement over the tax reform that the Social Democrats have agreed on with the government parties and the Radicals will not stand in the way of cooperation between the Social Democrats and the SF. Mogens Lykketoft has so expressed himself, and he is backed by the SF leader.

"The SF has at no time said that the tax reform would trip up any cooperation with the Social Democrats, and nor will we say so now," says Gert Petersen, who, however, adds that "the cooperation can become more difficult as a consequence of the tax reform, but that does not prevent cooperation."

Gert Petersen points out that not only the SF criticizes the tax reform but

also social democratic members of the Folketing like Karl Hjortnaes and Jens Risgaard are among the critics.

Mogens Lykketoft maintains that the cooperation should first be tried after a parliamentary election, but SF leader Gert Petersen wants the cooperation started at once.

#### Advance Discussion Important

"Things will go much more smoothly after a parliamentary election if we have discussed the cooperation in advance," says Gert Petersen, who thinks that "much now points to a labor majority after a parliamentary election."

There is still much that separates the Social Democrats and the SF, not least in the area of foreign policy.

"If the SF should participate in a government, it must be on the condition that the Social Democrats go much further along the alternative security policy line towards which the party has moved in the last few years," says Gert Petersen, who points to an end to Social Democratic cooperation with the Conservatives and the Moderate Liberal Party.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

COMMUNIST PARTY SEEN READY TO PICK NEW CHAIRMAN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Out in the Cold"]

[Text] When Aksel Larsen left the Communist Party he had served for so many years, the party slipped quickly out of the Folketing. He was replaced by the media-safe Knud Jespersen, who succeeded in leading the communists back into the Folketing. After the 1977 election, the Danish Communist Party still had seven seats. But then Knud Jespersen died while still quite young and was replaced by Jorgen Jensen. Ever since, the reversal has been uninterrupted. During the first general election under his leadership, the communists slipped out, and they have not succeeded in coming back since. On the contrary, election after election there have been large reverses. The communists received no more than 23,000 votes in the 1984 election. It is understandable that Jorgen Jensen wants to step down as party leader. In any case, there must certainly be plenty of others who want the job. But who? Of course, the party organ LAND OG FOLK has nothing to say about the matter, but the daily AKTUEL names a list of candidates. Besides a couple of trade unionists, the paper points to the driving forces behind the Popular Movement against the EEC, Jens-Peter Bonde and Else Hammerich. The latter is, of course, not a party member, but that can certainly be taken care of, and it is true that the communists must look at the popular movement as the kind of work they have had the best luck with these past few years. They command an organization whose circles and fields of interest extend far beyond their own narrow ranks. It may be this roundabout strategy that brings the communists in from the cold.

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

PAPER PROFILES PARTIES 'CROWN PRINCES,' 'CROWN PRINCESSES'

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 14

[Article by Carl Otto Brix: "Politicians in the Second Row--Headed for the first"]

[Text] A look at crown princes and crown princesses in political life.

Of course only in hereditary monarchies can crown princes count on becoming kings, but in democratic organizations, too, it is worthwhile to cast a glance at who sits in the second row in order to judge who will end up in the first.

Political parties have their number two men, and they have no guarantee of eventually sitting on the throne. But some of them most certainly will.

There are two obvious names for the country's largest party . There is deputy chairman and party spokesman Svend Auken, and there is the group's deputy chairman Ritt Bjerregaard.

If they were to be characterized rather narrowly, then Svend Auken stands for the more traditional social democratic line. He is the one who maintains close contact with the labor movement and the one who can talk with the other parties. He is a mediator where Ritt Bjerregaard is the sharp ideologist: the one who lays down a party line and follows it. If the Social Democrats are the popular party that also in the future will be able to govern and create a broad unity that extends to some degree across the nonsocialist side of the dividing line, then the leader's name will be Auken. If it is to be the ideology of democratic socialism, of cultural struggle, of peace before security, then the word is Bjerregaard.

Unifying Social Democratic Candidate

Should the two opposing tendencies in the large party be about to upset everything, then there is a unifying candidate, crown prince in waiting Svend Jakobsen, who probably is a little further upstage in the limelight than another serious top figure, Mogens Lykketoft.



Thus there are enough to choose from. In contrast to another large party, the Conservative People's Party. If one must name a replacement for the all-dominating leader, Poul Schluter, Palle Simonsen's name first comes to mind. But he has the regrettable attribute in a crown prince of being nearly as old as the king.

Among the Conservatives, the development has been such that for a time Poul Schluter was both leader of the Folketing group and the organization. Then Ib Stetter became organization chairman for a period, after which Schluter as prime minister again took over the post.

Thus there has not been a chance for any rising star to find a place in the organization that ever since Christmas Moller's and Poul Sorensen's days has been a conservative leader's base.

Some young conservative or other can look forward to a jump promotion.

The third largest party--according to pollsters the Socialist People's Party (SF)--has similar problems.

Gert Petersen is such a dominating leader that the undergrowth has difficulty in growing to its full height.

If the identity cannot be guessed, then the sex can. The SF has through positive affirmative action advanced many women to the highest ranks. Yes, it is the only party with a woman group chairman and a woman member of the Folketing's presidium, respectively Ebba Strange and Lili Gyldenkilde, who today are both good bids to become leader.

But some rulers keep themselves in power a long time, so it is probably from among the younger women party members that a successor must be sought. Environment mayor of Copenhagen Charlotte Amundsen is a refreshing possibility.

#### Line of Succession Laid Down

The Liberal Party laid down its line of succession this summer when Anders Fogh Rasmussen was elected deputy chairman ahead of two others who could also be candidates: Ministers Elsebeth Kock-Petersen and Bertel Haarder.

At the first opportunity, perhaps this summer, he will have his ministerial apprenticeship to gain administrative and political experience. If he passes his journeyman's exam, he can count on getting his chance. He has the right background, the right education, and the right age.

Center Democrats do not have a crown prince but a crown princess, the daughter of the party's founder moreover. Mimi Stilling Jakobsen, in contrast to the other aspirants, is plainly the choice of the party's convention (even though this meeting does not mean so much in the party).

The Radical Liberal Party does not seem to need to think about a line of succession. The group has been put together without renewals in the same way

for years. The reigning party chief Niels Helveg Petersen is, moreover, of the younger generation, so the need is not nearly so pressing.

If it is not Chr. Christiansen who will lead the Christian People's Party, then it is Flemming Kofod-Svendsen, who already possesses half the kingdom. And on the Progressive Party's little island appears Pia Kjaersgaard as the leader who can follow in Helge Dohrmann's steps while listening to His Master's Voice.

Photo Captions [photos not reproduced]

Svend Auken--pragmatist who can talk with people.

Ritt Bjerregaard--the hard party ideologist.

Svend Jakobsen--unites the two wings.

Palle Simonsen--favorite to replace Schluter.

Ebba Strange--a likely candidate for a high level post.

Charlotte Ammundsen--refreshing possibility.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen--ministerial apprentice.

Mimi Stilling Jakobsen--crown princess.

Pia Kjaersgaard--a possibility in the FRP.

Flemming Kofod-Svendsen--a possibility in the KRF.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## GREENS FACE DECISIONS CRUCIAL FOR PARTY SURVIVAL

Bonn DAS PARLAMENT (AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE supplement) in German  
9 Nov 85 pp 19-25

[Article by Marie-Luise Weinberger: "End of the Green Era?"]

[Text] I. Introduction

Their rise was cometlike: effortlessly, the Greens took one electoral hurdle after the other. And this despite the fact that they were against everything: against growth, against atomic power, against industrial society. It seemed as if more and more citizens wanted to join the young protest party's critique of our culture. Everyone joined in: APO-granddads, frustrated housewives, beknickered local-patriot friends of nature, purple feminists, student "spontis," prophets of the new inwardness, former K-group members with visions of world revolution, honest farmers, youth, and refugees from the SPD. Just as varied as this outward picture is the matter of content: there is agreement only on the basic values: ecological, grass-roots democratic, non-violent, and socially aware.

But the charm of novelty is gone. The voters in North Rhine-Westphalia and in the Saarland have made it clear to the Greens that no state-within-a-state is going to be set up on fundamentalist survival demands in the Federal Republic. The Greens are at the crossroads. Will the green protest- and movement-party become a parliamentary party with a program? Can the Greens hard-headedly put through all the interests of the new social movements, even under pressure to compromise? Can the Greens manage a reform of their own radicalness - the difficult journey from utopia to reality?

II. The Greens: Expression of a Social Crisis or Indication of an Epochal Shift?

The Greens are the result of the institutionalization and parliamentarization of the new social movements (NSM) active outside of parliament in the late seventies and early eighties: citizens-initiative movement, environmental and anti-nuclear-weapons movement, women's movement, self-help and alternative lifestyle movement, and peace movement. These movements were, from a sociological standpoint, more defensively oriented, against the "colonialization of life" (Habermas) and against the prevalent economic and bureaucratic

rationality (Footnote 1) (See J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Behaviour, Vol. 2, Frankfurt/M. 1981, pp 490 ff). The following are adduced, among others, in the social-science literature as further reasons for the rise of the Greens and of the new social movements:

Shifts of values and changes of paradigms (Inglehart, Hildebrandt/Dalton, Raschke)

Pervasive hedonistic ethos (Bell)

Cultural crisis of the West (Loewenthal)

Momentum of welfare-state demands (Klages) (Footnote 2) )The causes of the rise of the new social movements and of the Greens have by now been extensively dealt with in the social-science literature; this can therefore be dispensed with in the present connection. See especially M.-L. Weinberger, Setting Out for New Shores?, Bonn 1984; K.W. Brandt, New Social Movements, Opladen 1982; K.W. Brandt, D. Buesser, D. Rucht, Setting Out for a New Society, Frankfurt/M. 1985; D. Bell, The Future of the Western World, New York 1985; R. Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics, Princeton 1977; J. Raschke, "Politics and Value Shifts in Western Democracies," in AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, Vol 36/80; R. Loewenthal, Social Change and Cultural Crisis, Frankfurt/M. 1979; H. Klages, Listless Citizen, Listless State, Frankfurt/M. 1982; G. Langguth, Protest Movement, Cologne 1983; W. Schaefer, New Social Movements, Frankfurt/M. 1983; W.P. Buerklin, Green Politics, Opladen 1984; E. P. Mueller, The Greens and the Party System, Cologne 1984; G. Langguth, The Green Factor - From Movement to Party, Zurich 1984; Th. Kluge, Green Politics: Status of a Confrontation, Frankfurt/M. 1984; K. Gotto, H.-J. Veen, The Greens - Reluctant Party, Mainz 1984).

But the loss of leadership and initiative in the social-liberal style of governing also led to the Greens' being able to establish themselves as a fourth in the West German party system. Two social counter-ideals took shape against the industrial-society-cum-welfare-state legitimism of the SPD: a neo-conservatism which believes in growth, and the Green political model, critical of growth (Footnote 3) (J. Habermas, "The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energy," in his The New Imponderability, Frankfurt/M. 1985, p 152). Neo-conservatism is oriented on industrial society, but has an anti-welfare-state focus. It aims consciously at the "strata immediately involved in the production process, who have an interest in defending capitalistic growth as the basis of the welfare-state compromise" (Footnote 4) (J. Habermas, cited in footnote 1, p 577), and it in return accepts and approves the split in society between the economically active and the non-economically active.

The Green model of politics, on the other hand, aims at the "highly variegated periphery on the other side" (Footnote 5) (J. Habermas, cited in footnote 1, p 577), at the "anti-productivist alliance": women (housewives) and jobless,

the old, high school and university students, homosexuals and handicapped, foreigners and members of alternative-culture circles. These are joined by members of the new middle class of the social and services professions: the "therapeutocracy" with its "white-collar radicalism." "The distinct concentration of the Greens in the realm of the non-economically active and of the social-service professions indicates that a constituency is already in being for an independent political organization, which, in its daily experience and in its world of ideas, is sharply distinguished from the productivist producing core of industrial society. With a little courage for bold formulations, one could call these sectors of the population, which are liberated from the down-to-earth business pressures of a technologized and bureaucratized work world--borrowing from Habermas' behaviour types--'the communicative class.' Just as the collective-instrumental activity of the factory world moulded the egalitarian-solidaristic value scheme of the labor movement, so the structural principles of alternative politics find their basis in the social milieu of these post-industrial states: operating a town-meeting democracy is only going to be able to work in the longer run with a membership relatively free to dispose of its time; these activist groups have fields of professional activity that are mostly characterized by relatively surveyable dimensions, so that unforced understanding (the consensus principle) seems possible instead of formalized hierarchies; non-material goals, such as self-realization, independence and enjoyment of life, reside higher on personal-values scales than the pursuit of money, power and prestige, which is regarded as alienated" (Footnote 6) (D. Lehnert, "Alternative Politics: The New Social Movements Between Protest Potential, Values Conservatism and Environmental Socialism," in POLITISCHE VIERTELJAHRESSCHRIFT 1985, 1, p 33. Lehnert's conclusion: an opposition SPD, revived in terms of peace policy and environmentalism, will not make the Greens superfluous. This expectation, in his estimation, was unrealistic from the outset.).

The new world-picture developed by the Greens' adherents can be sketched as follows:

1. Anti-modernism: rejection of the growth-oriented consumption and throw-away society, and of technological progress as the engine of industrial development: the leftist critique of capitalism is complemented by a critique of the silent majority's life-style.
2. Anti-nuclear stance and pacifism: resistance on principle to military and civilian use of nuclear energy; plea for thoroughgoing non-violence.
3. Decentralization and grass-roots democracy: higher value in principle on smaller units, and self-determination for all.
4. Culture of "concern": belief in emotions and in subjective behaviour, and the attempt to practice non-violent, democratic and solidaristic social manners with one another (Footnote 7) (See K.J. Scherer and F. Vilmar, Environmental Socialism, Berlin 1980, p 34).



The Greens are not only an expression of a situation of social crisis, to the mind of such analysts, but possibly an indicator of an epochal social change. But "theory is gray" - let's look at the Greens' practice. Here four important currents have formed: the red and radical-environmentalist fundamentalists, who are consistent in wanting to get out of the dominant system; the practitioners of real-politik, who want to reform our industrial society; the economic libertarians, who aim at conservative voting groups; and finally, women, who aim at becoming a pivotal factor in the Green party, thereby assuring the political integration of the centrifugal currents.

### III. Intra-Party Tendencies Among the Greens

#### 1. The Fundamentalists, or Traditionalization and Theologization of Politics

The environmental socialists and the radical environmentalists belong to this current within the Green party.

The dogmatic-Marxist environmental socialists are in fundamental systemic opposition to capitalism and the bourgeois state - the old reds in chic new green clothing. With them, Marxist anti-revisionism, Rosa Luxemburg's critique of revisionism, and a one-dimensional emphasis on the property question and the class struggle continue to be dominant (Footnote 8) (See especially Trampert and Ebermann, The Future of the Greens. A Realistic Concept for a Radical Party, Hamburg 1984, and also Trampert and Ebermann, "Power Factor or Power Fantasy?" Konkret 1984-1985, and the discussions in the environmental-socialist internal periodical MODERNE ZEITEN). According to the environmental socialists, the Greens must develop a "strategy for overcoming the system," which would formulate the needs of various segments of the population--animal protectors, farmers, or steelworkers--and put them through against the interests of capital. The economic-policy ideas of this group: "Elimination of atomic plants, comprehensive industrial clean-up programs, and shutdowns in the chemical industry and in industrial and private combustion processes, clean-up of soils and waters, discouraging and forbidding the introduction of new techniques in the economy such as use of new media and genetic engineering. Departure from the modern agricultural industry, development of landscape protection and of technologies adapted to regions instead of wholesale paving-in and building-over, creation of regionally-patterned residential and economic structures instead of often wholly unassimilable industrial complexes" (Footnote 9) (Trampert and Ebermann (Note 8), p 275; see also North-Rhine-Westphalian electoral platform and the keynote motion of the national committee at the Hamburg party conference in December 1984, as well as the discussion of Green economic policy in the journal.).

Along with the plea for decentralized production, the dismantling of the Federal Republic as an exporting nation is advocated (but at the same time the West German welfare state is to be expanded), and, for example, a guaranteed minimum wage is argued for, with--truly hedonistically--work when and as one pleases. Guidance and planning in such a green economic order would take place a) through each individual involved and b) corporatively through



industrial councils, social councils and environmental councils. The contradictions of such a green economic policy can be seen in the example of the socialized steel area: on the one hand the extra (that is, uneconomic) capacity is to remain in being, yet at the same time a comprehensive humanization program (35-hour week, abandonment of shift work, and early retirement) is to be introduced (Footnote 10) (See especially the critique of H. Wiesenthal, "A Fundamental Model Program," in TAZ, 21 Mar 85).

The simple question of who is to pay for all this goes--prudently--unanswered. The dominant political type among the prophets of nationalization and the technology Cassandras is the former K-Group official who has been busily engaged since the seventies in finally moving German labor to revolution. The momentum for system change proceeds, in this political schema, from the new social movements, which operate outside of parliament. Great things still lie ahead for the women's movement, the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement and the peace movement: they are now also to become "the only relevant protagonists of the proletarian class struggle" (Footnote 11) (Trampert and Ebermann (Note 8), Chapter "New Social Movements and Workers Movement," pp 116 ff).

For the radical environmentalists, the issue is not so much Marxist categories as it is a "right to life" for nature, "ecological justice": "without ecological justice there can be no social justice... On the analogy of the fundamental human right to life, a standing in law must be conceded to nature and its manifold lifeforms. In cases of conflict, this standing affects the weights assigned to the legitimate interests on either side" (Footnote 12) (Words of the Green "philosopher" Maron-Manon Griesebach, one of the chief figures of the radical environmentalists, at the Green party conference in Baden-Wuerttemberg, in TAZ 13 May 85).

Intransigence, 5-minutes-to-12 thinking, moralistic rigidity, and the policy of prohibition characterize the fundamentalist environmentalists' understanding of politics. And: all hope is directed to the notion that people--spurred on by continued proselytizing--will inwardly and truly turn away from the industrial system and will live and work with ecological awareness in small self-governing units. Only thus, and not by looking around anxiously for majorities, can the final saving escape from catastrophe be found. On peace and security issues, too, behaviour is radical: immediate exit from NATO is heralded, as well as rigorous demilitarization and a break with the dominant bloc thinking; social defense or non-violent principles are promoted instead. On economic and social policy issues, there is a broad lack of ideas. Here, too, notions are reduced to a naive and helpless fundamentalism: "the Greens were always strong where they specified the price in nature, landscapes, environmental quality, human happiness, wasted resources, and burdens on the future for this policy" (Footnote 13) (So, for example, writes Antje Vollmer in a reply to Peter Glotz on the interior political situation of the Greens; see TAZ 14 May and 16 Jul 85).

In short, a theologization of politics is going on here, which (as with the red traditionalists) is not dealing seriously with political realities, or even seriously taking up the attempt to develop alternative, feasible policy concepts. Predominant, too, therefore, with fundamentalists of this stripe, are the "good shepherds," the "radical devotees," and the "alternative-lifestyle innocents with Manichaeian ideology," whose utopian alternative systems often display embarrassingly totalitarian characteristics (Footnote 14) (See in this connection the excellent presentation of political types by K.-H. Bohrer, "Innocence in Power," MERKUR 1985, 1).

The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu comments on the rise of these naive idealists and their rhetoric of innocence: "It is the new academic petty bourgeoisie that is breaking with value systems that, developed from a West European political tradition, are still dominant in the West" (Footnote 15) (Bohrer (Note 14); particularly in France, this concept of politics encounters deep mistrust; see for example B. Sauzay, German Lightheadedness, Paris, 1985). Instead of continuing to develop the dialog of the Enlightenment and of modern times, they want to change our society into an all-things-for-all-men Linderhof (one of Ludwig of Bavaria's ruinous never-never castles), in which morality and virtue, rather than the compromise of interests, represent the highest priorities, and in which all would peacefully reach out to one another in support groups. "What the Greens call fundamentalism is, more than anything else, an instrumentalization of politics in the service of self-discovery, estheticism posing as politics, resting on the notion that the world--this ecological vale of tears--is in the final analysis nothing other than occasion, parable and raw material for the search for one's own identity" (Footnote 16) (J. Strasser, "Search for Identity or Politics," in L'80 (1980) 33, p 27).

## 2. Women, or Housewife-ization of Politics

The representatives (or representatresses) of this tendency are less striking for their substantive differences than for their positive valuation of one property: femininity. The prescribed atmosphere in the "culture of concern" of the new social movements is, as we know, warm, unalienated, genuine, open. Peaceable woman can handle this better than the male chauvinist every time. Entirely in tune with presently fashionable theories of women as survival-bearers, the Green women are supposed to play an important intermediary role among the gamecocks of real-politik, of fundamentalism, and of ecolibertarianism.

This proposition has been tried in practice with the Bundestag delegation in the setting of the one-year Feminine - and a new form of political division of labor was tested: with the commitment of social workers and the corresponding atmosphere, the women improved the working climate (just as the housewife does within the family), thereby quietly and gently keeping the parliamentary machine going. Although the 6-woman team did not enter upon its duties with the pretension of acting as the delegation's "denmothers," it was thrust into precisely this role. Incipient conflicts were smoothed out at the outset, compromises were made. Instead of intrigue, the Green women wanted to try out honesty and openness; instead of using the elbows, they put their money

on cooperation and group dynamics. Instead of hardness they showed civility. The Machiavellian higher strategists (as published: "higher strategies"), by contrast, determined the Green programs in ways that were effective with public opinion, putting their rhetorical and histrionic talents forward in full parliamentary sessions (Footnote 17) (See TAZ 4 Dec 85, which captioned its background article "We're So Sweet and Good, No One Minds Us Any More." Eight months of Green Feminine: see "Against Male Power Politics as a Political Culture," a talk with Antje Vollmer in TAZ 12 Oct 84). "I myself, however, am not completely comfortable with the idea that women today don't just keep their own livingrooms nice and cozy, but are suddenly supposed to add the whole world to the chore. Instead of the emotional work in the private realm's being redistributed, it is simply being expanded: the removal of the difference between public life and the immediate sphere of living, the "be-housewifing" of politics, so to speak, simply raises the multiple burden on women to the level of the colossal" (Footnote 18) (C. Stephan, Real Relaxed in the Supermarket: Life and Love in the Late 20th Century, Berlin 1985, p 85).

The Green women, however, no longer want to accept this housewifization and emotionalization of politics. After barely a year of Feminine, they have become harder, more severe, more authoritarian; they have learned that not being willing to exercise power leads to minority-lobbyism; they had to learn that confrontation and controversy are needed for success. In other words, one must also practice up on primarily "male" characteristics if she wants to become politically effective. Despite all this: the female delegation managers paid off for the Greens in any case. Apart from the environmental theme, the greatest credibility is accorded the Greens in the matter of equal rights for women. Precisely the young women between 15 and 30 are in sympathy with the Green party's sense of politics and with its methods. "Hence arises a potential for female politicization--far removed from the traditional parties--which will play a significant role for political culture in the Federal Republic in the coming years," reads a report by SINUS Institute to the Federal Ministry for Youth, Family and Health. Perhaps a new "female majority, which will then of course not be a silent one," (Footnote 19) (See SINUS, "Young Women Between 15 and 30: Role Shifts and Daily Life Under Emancipation," Special Evaluation for the research project Changes in the Motivational Structure of Youth and Young Adults, Heidelberg, Nov 83, p 29) is being formed here.

This forecast can be empirically corroborated by a political change of consciousness. If women were traditionally rather conservative in political orientation earlier, the exact opposite is the case today: 54.1 percent of the young women between 15 and 30 favor a red-green majority on the national level. Even among those 25 to 35 it's still 50.5 percent (Footnote 20) (SINUS (Note 19), as well as W. A. Perger, "The Courage to be a New Woman," DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT 3 Feb 85). Based on these findings, women represent a central factor for the future of the Greens. The party strategists have recognized this, too: they argue for the formation of a green center, which is to act as a connecting link among the inimical male camps, and is to be actively forwarded by women (Footnote 21) (See TAZ 4 Mar 85, "The Issue is an Alternative Power Structure").

### 3. The Ecolibertarians, or Bourgeoisization of Politics

The ecolibertarians represent the surviving bourgeois wing within the Green Party. Substantively they stand for a liberal humanism that is tied to republican-liberal traditions. Although anarchistic tendencies play no part in their ranks, they call themselves libertarian. The ecolibertarians, among whom members of the classic bourgeois middle classes and older citizens are clearly overrepresented, aim their critique above all at socialist ideas of change: "the socialist experiment cannot do otherwise than bet on further acceleration of progress." And: "For this reason, the much-praised link between environmentalism and socialism is in fact dangerous. For it brings two authoritarian tendencies together: biological ecologism and the good old educationally dictatorial Jacobinism of the socialists." A further statement: "True, there really is a social question, but it is today a derivative problem of industrialism, and thus also a subordinate problem" (Footnote 22) ("Ecolibertarian Declaration of Principles," TAZ 7 Mar 84). With over 2 million officially registered unemployed (plus the "silent reserve"), with the marginalization of significant portions of the population, and in view of the cuts in the social field, this is a cynical observation.

In ecolibertarian commentaries--just as in conservative-liberal publications--polemics against the unions, against the bureaucratic, etatist welfare state, and against social innovations through government bureaucracies, are often found. The social-ecological reconstruction of society is to come about through market-economic methods and mechanisms. Therefore, it is not surprising that some prominent ecolibertarians come out for black-green coalitions (Footnote 23) (So for example the ecolibertarian Hoplitschek in the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 3 Mar 84. Schmid, too, argues for cooperation with the enlightened "Spaeth" capitalists toward the achievement of a guaranteed minimum income. See on this Th. Schmid, Liberation from Pseudowork, Berlin 1984, p 15).

The ecolibertarians' substantive orientations rest upon an estimate of the green electoral potential: "At the organizer level, it is true, the Green Party is still pretty firmly in the hands of cadres with Marxist-Leninist backgrounds - their clientele, however, in great part belongs univocally to the new middle class... The party of opposition-on-principle has thus been thrust up into parliament not least by the higher new bourgeoisie, to which the theatrical left's radicalism--rather unconcerned about concrete successes --is alien" (Footnote 24) (Th. Schmid in FREIBEUTER 15, p 25).

### 4. The Realpolitikers, or Secularized Movement Activists

For the representatives of the real-politik tendency, the Greens' prospects for development are: parliamentarization, alliance, compromise. According to their views, one cannot with impunity win elections and then act as if nothing had happened. The new social movements have been integrated into the parliamentary system by the Greens. Now the next step must logically follow: institutionalization and professionalization. The realization of this necessity leads necessarily to consequences also in respect to organizational



policy: the grassroots-democratic model of politics must be revised. Substantively, the issue for the adherents of real-politik is a social-reform path in the direction of an environmentalist and radical-democratic social order.

Some of the "realos" criticize the Marxological "junior-high level" of the dogmatical red fundamentalists, as well as the spirit of revelation that hovers over the radical-ecological world reformers. In the future the Greens should be, not a hotbed of protest or an arena for backward-looking ideologs and party-line beadles (with their drive for a dictatorship of the activists), but rather a bearer of hope as an alternative popular party which appeals to 10 percent of the population. Characteristic for methods among the real-politikers is the secularized movement activist who has shed his "sponti" skin to become a high strategist.

But the Green delegates in almost all the municipal and state legislatures, as well as in the Bundestag, are also realpolitikers. The reason: they quickly come to feel the (thitherto hated and denied) pressure of facts when they are faced with translating green demands into concrete executive instructions. Thus, we may read in the parliamentary delegation's report that the much-invoked grassroots activities cannot be carried over into the shifting Bonn arena. An example of this: "Out there you hear about leaving NATO and disbanding the Bundeswehr; but in here it's dogged detail-work to fight for a reduction of the arms budget. Out of sheer necessity, parliamentary measures will be modest in comparison with platform principles" (Footnote 25) (See TAZ 30 Nov 80).

The Greens in parliament are considered an active and industrious delegation: through September 1985, they have made more than 33 major interpellations, 568 minor ones, and 193 motions in the Bundestag. But in the parliamentary work to date, the Greens have succeeded with a motion on only one point: they obtained an import ban on sea turtles.

The Greens face stiffer sailing now than previously, as the other parties begin to take up green themes and integrate them into their parliamentary efforts and political platforms. So, for example, the CDU/CSU members on the Bundestag's Interior Committee indeed began by rejecting the Green bill for a washing-material law, only to bring in their own bill shortly thereafter - two-thirds of it copied from the Green paper. The same procedure was applied with the waste-water-fee bill, with the soil-protection amendments, and with women's affairs (Footnote 26) (See TAZ 4 Mar 85).

#### IV. The Voter: Fundamentalism - No, Thanks!

The various substantive concepts and strategic ideas within the Green Party were put on the electoral "market" for a vote in this year's state legislative elections in the Saarland and North Rhine-Westphalia, in the House of Delegates elections in Berlin, and in the municipal elections in Hesse. In Berlin and in North Rhine-Westphalia, fundamentalist cocktails with hors d'oeuvres were served. In Berlin the Alternative List presented itself as a

Dutch-uncle sect, pursuing a rigid prohibitionist policy (auto-free city, withdrawal of allied troops). In the traditionally conservative Saarland the Greens at first didn't want to enter the state legislature at all after Oskar Lafontaine's offer of coalition. The perception was, "We can change things only with extra-parliamentary pressure, and not with 2 token ministers" (Footnote 27) (See TAZ 7 Jan 85). The Greens made the Movement their idol, simultaneously gazing at the red-green Oskar Lafontaine with fearful fascination. The real-politik result of the strategy of denial: the Greens had to content themselves with 2.4 percent. In North Rhine-Westphalia, minorities within the party like pederasts and dogmatic eco-socialists had the last word. Their fine hand was evident in the 650-page platform which inter alia set forth "survival demands" for the SPD: abandonment of atomic energy, departure from lignite coal over the intermediate run, renunciation of new technologies, industrial clean-up programs, and programs to reduce mass unemployment while simultaneously moving away from the economy's export orientation (Footnote 28) (See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 17 Dec 85 and FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 25 Dec 85. TAZ commented: "There is no social basis for bringing about what the Greens articulated this weekend. All that's left here is Bahro's vision of a non-violent popular insurrection," in TAZ 18 Dec 84.).

Both in the Saar and in North Rhine-Westphalia, it was very easy for the SPD to push the Greens under the 5-percent barrier, because the Greens here a) came across as being in desolate condition both in people and in organization, and b) couldn't distinguish themselves early on through parliamentary activity. In Hesse, the red-green alliance was confirmed by the voters. That example shows: "Where Green alliances have even a ghost of a chance of coming to pass, the voters can actively support the process" (Footnote 29) (Th. Schmid, "Plea for an Electable Green Platform," TAZ 23 Mar 85).

Konrad Adenauer Foundation staff came to the following conclusions (Footnote 30) (See H. J. Veen, "The Greens at the Limits of Growth: An Analysis of Their Voters and Representatives Before the 1984 and 1985 Elections," Politische Studien Jul/Aug 85, pp 356 ff): the Greens' ups and downs depend on the SPD's situation. Where the SPD comes across assertively, with its candidates and/or with its program, the Greens have little chance to surmount the 5-percent hurdle. Nevertheless, the Adenauer Foundation researchers reckon on a Green parliamentary presence up to the end of this decade (only, however, if the Greens establish themselves on the left with the SPD). The reason for this assumption: in 6 states (Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Bremen, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Berlin) and in the municipal elections, the Greens, while indeed passing their zenith, have at the same time been able to consolidate at a lower level.

The following is adduced in the literature, inter alia, as causes of the end of the Greens' growth:

1. The momentum of value shifts, which made an essential contribution to the rise of the Greens, has halted at least for the moment. Traditional material values predominate once again with first-time voters (Footnote 31) (See on this the analysis of the pollster M. Guellner for the municipal elections in



North Rhine-Westphalia in KOELNISCHE RUNDSCHAU 27 Nov 85. Guellner calls some of the young voters super-operatives of conformity. See also Th. Sommer, "Greening of the Electorate Too?" DIE ZEIT 22 Apr 85).

2. The Greens have stagnated in their big-city citadels, and have been able to win no new segments of the electorate. In addition, the electorally decisive Green shift-voters have been frightened off by the fundamentalist orientation (Footnote 32) (See FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 14 May 85: The CDU campaign raised home-state patriotism and so SPD loyalty. The Cologne election researcher Guellner points to an interesting trend that became visible in the North Rhine-Westphalia state legislative elections: the FDP was especially successful in the service-industry centers with above-average education. Thus also in D. Oberndoerfer and G. Mielke, "Handwriting on the Wall for Bonn," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 15 May 85. The reason: segments of the upwardly mobile middle classes, the "young urban professionals," are turning away from the Greens.).

3. The Greens have far overestimated their own degree of appeal: not only is the charm of novelty much diminished, but the current market value of protest themes from the late seventies and the eighties (atomic energy, environment, full rearmament) has also fallen (or else these themes have been taken up in the other parties' programs, as the example of the SPD "Work and Environment" program shows) (Footnote 33) (See C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal, "The Green Fear of Reformism," TAZ 13 May 85).

#### V. The Green Reformism Debate

Formulation of a program adapted to governing and to political life is the order of the day for the Green Party. The ecolibertarian Thomas Schmid comes to the conclusion that "the Greens are still wanted...as people who have intelligent suggestions of moderate scope to make toward dismantling industrial society" (Footnote 34) (Th. Schmid, "Plea for an Electable Platform," TAZ 28 Mar 85 [but note the citation in Footnote 29]). If this perception becomes acceptable to the majority, the Greens must revise their previous understandings of politics and of organization at 3 decisive points:

1. Clear profession of faith in reform as opposed to revolution, and in parliamentary alliances;
2. Development of alternative policy ideas capable of winning majorities;
3. Reform of grassroots-democratic style of organization.

##### 1. Reformism and Parliamentary Alliances

If the Greens want to contribute over the long haul to the shaping of the political landscape in the Federal Republic, there is no alternative to reformism for them. If they make a final decision for anti-reformism, consistent in its convictions and anchored to principle, with its partly pedagogical, partly idealistic volunteerism, their future is already behind them.

The question of yes or no to reformism within the Greens' discussion is closely linked with the question of parliamentary alliances--particularly with the SPD. For the red fundamentalists, nothing is possible with the SPD (they do go in for negotiation with the SPD--as in Hamburg--but only with the aim, in the good old leftist way, of unmasking the SPD). The environmental fundamentalists, in adolescent love-hate, call old mother SPD names, and want nothing to do with her. But learning processes are going on--the normative power of the real is beginning to have its effect. Whilst the fundamentalists at the Hamburg party congress wanted to bring the Greens to a course of absolute refusal, the decision was otherwise at the Hagen party congress (after the desolating electoral defeats): from opposition-on-principle all the way to red-green alliances, everything is now possible (Footnote 35) (Some advanced thinkers, such as the designated Hesse Environment Minister Joschka Fischer, are now eying co-operation with the Christian Unionists. He argues that the SPD could come too much into dependence on its growth wing, and that alliances on the left have no prospects in the southern German states. See TAZ 4 Mar 85. On the Hagen party conference, see FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU 24 Jun 85, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 24 Jun 85, SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 24 May 85).

The first showing of a red-green coalition is now to get its try-outs in Hesse. Besides the environmental and energy portfolios, the Greens are getting a State Secretary for Women's Affairs. The Greens were not successful with the Social Democrats on their original demand for a women's ministry (Footnote 36) (Here arises the fundamental question whether it is meaningful to respond with bureaucratization to the social-political challenge of "equal rights for women." And: a (probably powerless) Women's Ministry could easily be made into an excuse for shunting aside wider-ranging demands.). This demand could have developed into a "breaking point" for the coalition negotiations, if the Greens had insisted on the portfolio in order to maintain their identity. But the Greens had gone through a learning process--and the coalition negotiations themselves showed this: here they no longer confused politics with the search for identity. A classic example of such a case was the near parting of the ways over the Hanau atomic plants Nukem/Alkem. "Anyone who in this way makes the actualization of his own model of society a precondition for day-to-day politics is renouncing in advance any chance of changing the conditions he objects to. The point is then reached at which the effort to stabilize a common identity makes the achievement of common interests impossible. For achieving one's interests requires political behaviour. But politics in our society is, according to a plain but profound definition by Max Weber: 'the effort to obtain power shares or to influence the distribution of power...with-in a state among the groups of people it includes'" (Footnote 37) (S. Neckel, "Political Identity and Social Interests," L'80 (85) 33, p 54).

It is important for the Greens to go through learning processes like this. For a functioning red-green coalition, in which the Greens give proof of their aptness for politics and of their reliability, raises their chances for the 1987 Bundestag elections.

## 2. Conceptual Reorientation

The future task of Green politics is no longer the formulation of anti-propositions (against growth, against atomic energy, renunciation of industrial society, retreat from NATO), but rather the design of ecologically oriented alternative policy concepts for the fields of economic, social, environmental and peace policy. Here, too, there are first indications of maturity: for the 1987 Bundestag elections the Greens want to come forward with an ecologically oriented restructuring program (which is to be produced with scientific consultation). The central point of the substantive revision debate will be the relationship of the social-worker and teacher party to the new technologies. The Greens entered as an anti-modernist grouping inimical to technology. Now they are confronted with the proverbial irony of fate: precisely their protest is contributing to industry's environmental-technological modernization. Looked at from the reform-politics viewpoint, the Greens have in the final analysis had a stabilizing effect on the industrial system, and they are the true unleashers of an enormous future growth push in the area of environmental technology. The SPD is taking account of this fact in its new party platform (which will aim at incorporating Green voters): it is still betting on industrial-state/welfare-state legitimism, but will develop it further in terms of peace policy, women's policy and environmental policy. And: enormous shortenings of work schedules, which are to be used for creating open spaces for the creative aspects of life, are hoped for for the coming decades from the use of the new technologies (Footnote 38) (On this see especially P. Glotz, The Task of Issue-Making, Berlin 1985; see P. Glotz, "Green Politics Between Diagnosis and Therapy," TAZ 14 May 85. The Social Democratic labor-union wing also declares for this strategy; see the paper of Rappe and Steinkuehler, "The Market Alone Cannot Assure Lasting Progress.").

The Greens' aspiration of overcoming social-democratic/economic modernism requires a central policy-strategic and intellectual effort, "namely the achievement of finding politically convincing answers to the question of how the social-justice and social-security problem is to be coped with, even with the renunciation of the modernist growth myth" (Footnote 39) (C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal, "Green Fear of Reform House," TAZ 31 May 85 [probably in fact the article cited in Note 33]). The Greens can only cut loose from this much-maligned modernism when they offer the voter convincing and thought-through answers to questions of work and employment, defense and social security. For the Greens, torn with strife among themselves, this is a task that can hardly be managed.

## 3. Reform of Inner Structures

The third point of the Green revisionism debate is reform of the grassroots-democratic political model. The footwork-vs-footing model of a Green anti-party party corresponds to the unstructuredly dynamic movement and protest phase of the new social movements. The principles of rotation, of openness of all forums to members, and of consensus have proven counterproductive in the conduct of everyday political business. The footwork-footing theory has been turned inside out: the new social movements have gone rigid--the

parliamentary footwork element has become the Greens' footing. Instead of completing this development, the Greens' leaders are taking refuge in fetishizing the new social movements (Footnote 40) (Similarly the spokesman of the Green parliamentary delegation, Christian Schmidt, who expressed himself thus after the electoral defeat: "Let us work less for the German Bundestag and more in the service of social movements" [TAZ 21 Jan 85]. The national committee spokesmen Rainer Trampert and Jutta Ditfurth also argue in a similar way; for both, the failure to reach the 5-percent mark is no longer a problem. See TAZ 14 May 85 and 4 Jun 85 and the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 14 May 85).

Conscious renunciation of professional politics leads before very long--even in a party with a statistically high educational level among its potential recruits--to the "dominance of the pallid busyworkers," under which the incompetent, inexperienced political amateur has the last word. The principle of rotation--as experience on federal and state levels proves--leads to a loss of efficiency and to mediocrity of Green policy (Footnote 41) (Also worthy of note in this connection is the result of a study by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (Note 30). This advocates the proposition that the later Green generations in almost all cases advocate more radical concepts than did their predecessors. Stephan Russ-Mohl demonstrates in a research paper that reform cycles begin with innovation in people and concepts, and end in mediocrity and bureaucratization; see St. Russ-Mohl, "Dramaturgy of Political Reforms," AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE B 26/82.).

The openness of Green forums to members allows the rival groupings within the party to reduce these meetings to a tool. Owing to the right of speech for all present (which has been limited to 5 minutes), the costs, both political and personal, and in terms of time, of achieving agreement rise to intolerable levels. The Greens' members' meetings, instead of being forums for political discussion, have developed into incalculable "comic-strip one-liner subcultures," in which disagreeable and disputed subjects are excluded (both at the Hamburg and at the Hagen party congresses, themes like rotation, structural reform, and the Greens' future conceptual orientation were set aside). The hitherto voluntary party workers must also be replaced by headquarters staffs.

Will the Greens be able "to formally limit the runaway forms?" (Footnote 42) (C. Offe and H. Wiesensthal [Note 39]). They will be able to survive as a party--this can be said even today--only if they accept organizational structures similar to those of the established parties, that is the principles of professionalism, expertise, division of labor, obligatoriness, assured procedural rules, and discipline. In such a case, of course, a further Green dream would have failed: the belief that the highly professionalized and specialized industrial-technocratic system can be countered by a lay system.

The results of the Green revisionism debate are presently still open. But the trend is running in favor of real-politik. Thus, Karl Kautsky may be proven right once more: "If conditions are such as to favor revisionist attitudes, there is then no longer any holding back, the majority goes over to revisionism" (Footnote 43) (K. Kautsky, quoted from Textbook and Exercises on the German Labor Movement, vol. 1, Bonn 1984, p 221).



POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# STUDY FINDS FRG FRIENDLIER TO FOREIGNERS THAN IT REALIZES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 7 Dec 85 p 1

[Article by gs: "Pollsters Find No Evidence of Xenophobia--Allensbach Analysts Say Germans See Great Problems But Have a 'Rather Friendly' Attitude"]

[Text] Bonn, 6 Dec 85--An opinion poll of the Allensbach Institute for Opinion Polls [IfD] made public Friday [6 December] shows that FRG citizens are "rather friendly" and by no means xenophobic toward foreigners in the FRG. The poll had been commissioned by the Federal Ministry of the Interior.

For its analysis (entitled "Between Tolerance and Concern--Attitudes of the German Population Toward Topical Problems of Xenophobia") the IfD polled about 2,250 FRG citizens in January and February 1985. These included 250 persons residing in areas with a particularly high proportion of foreigners. There are about 4.36 million foreigners in the FRG at present, which amounts to a good 7 percent of the total population.

According to the IfD study, the relationship between Germans and foreigners is "more relaxed than the constant portrayal of it as fraught with problems, in the media and in public discussions, would make them believe." Every other person polled, says the study, thought that a great deal was being exaggerated in this matter. Every third person, however, expressed the opinion that there were indeed great difficulties.

According to the analysis, great difficulties in the coexistence of Germans and foreigners are indicated to an above-average extent by citizens living in a neighborhood with a high proportion of foreigners. Compared with an overall average of 33 percent, 42 percent of Germans in those areas speak of great difficulties. On the other hand, citizens personally acquainted with foreigners state with particular frequency (55 percent) that the problems are portrayed in an exaggerated manner.

The image of foreigners gained on the basis of personal experience ("close image"), according to the IfD, is more friendly throughout than the image of foreigners as a whole in this country ("remote image"). Thus 65 percent of FRG citizens who know a foreigner personally consider him "friendly,

courteous." Foreigners as a whole are afforded this praise by only 16 percent of those polled, however.

According to the IfD study, German xenophobia is not shown either in the assesment of the role of foreigners on the labor market. Here there are, however, great disparities between the close and the remote image. The argument that foreigners are taking jobs away from German workers is supported substantially (39 percent) only by groups which are not particularly friendly toward foreigners. Among Germans who work together with foreigners, on the other hand, it plays a comparatively minor role (12 percent).

Among persons who stand out among the total population by their strongly pronounced tolerance, the following groups are clearly overrepresented: The young, particularly people under 30; persons with higher education; and Green voters. At the other end of tolerance scale are the fairly old, particularly people over 60; persons with an ordinary education; and supporters of the CDU and CSU.

A limitation of the influx of foreigners is endorsed by 75 percent of those polled, according to the IfD. There is no majority support, on the other hand, for limiting the opportunity for children to join their families in the FRG to children no older than 6. Only 27 percent are for it, 46 percent are against, and 27 percent are undecided. Introduction of the 6-year limit has been among the demands made by Minister of the Interior Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU).

A relative majority of the population is prepared to grant German citizenship to children of foreigners who have grown up in the FRG when they come of age (42 percent for, 29 percent against, 29 percent undecided). Naturalization of Turkish children, however, is advocated by only 32 percent with 33 percent against and 35 percent undecided.

In the question as to whether foreigners living in the FRG should be deported if they commit a punishable offense, the responses depend on the gravity of the offense. There are clear majorities for deportation in the case of extremist political activity (57 percent) and trade in drugs (70 percent). A right to vote for foreigners in the FRG is rejected by a majority, with 52 percent of those polled holding the view that only Germans should be entitled to vote. The right to vote for foreigners in Bundestag elections is endorsed by 19 percent, the right to vote in municipal elections by 27 percent. Demonstrations by foreigners in the FRG against conditions in their home countries are rejected by 56 percent of SPD supporters, 53 percent of FDP supporters, and only 21 percent of Greens.

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

LITTLE CHANGE SEEN IN RELATIONS WITH USSR AFTER SUMMIT

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 13 Dec 85 p 5

/Article by Rolf Zundel: "Economically Valued, Politically Upbraided--A Trip Without Any Big Events"/

/Text/ Bonn, early December--The waterway carries along the small one, says a political aphorism by the Federal chancellor. Applied to East-West relations, it would mean that the communicative style of Geneva also ought to make itself felt in Bonn's contacts with the East. The Bundestag delegation which visited the Soviet Union last week returned with divided impressions. Though it has not dried out or come to a halt, the river of German-Soviet relations is meeting a number of obstacles.

To be sure, protocol was satisfied; the last delegation, in 1973, had not been treated any better. One could have talked of a quite normal trip except for the fact that great expectations had been raised frivolously before the trip had begun, which then were followed during the stay in the Soviet Union by grumbling comments about the lack of appreciation by the Soviets of the importance of the party leader in the German Bundestag (which in turn were dispatched back to the FRG in pointed form by the agencies, only to be turned into burning protests there by overeager commentators). The great event, however--a meeting with Foreign Minister Zhevarnadze, not to speak of one with General Secretary Gorbachev, was denied to the delegation. The Germans did not get to see any of Gorbachev's new people.

The talks were described as "courteous and respectful" (Dregger) and "open and friendly" (Jenninger), only a shade more cordially than by the Soviets, who spoke more of a businesslike manner and sobriety. Nor did the delegation want to have its positive impression spoiled by their last talk, shortly before its departure. With the help of Soviet interpretation, the "outburst" by Central Committee official Zimyanin was played down as a "human particularity." A somewhat doubtful procedure in that this outburst was also, and much more so, part of a mixed strategy which was intended to make clear to the Bonn parliamentarians both the continuing Soviet interest in cooperation in all areas and its limits and conditions.

## Closely Knit Relations

In fact there exist (Soviet and Bonn interlocutors agree on this) comparatively closely knit relations between the FRG and the Soviet Union. Economic relations are working well. When the chairman of the board of the Deutsche Bank shows up in Moscow, he (like the leaders of the SPD)--I almost said as a matter of course--is received by the General Secretary. Cultural relations are not bad. (In the Moscow Intourist Hotel there were posters drawing attention to a Janssen exhibit.) There are hardly any complaints at the political working level, including the contacts between the Bonn foreign minister and his Soviet counterpart on the fringe of international conferences.

In the political-climate sphere, however, things look different. There may be a number of special reasons why the figures of German repatriates have been dropping for years, why the construction of the new German embassy in Moscow is 8 months behind schedule, and why comparatively few Soviet people show up at receptions of the German Embassy, but accumulatively the picture remains an unfriendly one. And if General Secretary Gorbachev visits London before he assumes office and then, while in office, first goes to Paris, then meets with Reagan, and plans a visit to Rome but so far shows no inclination to pay a visit to Bonn, it shows that the weights have shifted. The FRG has been demoted from its position of preferred partner, and the Soviets make no secret of that either. At present the place of the FRG has been taken by France.

## SDI Position Not Convincing

Actually there is a trend to measure the FRG by particularly strict standards. A number of reasons may be cited for this: disappointment at the FRG not having played the desired special role in Western Europe and wrong Soviet estimates in the question of the stationing of missiles. Ever since April 1984 (the reaction to the Bonn decision about the stationing of missiles coincided with the Soviet celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the end of the war) the Soviet press, with varying intensity but along identical lines, has described the FRG as a stronghold of revanchism. This makes some sense from the Moscow point of view. Except for FRG consent, it would hardly have been possible to station new U.S. nuclear weapons in West Europe, and FRG support for SDI, the new irritant in German-Soviet relations, is also of considerable significance.

The rejoinder by the German parliamentarians that in the case of the SDI the FRG is not the culprit but a victim is unlikely to have convinced the Soviet interlocutors. As far as Moscow is concerned, SDI is not only a question of security but a question of how it uses its resources. After all, Gorbachev's aim to modernize industry and improve income--imparted to the German delegation in many variants--is affected by how much money has to be put into armament. Gromyko's warning that the framework of German-Soviet relations would become narrower if SDI was implemented is therefore more than a tactical political move. There would be less money available, even with German aid, for the development of civilian industry and technology.

Economic relations certainly were the most pleasant subject of the Moscow talks. There was again mention of the inexhaustible treasuries of the Soviet Union, and also of the fact that the FRG was the most dependable economic partner. This definitely should be taken literally. What is meant by it is the punctuality and quality of German deliveries but also the fact that Bonn's economic policy is affected much less than U.S. economic policy by the changing political climate.

Industry is doubtless the most uncontroversial part of German-Soviet relations. This lures a number of FRG politicians into the somewhat careless presumption that despite SDI things will not be so bad: after all, they need us. This accords with the triumphant statement by CDU/CSU politicians that despite the stationing of missiles there has been no start of an ice age, and no impenetrable fence of missiles across Europe has been erected. This is an argument useful in domestic politics but harmful in foreign policy. Moreover it is only partly true, for apart from German-Soviet economic relations it is based primarily on inter-German experience, which in Bonn's eyes has covered up the political unfriendliness of the Soviets.

Here the judgment of the German delegation was divided along party lines. One extreme was marked by Dregger, leader of the CDU/CSU deputies in the Bundestag, who thought that the Soviets of course wanted to prevent SDI but once a decision had been made politics would continue on their normal course. Social Democrats and Greens are taking the Soviet warnings more seriously. What is right about Dregger's opinion is that economic relations will also weather a temporary freeze. This does not mean, however, that the SDI decision will not have any consequences. They might become noticeable in other spheres.

It is no coincidence that the Soviet side has kept saying that the further development of relations must proceed on the basis of the treaties and security interests. In the eyes of the Soviets, the border discussions in the FRG and the demonstrative references to the open German question appear to be a departure from the earlier interpretation of the treaties. This evaluation is connected with the suspicion that, in a sort of reversal of a former Bonn Ostpolitik maxim, Bonn is trying to conduct an Ostpolitik which bypasses not the GDR but Moscow. Seen in this light, Zimyanin's outburst definitely makes sense--his brusque answer to the inquiry about Honecker's visit of "why do you not ask him?" and his harsh accusation that the FRG, though no longer trying to wage war against the GDR, is attempting to devour it politically.

The attractiveness of the FRG to the East European states, particularly the GDR, apparently is a thorny problem for the Soviets. It is a question of power for them. Bonn would probably be well advised to take this sensitivity on the part of Moscow seriously. From several remarks on the fringe of the Moscow visit, it was possible to gain the impression that a Honecker trip to the FRG is not among Moscow's favorite projects.

This concern is one more reason why the FRG for the time being cannot leave the political penalty bench. It continues to be quite useful as a bogeyman for disciplining the East European states. Nothing about that will change over the short term--certainly not before Bonn's decision on SDI, and probably not all that fast either afterward, when it has been made contrary to Soviet wishes and warnings. Is there a big power that likes to be portrayed as a paper tiger?

For the German delegation the visit certainly was useful experience, not least for Dregger, who on his first trip to the Soviet Union developed an amazing amount of understanding for Soviet politics and interests. No one commemorated the dead of the Fatherland War in as dignified a way as he did. No one accepted the big-power position of the Soviet Union so readily. No one talked with such a lack of self-consciousness of things in common, for example of the fact that both countries have experienced war on their own soil.

Some of this, the Soviets found tactless, but they were not unimpressed for all that, and in all they found Dregger to be an agreeable and certainly useful interlocutor--a Deutsch-Nationaler /prewar nationalist party/ who does not think in terms of systems but in terms of categories of power and patriotism and who if addressed that way can also be influenced.

This experience actually ought to encourage the Soviets also to invite Franz/-Joseph Strauss. He certainly is no less eager for such a visit than Dregger was. Though no Deutsch-Nationaler, he would be hardly less impressionable.

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CSO: 3620/185

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# BRITISH STUDY CALLS UNITED SOCIALIST GERMANY THREAT TO USSR

Bonn DIE WELT in German 21 Dec 85 p 5

[Article by Rainer Gatermann: "A Reunified Germany Seen as 'Challenge' to Moscow--British Study Says Threat Exists Particularly If This Happens Under Socialist Auspices"]

[Text] London--Can it in fact be an objective of Soviet policy to strive for a reunified and socialist Germany? British diplomat Roland Smith poses this question in his study "Soviet Policy Towards West Germany" and reaches the conclusion that such a Germany "would represent a more delicate and monentous threat than would ever be the case with a reunified capitalist Germany which was a member of NATO, for it might turn into a genuine challenge for the Soviet leadership of the Warsaw Pact."

Roland Smith, 42, has been with the Military Mission in Berlin since mid-1984. In his study, published by the respected London Institute for Strategic Studies, he disputes the notion that the Federal Republic is a military threat to the Soviet Union. He sees a threat (from Moscow's point of view) in other fields--the political and economic ones.

The Federal Republic, says the British diplomat, is the only West European country which, albeit by peaceful means, aims at a change of the status quo between West and East in Europe, and moreover, on the basis of the traditionally close economic contacts, which also lead to a comparison between the German development and its own, Moscow could perceive "a kind of German threat."

Roland Smith describes the maintenance of the status quo in Europe as a "minimum aim" of Soviet policy and says that its final aim remains the "expansion of Soviet influence over the entire European continent." The Kremlin was trying to realize this aim with various tactics, but one had to ask oneself whether this effort really could be the optimum aim of Soviet policy.

In this context Smith draws the "extreme scenario" of a reunified socialist Germany. Even a neutral Federal Republic, he says, would mean instability and unrest for the Kremlin rather than a strengthening of socialism and political advantage. The natural result of such a development would then be for the



"GDR" to ask itself whether it was not time to leave the Warsaw Pact and for the Soviet forces to withdraw.

A neutral Federal Republic would call into question the role of the Soviet forces in various East European states. Even greater would be the "threat" to Moscow by a reunified but socialist Germany. "Moscow continues to be the Jerusalem of communism. In a reunified Germany under socialist auspices, the danger would emanate from Berlin of its arrogating this role or at least sharing it. This would call into question the image that the Soviet Union has of itself, and its role in the world."

In the diplomat's opinion, the German question has not been solved. In saying so, he is thinking not so much of the German eastern border, for which he believes there is "no real basis" for a change, as of Berlin and the "legitimacy of the 'GDR.'" He states that "by its very existence West Berlin keeps reminding one that something remains unsolved."

The problem of legitimacy, Roland Smith says, is shared by the "GDR" with the other East European states, but in the case of the "GDR" the question of national integrity is added. In light of its general experience in East Europe, it was necessary for the Soviet Union "to consider the possibility that it might one day have trouble with the 'GDR' again. This could lead to the national question."

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POLITICAL

FINLAND

## STALINIST NEWSPAPER HITS NEW INSTANCES OF TILT TOWARDS WEST

### EFTA Membership One Example

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 19 Dec 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Finland and EFTA"]

[Text] Finland's accession to EFTA as a full member, which was brought about by the Government with right wing support, is another new and far-reaching step in strengthening Finland's ties to the West. For the first time Finland has joined a Western organization as a full member.

The Government and Foreign Trade Minister Jermu Laine tried to push the EFTA decision through as stealthily as possible. When the matter finally began to be talked about an attempt was made to pass the decision off as a mere formality.

In fact from the standpoint of trade policy this decision is closely linked to Finland's EEC policy. It is well known that relations between the EEC and EFTA are becoming closer at present. Last year the first joint ministerial council meeting of the organizations was held. It is noteworthy that the Foreign Trade Minister announced Finland's plans to become a full member just before leaving for negotiations with the EEC.

The decision is by no means simply a trade policy matter but also one of foreign policy. It is thus no coincidence that the deputies nearest the far right in the Diet lauded the Government for its "courage" when the EFTA accession was implemented.

The question is the direction of the measures. Within only about half a year we had Finland's ties to the Western Eureka project before the nature of the whole undertaking was even clear, the EFTA decision and Minister Laine's disparaging speeches about trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. At the same time Western capital imports into Finland have facilitated and correspondingly Finnish capital has been sent abroad.

All of this has several consequences. Tying Finland more firmly than previously to the Western economy, which is subject to depression and crises, makes Finland more vulnerable than before. It is also a question of the

direction of resources: if the main emphasis is placed on expanding Western trade, then Eastern trade, which has guaranteed employment and economic stability, will necessarily be neglected; signs of this can already be seen. A still greater dependence on the West will also narrow our internal democracy, as the authority for economic decision declines further than before.

It is clear that the Government has still more plans for tying Finland closer to the West in its back pocket. They should be put on ice and a start should be made on an open and broad discussion of the way in which the foundations of our foreign policy and trade policy are being changed and how these changes affect our security policy.

### 'Self-Finlandization' Charged

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 20 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Aleksandrovits "Self-Finlandizers"]

[Text] Three fresh examples of how the self-Finlandizers operate: the case of Radio City and Siitoin, the case of the Paasikivi diary and the Metzger case.

Radio City interviewed the neofascist Pekka Siitoin. The Ministry of Communications reprimanded it.

There were rumors of sensational disclosures in the Paasikivi diary even before the work appeared and afterwards. Kalevi Sorsa found it justified to warn about the misuse of the diary. Even before him TIEDONANTAJA had written about the same thing.

Otava was supposed to bring out the memoirs of Hans Metzger, who served in Helsinki as a Nazi German diplomat during the war, for the Christmas market. In it there were a number of long excerpts quoted from the aggressive anti-Soviet essays written by Urho Kekkonen under the name Pekka Peitsi during the war.

Urho Kekkonen's son Matti forbade the quotation of the essays on the basis of the copyright. Otava postponed the publication of Metzger's book and destroyed the edition taken from it.

Were the top officials in the Ministry of Communications, Kalevi Sorsa and Matti Kekkonen self-Finlandizers in these cases? In my opinion the self-Finlandizers are those who raised a groundless and disproportionate fuss about these cases.

Self-Finlandizers could have admitted that a fascist should not and according to the peace treaty may not be granted a platform in the information media. Instead of that they resorted to acting indignant on behalf of Pekka Siitoin's "freedom of speech."

The self-Finlandizers could have recognized that there is justification for taking the views expressed by Sorsa into account. Instead of that the spectacle, "We boys were just pulling old guardian Sorsa's leg" began.

They could have behaved in the same way in connection with the Metzger case. Or at least shown a calm sense of proportion.

Placing the rejection of Metzger's book on a par with nazi book burning does not show any sense of proportion, although it does convey a sick humor. Among others Heikki Brotherus in his memoirs calls Metzger a "hardened nazi."

Self-Finlandizers are characterized by weak self-assurance, dependence and subservience in relation to right wing opinion in the so-called free West. The self-Finlandizers are worrying all the time, "What are the people over there thinking about us?"

And before people in the "free West" know anything or react to anything that happens in Finland, the self-Finlandizers themselves begin to wail and raise a ruckus and tell the world: just look at how we are censored and how Finlandized we are!

In its zeal ILTALEHTI went so far as to fix Urho Kekkonen's personal history and way of thinking. "Pekka Peitsi's line in the war years was rigidly anti-Soviet. And what else could it have been? Finland was waging war against its Eastern neighbor. Kekkonen's line was in accordance with official foreign policy."

ILTALEHTI "forgets" that Kekkonen adjusted his position in the latter part of the war and that the starting point of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line was the renunciation of the "rigidly anti-Soviet" line and the way of thinking in accordance with which "it could not be otherwise."

What would U. K. Kekkonen say if he had his strength back? Boiling of parasites?

12893/9435  
CSO: 3617/55

POLITICAL

FRANCE

# SOFRES POLL SHOWS SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION INCREASE

Paris LE FIGARO in French 23 Dec 85 p 8

[Article by Charles Rebois]

[Text] Twenty-four days before the legislative elections, 58 percent of those polled by FIGARO-SOFRES have indicated their intention to vote for the opposition, with 38 percent for the Left, that is, an advantage of 20 points for the opposition. Such a short time before election day the spread continues to be important, even though over the past month it has narrowed a bit. The socialist are said to be noting a "quaking." Doubtless they are right if the word is to be understood in its etymological meaning of agitation. Reportedly, they are even surprised that the current disarray in the government apparatus has not produced greater effect.

With 49 percent of the vote commitments, the parliamentary opposition would still have an absolute majority of the seats. The Socialist Party from a purely symbolic standpoint could claim to be the number one party in France. But its gain of 4 points results in part from the fact that in November the radicals of the Left were represented under their own colors.

At each end of the political spectrum, the Communist Party and the National Front are firmly planted in their positions, the former with 10 percent, the latter with 9 percent.

Neither is benefitting here from the upsurge noted in the last cantonal elections. As for the marginal parties which are making a lot of noise without bringing themselves recognition, their chances appear to be increasingly slim. With the approach of the elections, the reflex movement of the meaningful vote to the major parties is already being translated into vote commitments.

It is difficult to judge the respective chances of the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF [French Democratic Union] because of the establishment of common slates in two-thirds of the departments. This unification strategy benefits the UDF. It can deprive the RPR of the satisfaction of outstripping the PS [Socialist Party] in number of votes. However, the distribution of the rest of the votes between the two majority bloc parties will assure them a gain in seats.



On the basis of the latest poll figures, the projection of seats in Metropolitan France would give 307 places to the parliamentary opposition compared to 214 for the Left (a simple majority is 278). Therefore, the RPR and the UDF will not have to call upon the National Front to govern, even if their safety margin has decreased. The more so because the Right-Left distinction has been blurred in the minds of the electorate ever since the communists became fierce opponents of the socialists and also since the latter have been attempting to take quick measures tinged with liberalism to solicit the maximum number of votes.

A detailed analysis of this poll's data indicates that, public opinion has not changed appreciably since September. A somewhat more marked disaffection toward the Left was manifested in November. We find in December the same figures as in September, almost to the percentage point. Deep inside themselves, an equal number of Frenchmen are wishing for RPR's and the UDF victory. As for the possibility of a victory by the Left, like Michel Rocard, most Frenchmen still do not believe it will happen (only 12 percent are predicting such a victory). This is in spite of the puffery of the socialist political bosses.

On the other hand, even though political change is generally acknowledged, in the minds of 46 percent of those polled this should not bring about the departure of Francois Mitterrand.

#### Unemployment: Manipulations

Will this political change be peaceful or fraught with conflict? The choice of the prime minister will be decisive in this regard. In the prognostications, Jacques Chirac and Jacques Chaban-Delmas are at the top of the list ahead of Francois Leotard. It goes without saying that the nature of cohabitation will depend upon the future chief of government, as will the composition of the next government, a government which 31 percent see composed of socialists, and members of the UDF and RPR.

But Francois Mitterrand has taken many risks by advancing to the forefront to defend the socialist program. Doubtless his pretext is a slight rise in the polls, however, he is forgetting that his popularity rating continues to be very low. More than half those polled still intend to take advantage of the legislative elections to demonstrate their dissatisfaction.

A dissatisfaction which is also directed against the government. The economic achievements of the latter are not taken into account. The French are more sensitive to the drop in their standard of living than to the price index, whose improvement results primarily from external factors. The same is true of the fight against unemployment, in whose results the government takes pride, but which are looked upon as the results of manipulation. TUCs and summer training programs are considered to be artifices. It has not escaped the French that in this way the socialists are creating a subproletariat in the youth sector.

This attitude of the electorate, which could pass as fatalism, is marked by great skepticism. Some 48 percent say that nothing can influence them from now until the month of March. Not even a drop in unemployment will change the vote of 27 percent of the persons polled. Only two concerns are gaining ground in the sensibilities of public opinion: insecurity and immigration. The events of the past few days can only increase this trend.

Two and a half months before the elections, the electorate is beginning to mobilize. We note growing interest in the elections (58 percent compared to 53 percent in September). This slow increase in awareness goes hand in hand with a decrease in the number of those who are undecided. Some 17 percent have not yet chosen sides. This floating electorate is up for grabs. In it reside the last hopes for the Left. The scope of political change will also depend upon the vote of the undecided. The RPR and even more so the UDF, would do well to keep this in mind when François Mitterrand and the socialists pull out all the stops in their campaign.

## I. - Les intentions 1 de vote

2 (Sur 100 suffrages exprimés)

3

4

		Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
5			
	- Listes du parti communiste .....	10	10
	- Listes du P.S.U. et de l'extrême gauche .....	2	1
	- Listes du parti socialiste et du M.R.G. ...	22	26
	- Listes autonomes du M.R.G. et listes divers gauche .....	2	1
	<b>TOTAL GAUCHE .....</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>38</b>
6	- Listes du mouvement écologiste .....	4	4
7	- Listes d'union U.D.F.-R.P.R. ....	18	21
	- Listes séparées U.D.F. ....	9	9
	- Listes séparées R.P.R. ....	16	13
	- Listes de divers opposition (comprenant le C.N.I.) ....	8	6
	- Listes du Front national .....	9	9
	<b>TOTAL DROITE .....</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>58</b>
		<b>100 %</b>	<b>100 %</b>

8 (N'ont pas exprimé d'intention de vote : 12 %)

Key on following page

[Key to chart on previous page]

1. I. VOTING INTENTIONS
2. (out of 100 preferences expressed)
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 Poll
4. December 1985
5. --Communist Party slates  
--PSU and Extreme Left slates  
--Autonomous MRG and miscellaneous Left slates  
TOTAL LEFT
6. Ecological Movement slates
7. --UDF-RPR unification slates  
--Separate UDF slates  
--Separate RPR slates  
--Miscellaneous opposition slates (including the CNI)  
--National Front Slates  
TOTAL RIGHT
8. (Did not express voting intention: 12%)

## 1 II. - Les souhaits

2 QUESTION. - Au fond de vous-même, qui souhaitez-vous voir l'emporter aux prochaines élections législatives ?

	3	4	5	6
	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
7				
- Le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F.	47	44	48	46
- La gauche.....	34	31	32	33
- Sans opinion	19	25	20	21
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. II. HOPES
2. QUESTION.-Deep down inside of you, who do you hope will win the upcoming legislative elections?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --RPR and UDF  
--The Left  
--No opinion

# III. - Pronostics

2. QUESTION. — A votre avis, qui a le plus de chances de l'emporter : le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F. ou la gauche ?

	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
7				
- Le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F.	62	60	62	60
- La gauche.....	13	13	13	12
- Sans opinion	25	27	25	28
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. III. PROGNOSTICATIONS
2. QUESTION.—In your opinion who has the best chance of winning:  
The RPR and UDF or the Left?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --RPR and UDF  
--The Left  
--No opinion

# 1 IV. - L'Assemblée de mars 1986

2 **QUESTION.** - Sur la base des intentions de vote et des règles du nouveau mode de scrutin (représentation départementale à la plus forte moyenne avec seuil de 5 %), la simulation des sièges en France métropolitaine (555 sièges attribués) donne les résultats suivants :

3	- Parti communiste .....	42
	- P.S.U. et extrême gauche .....	0
	- Parti socialiste et M.R.G. ....	172
	- M.R.G. autonome et divers gauches .....	0
	<b>TOTAL GAUCHE .....</b>	<b>214 sièges</b>
5	- Mouvement écologiste .....	2
6	- U.D.F. (listes d'union et listes séparées) .....	137
	- R.P.R. (listes d'union et listes séparées) .....	163
	- Divers opposition .....	7
	<b>TOTAL OPPOSITION PARLEMENTAIRE .....</b>	<b>307 sièges</b>
8	- Front national .....	32
	<b>TOTAL DROITE .....</b>	<b>339 sièges</b>

10 *Dans ce cas de figure, l'opposition parlementaire disposerait sur la France métropolitaine d'une majorité absolue de 29 sièges (le seuil de la majorité absolue se situant à 278) et d'une avance sur la gauche de 93 sièges.*

1. IV. THE MARCH 1986 ASSEMBLY
2. **QUESTION.**-On the basis of voting intentions and the new election method (departmental representation to the majority bloc with a margin [seuil] of 5 percent), the projection of seats in Metropolitan France (555 to be filled) produces the following results:
3. --Communist Party  
--PSU and Extreme Left  
--Socialist Party and MRG  
TOTAL LEFT
4. seats
5. --Ecological Movement
6. --UDF (unification and separate slates)  
--RPR (unification and separate slates)  
--Miscellaneous opposition  
TOTAL PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION
7. seats
8. National Front  
TOTAL RIGHT
9. seats
10. In these calculations, the parliamentary opposition would have an absolute majority of 29 seats in Metropolitan France (a simple majority is 278) and an advantage over the Left of 93 seats.



# <sup>1</sup>V. - Blâmer Mitterrand

<sup>2</sup>QUESTION. - Souhaitez-vous qu'aux prochaines élections législatives

	<sup>3</sup> Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	<sup>4</sup> Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	<sup>5</sup> Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	<sup>6</sup> Décembre 1985
<sup>7</sup> ... les électeurs manifestent leur soutien à l'égard de M. Mitterrand et du gouvernement.....	25	22	24	26
... ou les électeurs profitent de cette élection pour manifester leur mécontentement.....	54	53	54	53
- Sans opinion ..	21	25	22	21
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. V. BLAME MITTERRAND
2. QUESTION.-In the upcoming legislative elections would you like for...?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --the voters to show their support for Mitterrand and the government  
--or for the voters to take advantage of this election to show their dissatisfaction  
--No opinion

# 1 VI. - Le président n'a pas à démissionner

2 QUESTION. - En cas de victoire de l'opposition aux prochaines élections législatives, souhaitez-vous que... ?

		3	4	5
		...M. Mitterrand reste président de la République jusqu'à la fin de son mandat	...ou qu'il démissionne	Sans opinion
TOTAL : 100 %		46	37	17
SEXE 6				
- Homme	100 %	47	39	14
- Femme	100 %	46	35	19
AGE				
- 18 à 24 ans	100 %	44	41	15
- 25 à 34 ans	100 %	53	33	14
- 35 à 49 ans	100 %	47	35	18
- 50 à 64 ans	100 %	42	41	17
- 65 ans et plus	100 %	43	40	17
PROFESSION DU CHEF DE FAMILLE (nouvelle nomenclature P.C.S.)				
- Agriculteur	100 %	36	42	22
- Artisan, commerçant, chef d'entreprise	100 %	41	46	13
- Cadre, profession intellectuelle supérieure	100 %	45	44	11
- Profession intermédiaire et employé	100 %	52	32	16
dont : - Profession intermédiaire	100 %	54	34	12
- Employé	100 %	49	31	20
- Ouvrier	100 %	51	33	16
- Inactif, retraité	100 %	42	40	18
PRÉFÉRENCE PARTISANE				
- Parti communiste	100 %	66	9	25
- Parti socialiste	100 %	83	11	6
- U.D.F.	100 %	19	68	13
- R.P.R.	100 %	19	68	13
- Front national (*)	100 %	19	77	4

7 (\*) En raison de la faiblesse des effectifs, les résultats sont à interpréter avec prudence.

1. VI. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE TO RESIGN
2. QUESTION.-In the event of an opposition victory in the upcoming legislative elections, would you like for...?
3. ...Mitterrand to remain as president of the republic until the end of his term
4. ...or for him to resign
5. --No opinion
6. SEX
  - Men
  - Women

[key continued on following page]

#### AGE

- 18 to 24
- 25 to 34
- 35 to 49
- 50 to 64
- 65 and over

#### PROFESSION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

(new PCS nomenclature)

- Farmer
- Craftsman, merchant, company head
- Manager, higher intellectual profession
- Intermediate profession and employee, including:
  - Intermediate profession
  - Employee
- Worker
- Unemployed, retired

#### PARTY PREFERENCE

- Communist Party
- Socialist Party
- UDF
- RPR
- National Front (\*)

7. (\*) Because of the small number of persons polled, the results should be interpreted with discretion.

## <sup>1</sup>VII. - Les motivations

<sup>2</sup>QUESTION. - D'ici au mois de mars, qu'est-ce qui peut faire changer votre vote ?

	<sup>3</sup> Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	<sup>4</sup> Décembre 1985
<sup>5</sup>		
- Les problèmes de l'insécurité .....	11	14
- L'évolution du chômage .....	31	27
- Les problèmes des immigrés .....	9	13
- L'évolution de votre pouvoir d'achat .....	20	15
- La place de la France dans le monde .....	7	5
- Le maintien des acquis sociaux .....	13	13
- Une progression de la construction européenne .....	5	4
- La défense des libertés .....	16	14
- Rien du tout .....	40	48
- Sans opinion .....	5	5
	%	

[Key to chart on previous page]

1. VII. MOTIVATIONS
2. QUESTION.-From now until the month of March, what could change your vote?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. December 1985
5. --Problems of insecurity
  - Improved unemployment figures
  - Problems of immigrants
  - Improvement in your purchasing power
  - France's place in the world
  - Maintenance of social achievements
  - Progress in European construction
  - Defense of freedoms
  - Nothing
  - No opinion

## 1 VIII. - La détermination

2 QUESTION. - Tout compte fait, êtes-vous.

	3	4	5	6
	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel enquête Figaro- Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
7 ... sûr de voter pour une liste de gauche	30	27	26	29
... sûr de voter pour une liste d'opposi- tion .....	43	42	44	42
... ou hésitant entre la gauche et l'op- position .....	18	18	20	17
- Sans opinion	9	13	10	12
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. VIII. DETERMINATION
2. QUESTION.-Everything considered, are you...?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. ...certain of voting for a Leftist slate
  - ...certain of voting for an opposition slate
  - ...or vacillating between the Left and the opposition
  - No opinion

# <sup>1</sup> IX. – L'intérêt des élections

<sup>2</sup> QUESTION. – Vous personnellement, vous intéressez-vous aux élections <sup>3</sup> législatives <sup>4</sup> de mars <sup>5</sup> 1986 <sup>6</sup>.

	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres septembre 1985	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres octobre 1985	Rappel Enquête Figaro Sofres novembre 1985	Décembre 1985
<sup>7</sup> ... beaucoup .....	21 } 53	22 } 54	21 } 56	24 } 58
... assez .....	32 }	32 }	35 }	34 }
... peu .....	31 } 47	29 } 46	29 } 44	29 } 42
... ou pas du tout .....	16 }	17 }	15 }	13 }
	100 %	100 %	100 %	100 %

1. IX. INTEREST IN ELECTIONS
2. QUESTION.-Are you personally interested in the March 1986 legislative elections?
3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES September 1985 poll
4. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll
5. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES November 1985 poll
6. December 1985
7. --very much  
--somewhat  
--not much  
--or not at all



# 1 X. – Quel gouvernement ?

2 QUESTION. – Quel est le gouvernement que vous souhaitez voir former après les prochaines élections législatives ?

	3	4
	Rappel enquête Figaro/ Sofres octobre 1985	Décembre 1985
5		
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialiste et le parti communiste .....	10	11
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialiste seul .....	16	16
- Un gouvernement comprenant le parti socialistes, l'U.D.F. et le R.P.R. ....	30	31
- Un gouvernement comprenant le R.P.R. et l'U.D.F. ....	23	22
- Un gouvernement comprenant le R.P.R., l'U.D.F. et le Front national de J.-M. Le Pen .....	7	7
- Sans opinion .....	14	13
	100 %	100 %

1. X. WHAT KIND OF GOVERNMENT?

2. QUESTION.-What kind of government would you like to see formed after the upcoming legislative elections?

3. Results of FIGARO-SOFRES October 1985 poll

4. December 1985

5. --A government consisting of the Socialist and Communist Parties

--A government consisting of the Socialist Party only

--A government consisting of the Socialist Party, UDF, and RPR

--A government consisting of the RPR and UDF

--A government consisting of the RPR, UDF, and the National Front of J-M Le Pen

--No opinion

# 1 XI. – Premier ministre : Chirac ou Chaban-Delmas

2 QUESTION. – En cas de victoire de l'opposition, en mars 1986, sachant que M. Barre ne veut pas être premier ministre, quel serait selon vous, face à François Mitterrand, le meilleur premier ministre ? 3 4

	Jacques Chaban-Delmas	Jacques Chirac	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	François Léotard	Simone Vell	Une autre personnalité	Sans opinion
<b>TOTAL : 100 %</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>SEXE 5</b>							
– Homme ..... 100 %	22	18	8	15	9	12	16
– Femme ..... 100 %	14	17	10	15	11	7	23
<b>AGE</b>							
– 18 à 24 ans ..... 100 %	5	23	6	24	12	9	21
– 25 à 34 ans ..... 100 %	11	19	8	23	12	9	18
– 35 à 49 ans ..... 100 %	21	13	10	12	13	12	19
– 50 à 64 ans ..... 100 %	26	17	9	12	12	6	18
– 65 ans et plus ..... 100 %	23	19	10	6	9	9	24
<b>PROFESSION DU CHEF DE FAMILLE (nouvelle nomenclature P.C.S.)</b>							
– Agriculteur ..... 100 %	11	36	9	9	15	7	13
– Artisan, commerçant, chef d'entreprise ..... 100 %	15	22	15	19	12	3	14
– Cadre, profession intellectuelle supérieure ..... 100 %	23	17	5	15	20	9	11
– Profession intermédiaire et employé ..... 100 %	16	15	6	19	13	9	22
dont : – Profession intermédiaire ..... 100 %	17	15	7	17	13	11	20
– Employé ..... 100 %	14	14	6	22	13	7	24
– Ouvrier ..... 100 %	17	16	11	18	9	8	21
– Inactif, retraité ..... 100 %	22	17	10	10	10	11	20
<b>PRÉFÉRENCE PARTISANE</b>							
– Parti communiste ..... 100 %	12	3	5	14	9	20	37
– Parti socialiste ..... 100 %	28	7	5	14	17	12	17
– U.D.F. .... 100 %	16	19	20	18	8	4	15
– R.P.R. .... 100 %	13	43	7	17	9	3	8
– Front national (*) ..... 100 %	12	42	8	6	4	11	15

(\*) En raison de la faiblesse des effectifs, les résultats sont à interpréter avec prudence

1. XI. PRIME MINISTER: CHIRAC OR CHABAN-DELMAS
2. QUESTION.-In the event of an opposition victory in March 1986, knowing that Barre does not wish to be prime minister, who, in your opinion, would be the best prime minister vis-a-vis Mitterrand?
3. Another personality
4. No opinion
5. SEX
  - Men
  - Women

[Key continued from previous page]

AGE

- 18 to 24
- 25 to 34
- 35 to 49
- 50 to 64
- 65 and over

PROFESSION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD

(New PCS nomenclature)

- Farmer
- Craftsman, merchant, company head
- Manager, higher intellectual profession
- Intermediate profession and employee, including:
  - Intermediate profession
  - Employee
- Worker
- Unemployed, retired

PARTY PREFERENCE

- Communist Party
- Socialist Party
- UDF
- RPR
- National Front (\*)

6. Because of the small number of persons polled, the results should be interpreted with discretion.

SOFRES Technical Information

- Poll conducted for: LE FIGARO
- Date conducted: 5 to 11 December 1985
- National sample of 1,000 persons representative of the French population as a whole 18 years of age and older.
- Poll categories (sex, age, profession of head of household-PCS) and breakdown by region and party preference.

8143/9738

CSO: 3519/90

POLITICAL

FRANCE

#### MITTERRAND SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN DEBT CONFERENCE QUESTIONED

Paris LIBERATION in French 18 Oct 85 p 6

[Article by Dominique Nora: "Mitterrand, 'The African', Is Upsetting to the Rue de Rivoli"]

[Text] Surprise! The Treasury's leadership learned from the newspapers that Francois Mitterrand had agreed to the African request for an international conference on the African continent's debt. This eminently political position could prove expensive to France and would set a historical precedent in the dialogues between debtors and lenders.

Is it a period of euphoria before the election campaign? Or is it his desire to show his authority in his own hunting preserve? In any case, Francois Mitterrand, all smiles, is becoming more and more unpredictable on foreign policy. For instance, Mitterrand answered "yes," last Friday, to the African request for a conference on the African continent's debts. Was this a concession arrived at after mature deliberation or was it blundering? The Treasury's leadership, from top to bottom, has not hidden its surprise. As a matter of fact, during the past weeks, the Treasury's experts have been declaring publicly the possibility of "political slippage" in such a gathering. The banks and the French are in Africa up to their necks.

On Friday, 13 December, Francois Mitterrand closed the 12th Franco-African Summit Conference by holding a lively press conference. In answer to a question of the conference on debts, Mitterrand stated, "I have already given my consent to President Abdu Diouf...France has become the attorney for a project adapted to African indebtedness...therefore, I am answering you with a yes." Diouf, the President of Senegal, elected in July to the chairmanship of the UAO (United African Organization), has been trying since last summer to convince the international organizations and the governments of those countries to which money is owing, of the urgent need for such a conference (see the interview below). Indeed, we want to pay off our debts, the UAO declared in substance; however, our creditors must understand that we have a rope around our necks, that they must renew their loans and make arrangements for repayment.

## The Effect of a Bomb

Up to now, Paris has been supporting the African request for a special meeting of the UN General Assembly on Africa's economic problems (the external debt is included among them). All the government officials questioned, however, underscored the inopportuneness of a "special debt" show. Their argument is that the mechanics used by the creditor governments within the Paris club to spread out the payments, country by country, would be jeopardized. "Besides, the African debt will be the subject discussed specifically next April in the World Bank's Committee for Development," Treasury leadership frequently pointed out.

On Monday morning, the President's "yes," therefore, had the effect of a bomb within the stronghold of French financial orthodoxy. Had Francois Mitterrand really let one go? Yesterday morning, uncertainty still regained on the Rue de Rivoli. "The President need only check with the experts," a high official stated. "As far as I know, the French position has not changed," he added warily. At the Elysee Palace, on the other hand, it was formal. "It is written in black and white in the record of the press conference," dryly stated Jean Christophe Mitterrand, the President's son and deputy adviser for African affairs. The record, incidentally, was still not available yesterday evening. Most peculiar. Is this, however, a change in the French position? "Since the President said it, it is now the official position," so said Jean Christophe. "It is not the Treasury experts who make French policy. Besides which, Francois Mitterrand has already given his consent to President Diouf. That is not new." Oh? Then the Elysee Palace must have forgotten to speak to the responsible services in the ministries involved. Hence, their concern.

Besides, every day Mitterrand sets aside a surprise in foreign policy. As one of his aides said, "At the FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] we have to run down the record of the record of the meeting so as to adjust (downwards) the fanciful figures for French aid in foodstuffs announced by Mitterrand."

If Paris really support this idea of an ad hoc conference on the African debt, it could be expensive. "French national and private claims amount to 60 to 90 percent of the foreign debt of some black African countries." Outstanding French bank loans represent a quarter of the total of bank loans of the developed countries on the continent and one half of the franc area. It is the same for government claims. Now, more than one expert dares only hope that Africa will really repay the capital. "From one year to the next, we arrange it so that they will be able, at least, to pay the interest," one banker explained. "But even that is becoming very difficult." Overdue payments are looming and involve such institutions as the International Monetary Fund. Yesterday, during a symposium in Paris, the chairman of the African Bank for Development, Babacar N'Diaye, made it clear that "by the end of 1984, the African continent debt reached 158 billion dollars; it will have gone beyond 170 billion by the end of 1985." And the situation visibly gets worse, for the flow of new money is diminishing, the rate of loans is rising, deadlines are being shortened, and the share of national capital is diminishing in relation to commercial loans.... "The rate a debt increases



most often exceeds the rate of increase in national income, which to the south of the Sahara is negative," N'Diaye emphasized.

#### Some Commitments That Will Perhaps Be Diluted

We hear on every side that the situation is "alarming, disconcerting, worrisome." The World Bank is preparing its own report on the African debt. A working paper describes Africa's "perilous financial situation" and points up the "ineffectiveness" ways presently being used to deal with the problem. In spite of special efforts made by the World Bank and the IMF, "more comprehensive solutions on the longest terms possible are required," the paper states. There then follows possibilities for a "partial cancellation" of debts and for a "rephasing of more spread-out payments...."

In this context, it is not clear how France, creditor and number one friend of the continent, could participate in an ad hoc international conference without making some kind of gesture. Unless the United States and other leaders, believing such a conference sets a dangerous precedence for Latin America, are opposed to its being held. At the Treasury, preparations are undoubtedly being made to move in this direction, in order to dilute commitments made by "Mitterrand the African."

9766/13167

CSO: 3519/78

POLITICAL

GREECE

DETAILS, COMMENTS ON KYP REORGANIZATION BILL

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 10 Jan 86 p 24

/Text/ "A lot of hot air: the KYP /Central Intelligence Service/ that is today luckily 36 years old (....) cannot be saved by anything regardless of how many personnel changes are made (....). The only solution is to have it dismantled and to have something altogether new established (ranging from name to personnel, mentality, etc.) since we are unable to live without such a service....."

We have written and rewritten that the time has come for the dismantling of the KYP but Andreas insists (here too!) on half-measures!

Finally, what is happening with the KYP?

After a gestation of months during which many various things were heard (ranging from the fact that the government does not really want a KYP reorganization because... it is afraid to the fact that Alexakis is opposed), an amendment was scheduled to be tabled in the Chamber of Deputies last evening (in the classification and ratings bill) that is concerned with KYP matters. The amendment concerns a change in Law 1415/85 on the KYP; it has only one article; and it is signed by Andreas himself. It provides for the following three major changes:

1. From a State Intelligence Service, the KYP is being renamed National Intelligence Service (EYP). In the thinking behind the name change, Andreas had somewhere or other thought of us in the introductory expose!
2. The famous KYP organizational component that will see to the reorganization of the service (as AVRIANI wrote last Tuesday, it provides for the politicization of the service and the assignment of a civilian as director) will be called "Analytical Internal Organization of the KYP" and will constitute a secret decision by Andreas that will not be published in the GOVERNMENT GAZETTE.
3. Everything dealing with the KYP structure, positions, personnel, employee issues, etc. will be handled by presidential decrees for which Andreas will be responsible since the amendment provides for KYP being a public service "coming directly under the prime minister."

In this innocent looking amendment which, according to its drafters, has a "technical" aspect since it sets the methods by which the reorganization of the service will take place, there is a "sly" provision that personally give us the impression that the overall amendment was made for that purpose alone. What does it provide for?

That the personnel of the former KYP that have become surplus through the reorganization will be transferred to other public services and will be assigned to vacant positions or to temporary positions. The transfers will be made by joint decision of Andreas and the minister concerned.

The same provision also provides for the transfer of those who are judged by the service, i.e. the EYP, as "not serving its interests."

As anyone can understand, there is a "lot to be gained by certain persons" behind this regulation.

We will begin with the simplest: the personnel transferred from the former KYP will cut every tie with the service or, simply put, the state civil services will fill up with stool pigeons and, indeed, with rightists since they are the ones being transferred. (We cannot imagine any or even one of the approximately 200 PASOK followers who have been assigned to the KYP since 1981 being among those transferred).

The originators of the specific regulation maintain that from the moment when an employee of the former KYP leaves the service and is assigned to another civil service position he immediately ceases all contact with the service. But how can anyone be certain of this after all and everything that we have seen!

Reasonable doubts are also raised by the second part of the regulation, that is the one that refers to the transfer of an employee "because he does not serve the interests of the service."

However, who will determine who is not serving the interests of the service?

And how objectively will he appraise the employee's contributions?

Of course, there is the counter-argument that any specific action taken will occur in those instances where the employee of the former KYP and present EYP does not have the necessary qualifications to carry out his mission. And yet why is a specific action needed when there exists a previous regulation that provides for the transfer of employees who are described as "excess personnel?"

We have the impression that this is yet another opportunity to clean out the service of various "cliques" that the dictatorship and New Democracy had assembled. Now, how will "democratization" come about if the proportion of Greens and...others abstain, only God (and Andreas?) know....

However, we will learn much more from the discussions in the Chamber of Deputies.

#### The Alexakis Affair

....And right in the middle of the confusion the government struck: it replaced (at last) the notorious Giannis Alexakis from the most sensitive KYP Security Section!

The change occurred at the end of the year and Alexakis was left (how temporary?) with the Counterespionage Directorate.

This is the apparent view of things. There is, however, also a very pretty behind-the-scenes view that demonstrates that Alexakis is something akin to... Greece; "it never dies." What kind of plot was made for him to leave and ...to return tougher? Suddenly, on a nice day in December just before Christmas, he was called in by KYP Director Giorgos Politis who graciously informed him that the government had decided to give him a break and to leave him only the Counterespionage Directorate because it had realized that "the work there had slowed down."

Alexakis, like a good patriot, accepted the government decision with heavy heart but nevertheless he steeled himself and asked to contribute to the leadership's decision: he wanted to suggest who should replace him. He suggested Army Major Sotirios Liosis who, besides his various qualifications to assume Alexakis' position, was his subordinate!

The KYP leadership appreciated Alexakis' contribution very much and recognized Liosis as his successor in the KYP Security Section. The sequel is now being played out by KYP employees who are rubbing their eyes in awe: Alexakis, instead of sitting in the office of the counterespionage director, is spending his entire day at the office of the security director, i.e. Liosis' office, where he sees and receives people, etc.

Ah, Andreas, Andreas. And to say that you do not know firsthand what the KYP is doing and what Alexakis is doing? But you do know and know full well.....

5671

CSO: 3521/80

POLITICAL

GREECE

ABSENCE OF 'GAME RULES' IN NATIONAL LIFE DISCUSSED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 26-27 Jan 86 p 8

[Article by 'E': "Games..."]

[Excerpts] There is something that bothers many of our people, especially those who occupy high positions: why is it that when Greeks live and work in foreign lands, they are good and disciplined citizens, while they are so--let us say--difficult when they live in their own country?

This phenomenon has become more pronounced in recent decades; the Greeks who have left their country to live abroad are progressing in all their professions, they are excelling in the sciences, in politics, in trade, they are amassing respectable fortunes and are almost always model citizens.

When conversely, Greeks in Greece are showing worrisome signs of indifference, inaction and even anarchy.

The subject is difficult. The explanation easy.

Even if it does not look easy at first glance. However, it is founded on reality, a reality that prevents Greeks living in Greece from being good citizens; there are no rules for them to follow, in order to discover what a "good citizen" is.

All games, in order to be played right, need stable and immutable rules that the players must learn. They must know what the right way is, so that they can differentiate it from the wrong one, they must know what is permissible, what is forbidden, what is punishable--whoever the culprit happens to be--who is the winner and who the loser, what is rewarded, and the reasons for all that.

Here, in our country, the game of the citizen is played blindly.

In our country, people believe that the dumb ones are caught and the clever ones can get away. As if they did not know, the economic ministers present at regular intervals a lot of romantic trash about self-respect and about imaginary conscientious taxpayers. Of course, these would exist, if only there were conscientiousness and self-respect on the part of the state.



In a report from Paris, Rikhardos Someritis, an internationally known reporter, mentioned that only in 1985, 1,200 million dollars left Greece illegally.

Our ministers of course read the item, and reacted to it in a purely...Greek way! There was no comment, no denial, no expression of concern, of surprise, of doubt.

"Come on, George, let's send the little money we have abroad, to Switzerland! What should we do with it here?"

"But it is forbidden! Suppose we get caught?"

"On, come on! Everybody is doing it. How do you think all these millions left the country? And did you notice anyone getting caught and punished? They are not even prosecuting them!..."

When there will be a government, some time in the future, that will play a clear game with the citizens, then it will be the citizen's turn to do so...

/9599

CSO: 3521/85

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

CAVACO SILVA APPROVAL--A poll commissioned by the government showed that Prime Minister Cavaco Silva is considered honest by 57.3 percent of the respondents; intelligent by 69.2 percent; competent and pleasant by 54.3 percent; 54.2 percent affirm that he is stable and decisive, 52.1 percent think that he can conduct a dialogue very ably, and 55 percent believe that he possesses personal prestige. The poll, whose partial results were obtained yesterday by the NOTICIAS DE PORTUGAL news agency, also reveals that the majority of the respondents believe that this government will last 4 years. The poll was conducted by the NORMA last week on the continent, with 3,000 persons interviewed in localities with more than 10 households. [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 Jan 86 p 2] /9599

CSO: 3542/63

MILITARY

DENMARK

PEACE RESEARCHER COMMENTS ON 'DEFENSIVE' MILITARY SCHEME

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 p 13

[Op Ed Article by Bjorn Moller of the Center for Peace and Conflict Research:  
"On a Defensive Defense"]

[Text] In BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 1 December, Defense Minister Hans Engell reacted to my contribution to the paper on 26 November wherein I tried to give a concise overview of the idea of a defensive defense. Since I have been away, the necessary response is somewhat late.

The minister has many criticisms against defensive defense. One can quite quickly be repudiated: that there are no concrete proposals from the military experts. This holds true for Denmark, as long as this remains the case, but certainly not for the Federal Republic. At random, for example, could be named the following officers, all of whom have worked out concrete models: Norbert Hannig, Eckhardt Afheldt, and Wilhelm Nolte. In other countries as well "the military experts" have taken such thoughts seriously and used their professional expertise to solidify these thoughts: the Frenchman Guy Brossollet is an example, the Austrian general E. Spannocchi is another. Moreover, Spannocchi's thoughts have appeared so attractive to the Austrian defense ministry that they have been used as the basis for the new national defense plan that was adopted in the spring of 1985. The author of this article is currently working on a book on the various models--of civil as well as military origin--a preliminary form of which in the shape of a summary overview can be obtained from the Center for Peace and Conflict Research (free). With it Engell and others can assure themselves that there are many variants.

And now to the concrete objections.

First, Engell. does not believe that Western Europe has sufficient depth to be able to carry out the kind of defense based on attrition that I suggested. Clearly the minister has a point here especially since the West German population centers lie so alarmingly close to the border. Some models, therefore, operate with a forward "belt" along the border consisting either of infantry or of "fire," that is, of artillery units positioned somewhat less far forward. When this is combined with the above mentioned "space inclusive" net defense, then supposedly the advantages to both the present defense and to

a pure net defense are gained: There is not "free entrance" to territory, but on the other hand neither is there "open house" as soon as the line of defense is broken through--as (almost) is the case with the structure now in place.

Now this whole problem must also be seen in context with the risk itself of an attack--which ought to be able to be lessened with the suggested reform: Either the Russians will attack in order to control territory--which the reform will make much more difficult since the defense now covers the entire territory. Or they will attack in order to put something out of play which they--rightly or wrongly--see as threatening. The latter motive is certainly the most likely--and it disappears completely when the defense is made defensive. There are no more military targets left that they could want to neutralize--and therefore no motive for a preemptive strike. Crisis stability should therefore be increased--supposedly the most pressing task for defense policy in the coming years.

And so to Engell's comments on NATO: both that today's strategy is already defensive and that a defensive alteration cannot be combined with the strategy. Already in this juxtaposition there is a selfcontradiction: Of course NATO's intentions are defensive. (At least I have no doubts as regards Engell himself.) And the same goes in all probability for the Warsaw pact's intentions! But both alliances believe that these /defensive/ [in italics] intentions can best be realized by keeping the potential for /offensive/ [in italics] military operations. And from this arises the mutual fear and mistrust, the arms race, the danger that crises "run away with us," and so forth. The best way to show one's defensive intentions is precisely to be satisfied with defensive forces (capabilities). Which herewith should be proposed to the two alliances who both transgress against this principle.

But would an alteration of the Danish defenses be able to be combined with the rest of the alliance, especially West Germany with whom we share the united command for the BALTAP area? Yes. First, because our neighbor to the south is also beginning to think along the same lines. If the SDP should come to power again--that is, in 1987 or 1991--then they will begin to realize these thoughts. And then suddenly it could be we who must pull out of the united command. Second, all things considered, there are broader limits to what NATO membership demands of its members than our decisionmakers usually are told to impute. NATO is no "monopolistic" block. Just to name a couple of examples that illustrate the breadth of the spectrum: Iceland has no military whatsoever; France and Spain do not take part in the integrated military cooperation; Greece wants to do away with the American bases, etc. Naturally, we should not copy their example slavishly, because such steps would naturally have consequences, among other things. But also the Nordic countries have previously shown (with reservations about bases and nuclear weapons in 1949 and 1957) that there actually are possibilities for "exceptional cases." One exception could be to introduce a limited Danish rearmament in the hopes of hereby starting a similar process in the other NATO countries.

With this, we are brought to the last point I would like to raise. It is also possible to start developments "on the other side." Hans Engell is surely too pessimistic when he judges the Soviet Union as totally static and inflexible. Certainly they have an enormous "materiel inheritance" to drag along in the

form of tanks and so forth, many of which, by the way, notably date all the way back to the "Great Patriotic War--as they are afflicted with a large group of "Methuselahs," i.e. veterans from the Second World War, who naturally are not the best exponents for a new way of thinking. But there actually are changes occurring in the general staff--and the Soviet Union has economic problems that require fundamental reflections about expensive weapons systems. Moreover, they are almost as sensitive about their international reputation as we are.

All of these factors should make it possible to exercise influence. Not with rhetoric or good advice. But by procuring weapons that invite "copying" on their side. What NATO is currently setting the stage for can have fatal consequences: Increased weight on "penetrating attacks," etc, with high technology weapons systems--which with the inevitability of a natural law will get WAPA to acquire counterparts to them. After which we will be faced with a threat of a deep attack against Jutland, Copenhagen, etc, without the enemy needing to overstep the magic nuclear threshold and thereby call down "hellfire" on themselves.

On the other hand, if NATO altered the strategy in an unequivocally defensive direction, WAPA could be faced with the choice of keeping in step with less offensive forces and doctrines--or of revealing itself as a power with aggressive intentions. Naturally such a readjustment could not happen with one stroke--and it would not necessarily be "symmetrical" with our own steps. But presumably, it would nevertheless contribute to a more stable situation in Europe.

12819

CSO: 3613/44



MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

NAVY ORDERS DOMESTIC ELECTRONICS--Terma Elektronik of Aarhus has received an order for 125 million kroner from the Navy's materiel command. Command, control and communications systems will be delivered for the Navy's new ships of the type Standard Flex 300. The order will be executed in cooperation with Philips Elektronikindustrier of Sweden, Plessey Displays Ltd of England, and with a number of Danish electronics manufacturers as subcontractors, namely, NEA-Lindberg, Disa Elektronik, Standard Electric Kirk, and Jorgen Andersen Ingeniorfirma. [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Dec 85 Sect III p 2] 12819

CSO: 3613/44

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## NATO'S 'DEFIANT SAXONS' COMBINED ARMS EXERCISE REVIEWED

### Close Inter-Allied Cooperation

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 12 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Cold Fire Over Defiant Saxons/Allied Air and Ground Forces in Common Exercises in North Germany"; first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Bonn--This year's army exercise "Defiant Saxons" begins today. The maneuvers were planned and prepared by I Corps; they are being executed under leadership of the commanding general, Lieutenant General Gerhard Wachter. The exercise, which is to last until 1 September and in which 60,000 German, American, British and Dutch soldiers are taking part, stretches over a large part of Lower Saxony as well as over smaller areas of Sleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia. "Defiant Saxons" is a component part of the NATO exercise series AUTUMN FORGE and is closely linked to "Cold Fire," the NATO air-forces exercise which is taking place from 9 to 20 September over southwestern Sleswig-Holstein, northeastern Lower Saxony, and the Siegerland and Sauerland.

Allied air forces are thus providing close air support for the German I Corps and the Belgian 16th Division in the course of "Defiant Saxons" and of the Belgian "Clever Centurion" maneuvers.

"Cold Fire" serves to improve cooperation between allied air and ground forces as well as to further the coordination of sorties by participating American, Belgian, Dutch and German air units.

Among the announced goals of this year's "Defiant Saxons" army exercise, besides the close cooperation of the army units with allied air forces, is the exercising of cooperation between regular and reserve units, between ground forces of the German and allied armies, as well as (and this especially in planning and preparation of the maneuvers) between armed forces and civil authorities.

Special tasks fall to the Territorial Army, as well, which is sending 9,000 soldiers, predominantly reservists, into action under the direction of Defense Area II, using 200 tracked vehicles and 2,200 wheeled vehicles.

Altogether 3,300 tracked vehicles, 18,000 wheeled vehicles and 250 helicopters are to be deployed in the course of the large-scale maneuvers. If weather permits, the participating air forces will fly some 150 sorties a day over the battlefield. As usual with military maneuvers, the exercise antagonists Blue and Red stand opposed this time as well. On the Blue side, the German 1st Armored Division, with the 1st Armored Infantry Brigade and the 2d Armored Brigade, the British 4th Armored Brigade, and - attached only at a later point in time - the 27th Airborne Brigade, together with the 52d Home Defense Brigade, will try to hold "shoulder to shoulder" against the Red forces' attack. To the latter belong the German 3d Armored Division, with the 8th Armored Brigade and the 9th Armored Training Brigade, the United States 3d Brigade, and the Dutch 43rd Armored Battalion. In the course of the exercise, the German 17th Armored reinforce the ranks of the "Reds." The 7th Armored Division and the 11th Armored Infantry Division are serving in control and umpire capacities.

By the day after tomorrow the participating units will have closed into their starting positions. On the weekend Red and Blue will prepare for battle before the "hot phase" of the exercise begins this coming Monday.

Although the exercise players have relatively great leeway in their decisions and measures, and thus the course of the maneuvers cannot be predicted in every detail, the action will not deviate from the proven pattern of past exercises: Red attacks, Blue holds up the attack, defends, and finally goes over to a counterattack. Herewith, some spectacular engagements will come about - place and time cannot of course as yet be predicted: a night jump by a parachute battalion, an airborne attack by an airborne brigade, passage of various bodies of water by several large formations.

Army maneuvers of this order of magnitude are simultaneously training exercises for leadership and troops and also a demonstration for civilian and military visitors of the German army's capabilities. In this regard, individual specially important aspects of the exercise will be presented as examples, on a smaller scale and compressed in time. This year the army's air and water mobility, the operation of a major dressing station, the airborne supply of mass-consumption items, combined-arms action of an armored infantry brigade with live ammunition, the army's night-fighting capabilities, and a defensive action by a motorized infantry battalion of the home-defense force will be demonstrated on exercise grounds.

#### Lively Warsaw Pact Interest

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 Sep 85 p 11

[Article by Hans Schueler: "Secrecy Not Desired/Before the Eyes of Soviet Observers, the Bundeswehr Shows What It Has Learned"]

[Text] Major General Konstantin Cheryomukhin was, at least during the first half-week, the star of the maneuvers. Wherever he went, the cameramen's shutters snapped continuously, the TV people's cameras whirled, dozens of

journalists pressed around him. The Soviet Union had, for the first time in 3 years, again sent its military attache from the Bonn embassy to the maneuver grounds in Lower Saxony for the large-scale fall maneuvers of the Bundeswehr and allied units from Great Britain, the Netherlands and the United States.

The red general enjoyed the attention, and most certainly also the extraordinary tact of the organizers: they had indeed, as in Kaiser Wilhelm's time, attached the color red to the attackers, and blue to the defenders. But the evil "Redland" from which the attack proceeded lay not in the east, but rather north of an exercise national boundary running from Bremerhaven to Luenenburg, and belonged to an imaginary "North Pact," which had been seeking conflict with "Blueland," belonging to the "West Pact," since the beginning of 1985, and had now started its attack from its own large-scale maneuvers. The "East Pact," not imaginary, had - according to the Bundeswehr's further maneuver assumptions - "continuously stressed its neutrality in this conflict and had offered itself as mediator."

Nothing came of the mediation. The Reds, in the form of the 17th Armored Infantry Brigade from Hamburg, crossed the Elbe with ferries near Wedel and, elsewhere as well, pushed to the south on a broad front. Two days later they had already reached the area west of the Weser near Minden, which in turn gave the Blue engineers an opportunity to give a sample of their abilities before the Soviet general and 26 other observers from members of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (KSZE): at a permanent Bundeswehr water-exercise grounds on a Weser bend free of shipping, they demonstrated a counterattack across water with immediate creation of a bridgehead on the further bank.

This undertaking, presented in pouring rain, must have impressed the Russian, at least with regard to the troops' technical capabilities. First a parachute reconnaissance patrol, landing with guidable chutes, reconnoitered the terrain. Night was assumed for this. At once, CH53 helicopters of the army air command, at radar-proof minimum altitudes - 3 to at most 5 meters above the ground - flew further airborne troops to the further bank to cover an engineer reconnaissance unit that was crossing with amphibious armored carriers and began at once to detect and break up minefields laid by the enemy. Meanwhile divers were searching the Weser bottom for a ford over which battle tanks could pass the river by fording. Two "Leopards" demonstrated the passage at top speed - with interiors sealed and diving tubes in place on the turrets. The preparations for turning the tanks into submersible vehicles lasted only minutes. And the building of a footbridge composed of floats over the river - which is some 80 meters wide at the crossing point - could also be measured in a few minutes: the first infantrymen arrived on the enemy shore on their own dry feet. Throwing a heavy combat bridge across with the help of amphibious bridging equipment - which is thus also mobile on land - concluded the demonstration. This bridge will even bear heavy equipment transporters loaded with tanks - total weight, 100 tons.

During the bridgehead exercises, and later as well, barges were sighted on the Mittelland Canal near Minden, which were said to be Soviet spy ships which were listening in on the "Defiant Saxons" exercise and the continuous radio traffic it entailed. There was also talk of moving vans from the German Democratic Republic which turned up in the middle of the exercise area and stopped there with simulated problems. The drivers were said to have "taken as many pictures as they could" from under the loading platforms. The CDU defense expert Willy Wimmer, also an observer of the water-crossing exercise, got very excited about this and about the ships: this procedure of the Warsaw Pact, he felt, was a "monstrous provocation;" the Soviet ships should be towed out of lower Saxon waters at once. This was rather embarrassing for the security officers of the "military counter-intelligence service." They are very happy to see the east bloc's interest in large-scale maneuvers on West German soil, not only through official military observers, but also through hidden scouts: "Just let them see and hear what the Bundeswehr can do. It's part of deterrence."

In fact, real secrets can hardly be discovered by a potential adversary during an exercise. He sees and hears essentially only what he is definitely supposed to note for a realistic estimate of the combat effectiveness of the Bundeswehr and its allies. What thoughts can have gone through Major General Cheryomukhin's head as he observed the splendid cooperation of the American 3d Armored Brigade from Garlstadt near Bremen with the German 32d Brigade? The Americans had their "adoptive" teams detailed with the Germans down to the battalion and company level; they insisted on German umpires for judging their maneuver performance, and at times even went hand-to-hand in noble competition with their Anglo-Saxon cousins of the British 5th Armored Brigade, so that parts of the units had to be withdrawn from combat. Does it go so well in the east bloc maneuvers between the Red Army and its Polish comrades-in-arms?

Three innovations in planning and execution gave this year's fall maneuvers of the Bundeswehr and its allies a special character: the exercise ran essentially "free." All commanders down to the company level could make their own decisions within the given overall framework, could adjust to the changing combat situations, and thus themselves largely determine the outcome of the maneuvers. In fact, the Red attackers, by clever use of terrain and massing of forces in unexpected places, won more ground in the course of the first 4 days of battle than had actually been planned for them.

Reservists of the Territorial Army had a very prominent share in this - and this is the second special aspect of these maneuvers. Among the total of 60,000 soldiers who were in action in the exercise - with 3,300 tracked vehicles, 18,000 wheeled vehicles and 250 helicopters - there were 12,000 reservists, who were also led by reserve officers down to the battalion-commander level. Many of these soldiers had not taken part in any exercises for years and had to be instructed in the use of new equipment in a short time. They nonetheless handled their task with dash, according to the unanimous opinion of the exercise leadership.



Protection of the environment was a third emphasis: landscape-protection areas, orchards and seed-corn patches remained untouched by the maneuvers; camouflage material was carried along, so that trees and bushes also remained unclipped. Each soldier carried a pocket-sized card with 10 rules for the avoidance of accidents and damage. Key paragraph: "You are training in an area whose population will treat you in a friendly and open way. Do not betray the confidence placed in you by inconsiderate behaviour." The troops apparently took this to heart. It is already certain that maneuver damages are under the estimated amount of 5 and a half million marks.

#### Paratroops in Antitank Role

Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 21 Sep 85 p 10

[Article by Kurt Kister: "The Great Search/Despite Planning and Organization, Improvisation Plays a Decisive Role in the Army Exercises"]

[Text] Kettenburg, 20 Sep--The hamlet of Neu-Wehnsen has hitherto played no role in either the civil or the military life of Staff Sergeant Kurt Schiller. The little road from Nindorf to Kettenburg was just as meaningless for the paratroop sergeant. With the sudden appearance of a tank on that very Lower Saxon country road at the edge of Neu-Wehnsen, however, these houses and these roads move into the center of his attention, at least for half a minute. The staff sergeant tells Private First Class Micelli, who has a Milan tank-defense rocket, "Micelli, there's another one coming out of Neu-Wehnsen - he's got to go!" The private thereupon aims at the tank, some 1 and a half kilometers away, and fires off an illuminating round simulating the Milan rocket. Staff Sergeant Schiller transmits the engagement with the tank to the rear by radio and comments, "That was the sixth."

Major Heinz Georg Kerrl, sitting at the telephone 8 kilometers away in the clubhouse in Nordkampen, draws a conclusion from the repeated he's-got-to-go's; "The 272d Parachute Battalion is still holding against the attacking 81st Armored Battalion." Thus Kerrl reports the results of the Neu-Wehnsen action a little later to his commanding officer. Since the tip of the red arrow containing the number 81 on the map leaning on a big board on the wall is already touching the blue dotted line beneath which the number 272 can be read, not even the situation map needs changing. All the same, the six destroyed tanks contribute to the fact that the red arrows extend no further than they already do.

These red or blue arrows, lines and circles on the situation map, embodied by tanks and soldiers, were last week determining the lives of around 60,000 soldiers and a goodly number of civilians in the area of Minden, Soltau and Bremervoerde in the Lower Saxon farm country. As every year in September, the Bundeswehr and certain allied units had taken up their positions for the large-scale army maneuvers. The I Corps had taken "Defiant Saxons" into its head for a designation, and, for a motto "Wat mutt, dat mutt" (or, in standard speech: "What must be, must be").

## The Role of the Umpires

Such maneuvers look simple. There's a Red side that always attacks and a Blue side that always defends. The whole thing serves, at least according to the federal Defense Minister at a so-called field press conference in Suedkampen, first to keep the troops in training, but also to show, on the other hand, that NATO is strong enough to ward off an attack. That's why Blue has to stop Red's attack sometime in the middle of the single week of exercise war, and then go over to the offense itself.

Because, however, this is not quite so simple in reality and with several tens of thousands of vehicles, soldiers and aircraft as it is on the map, there is yet a third side, which is supposed to be neutral: the umpires, who, uniformed and with white armbands, also populate the battlefields by the thousands. An umpire unit is attached to every exercise unit (Red or Blue), and its members must ensure that Red and Blue behave as realistically as possible. The umpires must in addition inject into the exercise everything that happens in war but, for good reasons, not in maneuvers: for example, the effect of artillery fire, the determination of losses, the decision as to who was hit by whom on which side and how, and more of the same sort. This not only sounds complicated, it is - so that the average battlefield tourist can soon realize why Carl von Clausewitz was of the opinion that everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult.

Major Peter Haupt of the umpires support office - the length [in German] of the title indicates the importance of the establishment - explains the umpires' activities with an example. "Let's say, a Red artillery unit fires at a Blue battalion," begins the Major, "then first, the umpire with the Red artillery reports to his staff umpire that there has been firing." This information then arrives at the umpire support office, where it is again reported back and forth internally. In the course of this process it is ascertained by map coordinates "where the shells actually landed." This in turn goes from the support office to the staff umpire with the Blue battalion under fire [untranslatable word play here affects only tone]. The staff umpire passes this on to the company-level umpires. They read in their manuals that a particular kind of shell in a particular terrain produces this or that percentage of losses among troops dug in a particular way. No - Major Haupt dispels our doubts - this by no means takes as long as it sounds.

### Simply "Shooting" at Night

However this may be: artillery fire simply announced by an umpire can be explained only with extraordinary difficulty to the soldiers, Red or Blue. But naturally this is not the only artificiality they find themselves confronted with in such a mise en scène. A Red armored unit, for example, that adroitly tagged along behind withdrawing Blue Troops, slipped in amongst the 27th Airborne, a major formation to which the tank-annihilating Staff Sergeant Schiller is also assigned as a small cog. If the responsible umpires had let the Reds drive on unhindered, the entire Brigade might possibly have

started to give way, which would have somewhat confused the whole exercise, at least on this wing. Thus the infiltrating unit was thereupon "neutralized," that is, stopped. Particularly to the advancing troops. something like this is impossible to explain. Thus the umpire Lieutenant Colonel Frank Gerber had to convince a specially dashing shock-troop leader, who was impressed neither by assumed minefields nor by the Blues' firing, almost hand-to-hand that the reconnaissance patrol had to turn back at the crossroads.

Indeed, it is at times hard to tell who is actually friend or foe, and not just for the umpires. Even by day the red recognition crosses on the attacking vehicles fade in the distance - at night, identification is practically impossible. "Since no one wants to let the enemy break through in his sector," says Lieutenant Colonel Hartmuth Digutsch, who is assigned as umpire to the 271st Paratroop Battalion, "at night anything that moves is fired at." Here the "Red or Blue" question just has no meaning, since many of the citizen soldiers know nothing of the overall situation anyway. "Information on the situation of one's own unit is spotty among the men," is the word on this at the commander's briefing for the staff of the 25th Airborne Brigade, that is umpiring the 27th Airborne Brigade.

For the paratroopers of Captain Hans Monauni's 2d Company, to which Staff Sergeant Schiller's platoon belongs, the large-scale maneuvers just didn't really turn out to be such a tremendous experience: after the battalion had waited two and a half days far behind the exercise front in the so-called assembly area, came the order on the third night for deployment by helicopter. The troopers were helicoptered through the night for half an hour, to be landed on a harvested field in pitch-black night. The company assembled in the nearby wood, sent out alert sentries, and began construction of a position. For a further 24 hours little happened - if you call digging foxholes, sending patrols forward, and having very little time to sleep, "little." Only on the next-to-last day of the exercise did the "enemy" show up before the paratroopers' position, something the troopers had actually been waiting for since the beginning of the grand maneuvers. The actual flight, however, lasted no longer than 4 hours.

The movement activity of the troop units varies a great deal, of course, in such maneuvers. The days during which the paratroopers of the Monauni company were waiting in foxholes or barns, were spent in their vehicles by their comrades in the armored units. They covered very considerable distances, as the usual maneuver damages prove. Even with the armored infantry and the battle tanks, however, contact with the exercise enemy was restricted as a rule to half or three quarters of an hour. "In large-scale maneuvers, soldiers are challenged not so much by continuous battle as by all that is needed for preparing oneself to understand the battle," said Colonel Godehard Schell, Commanding Officer of the 25th Airborne Brigade.

#### Longing for a Shower

In a densely populated and in itself very peaceful country like Lower Saxony, it really isn't so much the orders that come too late, the breakthroughs, or the insufficient information on the situation that occupies the many

ordinary soldiers. Rather it is the so-called little things in life: while the colonel is going crazy trying to interpret this or that piece of guidance, the private is looking with at least as much intensity for a telephone booth to give the girlfriend at home a quick call. Since telephone booths are rare in the lower Saxon countryside, whilst puzzling guidance is a familiar occurrence in large-scale maneuvers, both commander and private are under considerable pressure in these circumstances.

For a person accustomed to civilization, it is not by any means so easy to sit around the command post till unchristian hours of the night for several days, then sleep a couple of hours on the floor of a gymnasium and thereupon share the only toilet and washbowl with a good 80 clearly smellable fellow men. But - and here we rely again on the defense Minister at the field press conference - a simulated-battle exercise simply demands personal sacrifices from all. A sentence whose degree of truth cannot be doubted, by the way, even when we see Manfred Woerner sitting before us in suit and fresh shirt, and are ourselves just then reflecting on when and where we would at least get to see a shower.

In fact, the search for just about everything claims an amazingly great share of all the soldiers' time in such an exercise. The Blues are looking for the Reds and vice versa, the great heaps of invading guests - the European Security and Cooperation Conference observers, journalists, retired and active-duty generals - are looking for the front and the troop movements, the major is looking for a driver, who in turn has been looking for (and has found) a little sleep in some corner or other. At least as rare as telephone booths and open grocery stores are items of daily military consumption: vehicles, that day's head-covering of the day, maps. Volker von Paer, Lieutenant Colonel and umpire, has a way of bringing this last lack out graphically: "Up there a reconnaissance patrol is stumbling around while its leader is orienting himself on an Aral map from the gas station": this isn't exactly according to regs, of course, but it does at least give evidence of a talent for improvisation.

Without a willingness to improvise, as any observer can readily recognize, the whole maneuver activity would collapse relatively quickly. Precisely the umpires must on occasion show themselves very inventive, in order to keep the exercise war more or less underway. The extent of this improvisation contributes to the increasing prominence of planning and organization (but also of what is only afterward represented as such) in maneuvers of this size. The military leaders, which means primarily the staff officers, are burdened almost to capacity with the production of an immense flood of paper. This indeed has the effect that majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels manage to work up to an astounding degree of bureaucratic routine in leading the peacetime exercise war, whilst training that really simulates combat ends up in the background in such army maneuvers.

For the civilian, in turn, this development also has something reassuring: since a considerable mass of organizational and paperwork confusion is absorbing the working capacity of military leadership, not only in NATO but



also in the Warsaw Pact, probably in the long run there will be no time left for making war. Thus what can in fact be learned from the "Defiant Saxon" [sic] has something to do with the strengthening of reciprocal self-limitation: "Imagine there was a war, and it had to be organized...."

#### Heavy Territorial Participation

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 9 Sep 85 p 2

[Unattributed report: "For the Territorials, Too, a Tough Fitness Test - 9,000 'Home Defenders' Also Take Part in 'Defiant Saxons' Exercise - Reservists Challenged": first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Hannover-As in years past, so also in this year's army exercise, the Territorial Army is participating with a large force. Under the leadership of Defense Area command II, in whose territory the total of 60,000 soldiers is to take on "Defiant Saxons," around 9,000 "Home Defenders," with 2,200 wheeled and 200 tracked vehicles, will for a week in mid-September also be subjected to a tough military fitness test.

The individual missions and exercise goals of the Territorial Army result again this time from its mission in the overall defense framework: the Territorial Army ensures the operational freedom of the NATO forces in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Concretely, the Home Defense Force protects areas and important points, secures rear areas and important traffic and supply installations against airborne and frontal attacks, and is also deployed to strengthen the field army in the forward defense area.

Besides the 52nd Home Defense Brigade, whose 524th Armored Battalion will be fully activated for the first time, from commanding officer to gunner and for the duration of the exercise, the 22nd and 25th Defense Commands, with 3 home-defense companies, the 800th Engineer Command, the 822nd Motorized Infantry Battalion, security platoons, medical troops, and an ABC defense company, Defense Area Command II is deploying the 720th Military Police Battalion, with reinforcements from Defense Area Command III and the Schleswig-Holstein Territorial Command. A motorized infantry company of the 53rd Home Defense Brigade, the 800th Engineer Headquarters and Service Battalion and, with the military police, a topographic battery are acting as "troops in executive service," that is, sometimes on the "Red" side, sometimes on the "Blue." All the deployed formations and units of the Territorial Army have a distinguishing characteristic: they consist in considerable proportions (at times up to 98 percent) of reservists.

Besides securing the assembly of the participating forces and the cooperation of two Territorial Commands (Northern Territorial Command and the Schleswig-Holstein Territorial Command), "Defiant Saxons" has the following exercise emphases for the Territorial Army: crossing of the lower Elbe by a brigade with military and civilian ferries; deployment of the 52nd Home Defense Brigade against airborne opponents and in area defense; defense on the Aller



with the 52nd Home defense Brigade; operation of reserve hospitals and other medical installations; operation of a hospital train of the German Federal Railways; decontamination of contaminated soldiers at an ABC-intake medical unit and a major decontamination center.

Most of the deployed territorial units only grow to their full deployment strength after a somewhat lengthy mobilization process. The reservist concept is thereby tested and the tactical training of reservists exercised. Further exercise goals of the Territorial Army are cooperation with the air forces and the NATO forces (Bundeswehr and allies). In short: "Defiant Saxons" gives the territorial forces once again the opportunity to exercise overall defense realistically with participation by all forces and in combined-arms combat.

#### Reservists' Readiness Rated High

Bonn BUNDESWEHR AKTUELL in German 23 Sep 85 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "Saxons' Defiance Was Worthwhile: Army Exercise '85 Ends - Defense Minister Praises Reservists and Helpfulness of Population": first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] Rethem/Aller-This year's army exercise "Defiant Saxons" ended last Friday. Sixty thousand soldiers, among them 12,000 reservists and 9,000 allies, took part in the one-week maneuvers prepared and executed by I Corps. At a press conference last Thursday at the command post of the 27th Airborne Brigade near Bethem on the aller, Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Woerner, in the presence of the Lower Saxony minister-president Ernst Albrecht, thanked the people in the exercise area for the "helpfulness and open-mindedness" with which they greeted the soldiers. He also thanked the Lower Saxony state government and the authorities who did all in their power to make the exercise a success.

As the Defense Minister pointed out, "Defiant Saxons" fully fulfilled its goal, namely to exercise and demonstrate the army units' operational readiness and to highlight alliance solidarity. American, British and Dutch units took part in the exercise. The Minister underlined the necessity for exercises with the words: "The better the forces can fight, the less the danger of their having to." The Minister showed himself especially pleased with the fact that, for the first time, an exercise of this size ran freely - that is, not according to a plan already laid down by the leadership. Room was thereby created for improvisational talent and for spontaneous decisions by commanders, the Minister emphasized. His special thanks therefore went to the Commanding General of I Corps, Lieutenant General Dr. Gerhard Wachter, for the courage he showed in carrying out an exercise of this kind. In the further course of the press conference, Dr. Woerner expressed his great satisfaction that an extraordinarily high fraction of the reservists, namely 80 to 90 percent, responded to the call-up for the exercise. The reservists' readiness to preform is very high, said the Minister further, and in no way falls behind that of those fulfilling their military-service obligation. All this shows, concluded Dr. Woerner, that the Bundeswehr is on the right path with its concept of better utilizing reservist potential.

Minister-President Albrecht reminded the press that, because of its geographical situation, Lower Saxony experiences large-scale maneuvers "almost every year." Despite these burdens, the people's attitude toward the soldiers has always been, and remains, extraordinarily positive. "People in our state know whom they have to thank for living in peace and freedom for 40 years now," said the Minister-President, who at the same time thanked all the soldiers for their consideration toward the population.

#### Individual Reservists' Experiences Vary

Hamburg ZEIT MAGAZIN in German 1 Nov 85 pp 11-20

[Article by Wolfram Runkel: "To the Rear, March!": first paragraph published in large type]

[Text] The Bundeswehr is 30 years old in November. The anniversary finds it in good shape. Shrinking service-age contingents, however, forebode a dangerous personnel shortage. Reservists are therefore being called up for training more often. Hans-Hermann Piening, a Lower Saxon township manager, got caught after an interval of 21 years.

Mobilization. Township Manager Piening snaps the last file closed and takes the whole folder - "Property Surveys for the Sewer Construction Project" - over to his duty's office.

The manager, the last to leave the town hall of Geestequelle township this evening, drives the 10 kilometers home to Bremervoerde. Wife Margrit and the children Dagmar and Gunnar receive him in his single-family house. A kind of hearty last meal. The township manager is not going to the town meeting, he's going to war.

Luckily, it's a false alarm, a simulated war: one of the Bundeswehr's so-called Mob-Exercises.

Hans-Hermann Piening is one of this year's 200,000 "reserve trainees," and one of the 12,000 reservists among the 60,000 soldiers ordered into the army's large-scale fall maneuvers, "Defiant Saxons."

The 44-year old NCO Piening got caught after 21 years of "peace in the reserve." Piening, who performed his obligatory active duty in 1962-1963 and did his last exercise in 1964, belongs to the first generation that was obligated to serve in the Bundeswehr, and is one of the reservists with longest service among the "Defiant Saxons."

Tomorrow's soldier climbs up to the attic to rummage out his costume for this second role. He slides a dusty duffelbag down.

"Are you looking forward to the exercise?" He rejects the question: "That's not the point! I'm just doing it." Certainly, Piening, who lived through the bombing death of his mother in 1944, is anything but a warrior. He is what he wanted to be from his schooldays: a government economist. His tool

is not the gun but the ballpoint, organizing a new sewer system suits him better than digging trenches: "This exercise doesn't fit my schedule. A lot of things in the township are going to have to wait...." And: "If I'd wanted to, I could have put in an appeal," as around 30 percent of all those called up do. But Piening didn't want to. He is not just a government employee, but also, as a civil servant, a loyal servant of the state. Smiling bravely, he shows us the Bundeswehr's current maneuver poster: "Wat mutt, dat mutt" [in "Platt," "What must be, must be"]. Even the most defiant Saxon has no defense against the trivial logic of this twaddle. Only Ms. Margrit has objections: "Of course he should have refused, especially as we have the workmen in the house."

But wat mutt, dat mutt. The next morning, Hans-Hermann Piening, 1.83 meters, 77 kilos, appears punctually as ordered, with bag and papers, at his muster post in Buxtehude, where he last saw service 21 years before as a private first class in an office of the Headquarters Company of the 3d Armored Division. This time he is supposed to serve as an interpreter in contacts with the Americans. Although "I don't know a word of English. But maybe they understand Platt!"

Now Piening must go through the "intake" mill. Like around 100 other reservists, some of whom have been dropped off by wife and child, he reports to the "Mob Report Start." From there onward from counter to counter - questionnaire issue: Profession? Rank? Illnesses? Gasmask issue, ID photo issue, chow, pay. One hundred eighty marks. That's something, anyhow.

But the more he's "in-taken," the more the confident township manager's self-assurance fades from his face. At the clothing-issue room, this specialist in organization gets his first big blow. Here the contents of his dufflebag, his equipment, is checked, completed and exchanged. But just now the manager must push himself and his "Geroedl" (Bundeswehr jargon for absolutely everything) forward for over an hour in a line of reservists. "What a waste of time! This could be taken care of much faster in a bigger room with a bigger counter and several people," groans Piening irritably.

"Maybe they have to kill the time until orders come out at 1600," speculates another reservist. But with the Bundeswehr everything goes at a well-regulated pace. Even the people on the post move slower than those on Moenckeberg Street.

Finally it's Piening's turn. The private behind the counter calls out in order the list of required clothing articles. But Piening rummages out of his bag nothing but things the private has never seen before - wrong shoes, socks, trousers. Even the infamous "crab" [untranslatable play on the German for "felt"], a felt suit done away with years ago, makes an appearance. The helpless private calls for a sergeant's aid. But even he is amazed at the stripes on Piening's parka sleeve. "One stripe slanted, one straight; what is that supposed to represent, my dear sir?" Once it meant NCO candidate. Piening was promoted to NCO only after his last exercise, in absentia. The sergeant passes on this one: Go to "admin." At the post administration offices Piening gets new clothing from head to foot. The impossible stripes are removed from the old parka.

In the corridor of Wing C, in which Piening shares a room with 4 other reservists, the sergeant on duty tells Piening he's "nobody without stripes." Back to the clothing room for issue of the valid shoulder pieces. His roommates, long since wise to the drill, give the baggy-trouser township manager supporting fire, when he quietly asks: "How do I buckle the belt? Is my cap straight?" While Piening is starting to get homesick for the town hall, his buddies are looking forward to an "adventure vacation" on which they will enjoy a certain amount of "idiot's leeway."

Unlike many reservists, the Bundeswehr "by no means" regards active duty for training "as an adventure vacation," says the former commander of I Corps, Major General Gottfried Ewert; "Rather it's tailored to the reservist's function in the event of mobilization, deriving its meaning only from its being designed around the real thing." Reservists are on-call soldiers, who might better regard their civilian life as an always-interruptable adventure vacation. In the future this vacation is going to be interrupted more and more often. Because of the "pill dip," the future personnel shortage, the number on active duty for training will be tripled in the next 10 years. By this year, the number had already risen to 200,000 from 180,000 in 1984, while it was only 127,000 in 1982.

In order not to harm the unruly economy too badly, future exercises are to be shorter but more frequent, and take place primarily on extended weekends. Nonetheless, the economy will also be called upon for more discipline. The number of "essential employees" in industry is to be reduced from 25 percent to 15 percent.

The Bundeswehr has fewest problems with reservists who are not yet in the work force: only sickness saves them from exercises. The literature student Christoph Nitsche from Essen, for example, whom we visited the day before the big operation at his muster post in Lueneburg, is still laboring under the shock of the unexpected call-up. The private first class, a signalman and driver, who had finished his obligatory military service only 9 months before, "simply can't understand" it. The 21-year-old absolutely personifies the stereotypical sensitive, vulnerable young man who, with Wolfgang Borchert in his head, ends up in the military. "After high school I was even recognized as a conscientious objector," but the recognition was revoked on an appeal. "They just didn't believe the grounds I put forward, and yet even today, after 15 months of life in the military, I would still shoot over the enemy's head in the real thing." "Probably," we say, "you were a good soldier in your signalman and driver assignments all the same." He throws up his hands in desperation. This time he'll be chauffering the supply officer, a lieutenant colonel, Mercedes director and stud-farm owner, around the countryside.

High-ranking reserve officers like to go on exercises. Reserve Lieutenant Colonel Roland Geistbeck, who did a hitch in the regulars from 1962 to 1968, sees his yearly assumption of duties with the staff of the air defense battalion in Fischbek as an agreeable change of pace. But also as "my duty as a citizen, to make myself available for the security of the country and its citizens." Some of his battalion comrades mockingly call him, with his



16 exercises, "runner-up exercise world-master." (In "Defiant Saxons," according to the MANEUVERS COURRIER, a man with 71 exercises holds the record.) In civilian life, the 43-year-old Geistbeck, a Bavarian by birth, is a teacher at a Hamburg business high school; he is married to a Hamburg woman and has two daughters, 12 and 4.

In the "Defiant Saxons" exercise, during which we want to visit him and his comrades Piening, Nitsche and an armored infantryman, Geistbeck will run the night shift at the battalion CO's command post. As we talk with him at the barracks, he is studying the secret attack plans of the "Red" armored units, which he is to protect from Blue air attacks with his flak guns.

Take armored-infantry private Juergen Mittmann for example. He is among the 20 reservists in the 2nd Company of the 81st Armored Battalion. The company commander introduces his reservists to us in rank and file. "Pick someone out." These people make no secret of their chagrin over the call-up, even in the captain's presence. They are especially sour over the loss of money: the Bundeswehr replaces only 70 percent of the loss of earnings. "But you do get free food and lodging." Whose the loss is.... Answer: "Kiss my ass." Most also complain of boredom, the ban on alcohol, the personal restrictions in general. "If I don't do something I'm supposed to here, I go right to the cooler. That's no life."

In the first rank stands a small man with dark eyes, his face masked by a black beard. He says nothing. "Are you looking forward to the exercise?" we ask, "Do I look like it?" he asks fiercely in reply. Juergen Mittmann has been picked 4 times now, "every year since my active service." Last time he had to get through 14 days, "although my right arm was in a splint due to a tendon-lining injury." The 25-year-old journeyman butcher at an Uelzen wurst factory was taken away from his girlfriend and his fellow workers, "who have to do my work as well now. The government should really call up the unemployed!"

But the government needs armored infantryman Mittmann. Friday night, after the civilian evening traffic is over, things finally get started. The "Reds" move into their assembly areas. Monday afternoon we find Juergen Mittmann with his camouflaged tank in a small wood near Harsefeld. He is waiting for the 8th Brigade's marching orders, while the "9th" has already penetrated deep into the enemy "Blueland" during the past night. Tired? "Friday night we had no sleep at all. Now we can nap here. But the worst is the boredom." Cookie brings chow, a sort of goulash with carrots, potatoes, little meat. Good? "Hunger helps it down." Then the move-out orders arrive. Mittmann - frustrated with hunger, but happy that things are finally moving - throws his half-full mess kit into the "marten." He doesn't suspect that this was his last hot meal for 50 hours.

#### Assault Through a Breast-Deep Stream

We're rattling through Lower Saxony with the 81st Battalion in an umpire tank. When Red and Blue clash, the "umps" negotiate among themselves as to who knocked out whom. Just now, however, our tank goes out of action. Engine trouble.



Juergen Mittmann and his comrades "roedel" on southward without us. We find them again only the next morning, in stand-by position deep inside Blue-land. They have thundered through the region all night in pouring rain, have victoriously completed an assault, and are alive. Though not very. They are dead tired, absolutely starving (there was no breakfast or supper), and wet to the skin. Luckily the sun is shining at last and the beat-up clothing the infantrymen will never change during the week-long exercise is slowly drying.

The 2nd Company is now near a stream, on the opposite bank of which the Blues are preparing a hedgehog defensive position. How does Juergen Mittmann like playing war? "Better than the real thing, at least. Even then I wouldn't aim at the enemy." Enemy aircraft hiss by overhead. Mittmann aims. What are his feelings when he keeps reading about better and better anti-tank weapons like the remote-controlled Milan rocket? "If it ever really gets serious, I'll take off. It's really all nonsense, with such weapons. If disputes were settled with cudgels again, as earlier, I'd be there." Shortly thereafter, things almost do get serious. The platoon leader wants to make an assault through the breast-deep stream with his people. "Count me out, I can't report sick to my boss Monday. He'll say, 'Just stay with the tanks permanently.'" Luckily, the attack is called off before it had to come to a refusal to obey orders.

Early in the afternoon the chow wagon finally showed up, bringing the belated breakfast. There was no hot food. Weight-loss as an exercise objective? Or was the meat bad?

Township Manager Piening didn't have to complain of hunger or dampness. We find him in a farmer's barn converted into a divisional command post; gigantic maps hang on the walls. Piening sits at the table, exhausted, bowed, harassed. Circles under his eyes. He had indeed been freed from the nonsensical interpreter assignment, but has received instead a responsible job at the command post of the "Red" commanding general. He is constantly shoving pieces of paper into runners' hands and receiving others, noting each step in a book. He is as it were the post office, sending all the commander's orders to the right addresses, and logging and forwarding the incoming reports. He is on the night shift: since the command post is manned around the clock, however, he hardly gets any sleep during the day either - "maybe in some animal pen" - and, contrary to strict orders, he doesn't do it embracing his rifle. The leveling effect of the uniform irritates this civilian even yet. Once he runs after a soldier he takes for a certain runner, looks him in the face and says, "Oh - you're somebody else."

His superiors are happy with him, he does everything to perfection, "hardly the slightest problem." "Hey, hand over a chair," demands an officer. As a city editor shows surprise at the docility of the township manager, the latter simply answers: "Today I'm a soldier." That tomorrow or the day after he will once again be a township manager, is the joy that helps him go on living. "I can only stand this because I know it's going to end soon." How is all this supposed to work in the real thing?

The brave Lieutenant Colonel Geistbeck is more drained than Piening. He moves like a sleepwalker around the farm where his AA command post is set up. His eyes twitch convulsively. He has not slept in 5 nights. "Nights I'm on duty, days I can't sleep. Biorhythm." He's deeply frustrated besides. "Just give me a call in Hamburg after the exercise," he says.

#### Twelve Hours of Sleep in Seven Days

The next day in a little village along the front lines we unexpectedly run into driver Christoph Nitsche, the unsuccessful conscientious objector, who is calmly strolling along the road. "So what's going on with you?" "Shot down!" His boss, the supply officer, had by an oversight ordered the jeep into Blueland, where both got "snapped off" (Bundeswehr expression) by a patrol. The umpires have "neutralized" the fallen for one hour. "I'm dead," says Nitsche gaily. "Now I can enjoy life for an hour."

Juergen Mittmann, the armored infantryman, is also dead, up in flames in his "snapped off" tank. Luckily, he is really just drunk as he returns to his girlfriend in Uelzen. A different kind of desertion. Before his release from active duty, "when everything was taken care of," he simply took off from the barracks.

Lieutenant Colonel Geistbeck, on the other hand, can't go back to school. His body protests against the over-exertion, "12 hours of sleep in 7 days." His spirit protests against the "pedagogically insufficient treatment of the trainees by the regular soldiers." Geistbeck: "The new officers have gone up the ranks too fast. They don't take the reservists seriously. Treat them haughtily."

Township Manager Piening, two kilos lighter, who has slept almost the entire weekend, is at his desk again on Monday with the survey records: "Everything OK. Sewer construction can begin."

He will participate in no more exercises. What needn't be, needn't be.

#### Reserve Officers Criticize "Bureaucracy"

Bonn LOYAL in German Oct 85 p 28

[Article by Hans-Joachim Linck: "Maneuvers Critique"]

[Text] Over 20 percent of the soldiers who took part in the "Defiant Saxons" exercise were reservists. One of them was SPD Deputy Captain (Res.) Klaus-Dieter Kuehbacher from Braunschweig. He exercised with the 2d Armored Brigade, and found not only "splendid comradeship" but also a few "itchy places" which he is soon going to discuss with experts in the responsible offices.

Klaus-Dieter Kuehbacher, 1941 age-class, is married and has 3 children. From 1974 to 1976 he was a member of the Lower Saxony state legislature; since 1976 he has been a member of the Bundestag. Since 1983 he has been on

the "Services Budget" committee. He is intensely concerned with the Bundeswehr and with everything having to do with reservists. In his two years of active duty with armor he rose to reserve officer candidate. In the following years he exercised several times with 11th Armored Battalion. In 1975 he became a reserve lieutenant.

On the next-to-last day of the "Defiant Saxons" exercise he was promoted to reserve captain. Kuehbacher was impressed above all in this fall exercise by the performance of regulars and reservists, not least because, in his opinion, the 2nd Armored Brigade was unduly tasked. "The soldiers had the feeling they are needed and not, 'well, let's exercise a little again'," was his opinion.

Negative experiences in the exercises for Reserve Captain Kuehbacher were that "orders were given by the leadership without regard for the soldiers' health, especially those belonging to clean-up companies. I felt a very great distance between soldiers and staffs, and I think it's questionable whether that 3 to 1 soldiers-to-vehicles ratio is correct. I was able to observe any number of double taskings. The chow upset me the most. There was plenty of bread and spread but, because the unit supply people could no longer freely purchase, there was in fact nothing else. The soldiers were 'right out in the country,' in an excellent farming area. It would have been easy to buy potatoes, apples and other things here. This must change. The food service units within the companies must get back more independence."

After a 32-hour mission without sleep, the reserve captain showed himself pleasantly surprised when the brigade CO, Colonel Rueckbrodt, refused a further mission for his soldiers on the ground that he didn't want to carry out this exercise any further if the soldiers didn't get 6 hours of sleep at once. "Defiant Saxons," says Kuehbacher, "was very valuable to me as a learning experience. In particular, I found that the cooperation between the active-duty troops and the reservists was an outstanding success, naturally taking account of the degree of training. I experienced some things that need further discussion. Someone's going to have to tell me why the massive volume of bureaucracy practiced here - and often experienced as a negative impression - has to be handled just this way and not otherwise."

In this, the newly promoted captain by no means stood alone. The SPD Bundestag delegate Lothar Loeffler, from Berlin, also exercised with him as a reserve first lieutenant. The 50-year-old member of the Bundestag did his orientation exercise in July of this year, and then took part in the fall exercise. Loeffler found the large-scale maneuvers impressive in all their phases, praised the great commitment of soldiers of all ranks, and perceived as the most negative element, throughout the entire week of the exercise, the extremely active bureaucracy, which often came across as a drag.

On the next-to-last day of the exercise Defense Minister Dr. Manfred Woerner and Lower Saxony Minister-President Dr. Ernst Albrecht visited the 2d Armored

Brigade in the vicinity of Sulingen, where Farmers President Konstantin Freiherr von Heeremann was exercising as a reserve captain. Minister Woerner emphasized to LOYAL that he had heard very positive judgments above all on the attitude of the reservists, their bearing, their willingness, and their ability to perform. In every evaluation, said the Minister, the varying degrees of training must naturally be taken into consideration, depending on how far back the last active duty was. That is only natural. "But I am very optimistic for the future, since we do want to push reserve training harder, in order to apply this potential more intensively in the Bundeswehr," as he summed it up.

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# LEOPARD 1'S TO UNDERGO FOURTH COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS UPGRADING

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Sep 85 pp 219-255

[Article by Gern-Rainer Geist]

[Text] The Leopard 1 battle tank, one of the main weapon systems of the German army, is about to undergo its fourth combat effectiveness upgrading. In its 20th year of use and since it was introduced it has always been adapted, in the context of several combat effectiveness upgradings, to the threat of the moment and to the newest level of technology.

In these combat effectiveness upgradings basically the following sectors underwent improvement:

## Turret

- installation of a weapon stabilization system,
- equipping with a deep-fording system.

## Weapon System:

- Retrofitting the main gun with thermal insulation covers.

## Ballistic Armor:

- Retrofitting the side track gun shields,
- retrofitting auxiliary turret armor for the Leopard 1 A1A1,
- reinforcing the cast turrets in the Leopard 1 A2,
- welded turret with bulkhead armor in the Leopard 1 A3/A4.

## Fire Control System:

New integrated fire control system in the Leopard 1A4 consisting of:

- computer-assisted rangefinder (EMES 12A1),
- fire control computer,
- compartment-stabilized commander's panoramic periscope (PERI R12),



- improved control units,
- internal computer-assisted test system.

With the new fire control system in the Leopard 1A4 in an armored division it was possible for the armor branch to gather experiences which could be utilized later in the further development of the Leopard 1 and new tanks.

#### Necessity and Extent of the Fourth Combat Effectiveness Upgrading

The need for another combat effectiveness upgrading of the Leopard 1 came as a result of the following predeterminations:

- necessary adaptation of the weapon system to the emerging threat,
- decision about extending the utilization phase beyond the year 2000,
- utilization of technological progress, for example, the rapid development in electronics and optronics and
- experiences from "operational test on a divisional scale" of the Leopard 1A4 as well as additional status reports from the armor branch.

The following aspects of the threat which must be anticipated influence the further development of the Leopard 1's weapon system:

- further quantitative superiority of the enemy,
- increasing quality in technology; in subareas technological equality must be assumed,
- focal point in the further development of the armored combat troops,
- attacks by massed armored units in echelons with support of artillery, attack helicopters, and the like, to achieve rapid and deep penetrations and breakthroughs and
- uninterrupted operations by day and night.

In order to be able to withstand this future threat in the planned utilization phase the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 1 must be improved as follows:

- enhancing first-round hit probability,
- shortening reaction times,
- effectiveness by day, night and under limited visibility,
- improved ammunition effect on the target,
- enhancing the ballistic armor and passive protection, and
- enhancing the crew's chances for survival.

These requirements can be met by the following measures:

- installation of a new fire control system while retaining existing optics,
- improvements in the undercarriage and turret areas,
- introduction and application of a new mottled camouflage,
- converting the communication facility to the new SEM 80/90 radio equipment generation,
- developing and introducing improved and new ammunition,
- introduction of new high-speed smoke grenades (SNWK),
- development and installation of an electrooptically covering smoke and deception system,
- if necessary, mounting additional new turret armor,
- if necessary, installation of the 120-mm weapon system of the Leopard 2 and
- if necessary, reoutfitting with a fire suppression system.

Combat effectiveness upgrading of the Leopard 1 requires high-level financial outlays which could also be used to purchase a small number of additional Leopard 2 tanks. However, such a measure would not take into consideration the aspect of the threat of quantitative superiority on the part of the enemy. In order to be able to cover the combat zones in the context of our forward defense there must be a minimum number of weapon systems which are commensurate with the threat. A smaller additional number of Leopard 2 tanks cannot begin to make up for the loss in combat effectiveness which would result from not upgrading the combat effectiveness of the Leopard 1.

#### Measures to Upgrade the Combat Effectiveness of the Leopard 1

##### Installing a New Fire Control System

Installing the new fire control system with the most modern components of today's technology is the nucleus of the fourth combat effectiveness upgrading. The requirements of a new fire control system were set forth in 1981 in a "Tactical Needs Document." On the basis of this phase document three German companies each developed a fire control system which was evaluated in 1983 in comparative testing. At the end of 1983 the EMES 18 fire control system from the Krupp Atlas Electronics Co, Bremen, was selected for the Leopard 1 combat effectiveness upgrading. The firm of Wegman and Co, Kassel, will install the fire control system in the Leopard 1. Delivery of the first Leopard 1A5 tanks whose combat effectiveness has been upgraded is planned for the end of 1986.

Among others, the following requirements, which the EMES 18 meets, were placed on the new fire control system:

- high first-round hit probability,
- shortened reaction times until opening fire,

- directing firing by the gunner or the commander,
- expending six kinds of ammunition with the main sighting telescope,
- passive observation, identification and sighting by day, night and under limited visibility,
- rangefinding, sighting and firing while moving,
- simple and speedy operability of the fire control system,
- simple and rapid boresighting,
- high degree of precision and stability in boresighting,
- high degree of stability under load for the fire control system and thus greater availability of the battle tanks and
- internal capability to test the fire control system for function by the crew.

The EMES 18 fire control system was developed on the basis of the EMES 15 fire control system in the Leopard 2. For the most part it consists of EMES 15 components which in part were adapted to the Leopard 1. This then produced a high degree of logistic uniformity with the Leopard 2.

In the following the Leopard 1's new fire control system is presented. Figure 2 shows the design of the EMES 18 fire control system and the location of the components. The main sighting telescope with an integrated thermal imager is the main aiming device in the Leopard 1A5. It helps the gunner and the commander, respectively, with observing, identifying targets, rangefinding and aiming by day, night and under limited visibility. The compact arrangement of the components [pictured in Figure 3, not included], guarantees a very high level of boresighting stability.

The fire control computer serves to determine the elevation and lead angle values and to stabilize the line of sight in the main sighting telescope. The elevation and lead angle values are determined by the computer with consideration of the following input variables: different kinds of ammunition for the main gun, weapon choice, machine gun, laser rangefinder, manually inputted distance, TRP [turret panoramic zoom optical system] distance, outside temperature, air pressure, powder temperature, crosswind velocity, system error correction, barrel wear, vehicle canting, point and field adjustment, synchronism. The fire control computer is fitted with a digital ballistics core.

The sensors provide input variables for the fire control computer.

The computer control unit serves to input the input variables and correction values into the fire control computer.

The TRP panoramic periscope is the gunner's second observation device and gun sight. It is also being taken over, in modified form, from the old fire control system.

The new gunner's control unit serves to switch the different operating stages of the fire control unit, to operate the HZF [main sighting telescope] and thermal imager (WBG), to adjust the HZF and WBG electrically, to operate the central testing electronics and to control the operational condition of the fire control system.

Figure 4 [not included] shows the operational status of the gunner with his sighting and operating equipment.

The new loader control unit serves the loader in choosing ammunition, in preparing the main weapon for firing, in switching on the turret hydraulics and operating the crew compartment ventilator.

With the auxiliary WBG control unit the commander can operate the WBG in the HZF.

The WBG electronics are the central power supply for all WBG components.

The laser electronics serve to supply the laser rangefinder with power and to evaluate the incoming laser impulses. The values determined are further processed in the fire control computer.

The monoblock electronics replace all traditional electric components in the weapon stabilization system. In addition, they have a tracking controller and coincidence switching which permits firing only after the main gun is in the position, in respect to height and side, as determined by the fire control computer.

The adapter, test and logic module (APL) is the link between the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2 components and must fulfill various electronic tasks.

The internal test system monitors the functional readiness of the fire control system. Defective components can be identified with this system. In the gunner's control unit it is connected in the "operation monitoring" or "technical examination" operating stages.

The EMES/TRP angle drive module serves to relay the elevation angle of the main gun to the fire control computer, the HZF and the TRP.

The field adjusting systems (FJA) consists of the field adjusting collimator on the muzzle of the main gun and of the part which is integrated in the other components of the fire control system. It makes it possible for the gunner to quickly check the adjustment of the HZF to the main gun without having to leave the tank.

#### Operation of the Fire Control System

The EMES 18 fire control system can be connected in four operating stages. The full efficiency of the system is achieved in the "stabilization EIN"

operating stage. A uniformly high first-round hit probability and short reaction times to opening fire are achieved by the following decisive performance characteristics:

- same HZF/WBG field of view for gunner and commander,
- smooth field of view even when moving through difficult terrain. The compartment-stabilized lines of sight point continuously in the same direction independent of the yawing and pitching movements of the tank,
- smooth field of view when moving on streets and concrete roads. Special design features of the HZF suppress vibrations,
- automatic lead angle computation with moving targets and/or when the tank is moving. A shift in point of aim is not necessary since the weapon automatically adjusts by the amount of target movement and/or the amount of movement of the tank,
- automatic correction of the day vision/weapon and WBG/weapon parallax values,
- high aiming speed of the HZF and
- simple operation of the laser rangefinder.

#### Evaluation of the EMES 18 Fire Control System

With the conversion to the EMES 18 fire control system the Leopard 1 has unrestricted combat capability by day, night and under limited visibility. The system has the performance level of the EMES 15 in the Leopard 2. The future certainty of the EMES 18 is confirmed by the following characteristics:

- possible use of other varieties of laser, for example CO<sub>2</sub>-laser,
- possibility of connecting additional sensors, for example, for crosswind, powder temperature, the type of ammunition loaded and
- possibility of connecting duel simulator, camera for television monitoring system, field of fire defining system.

An additional decisive advantage of the EMES 18 is the great logistical uniformity with the Leopard 2 fire control system. Approximately 80 percent of the Leopard 2 components are used in the EMES 18. This results in a reduction of the logistical expense, a simplification of training and the transfer capability of a large part of the basic material data from the Leopard 2.

#### Improvements in the Undercarriage and Turret Sectors

Prior to conversion to the new fire control system the battle tanks undergo depot maintenance and emergency repair. In the context of these repair measures a number of improvements are introduced in the Leopard 1 in the form of "technical changes" which in part must be evaluated as combat effectiveness upgrading and in part as improving material maintainability. By improving material maintainability the availability of the battle tanks is increased and with it the combat effectiveness of the weapon system is likewise improved.



In the undercarriage sector, among other things, the following changes are being introduced:

- installation of a jet water cleaning system for the periscope of the tank driver,
- installation of maintenancefree batteries,
- improving the shock absorber mount in the running gear,
- reinforcing the suspension arm mounting in the running gear,
- mounting hoist rigs on the hull, for example, to simplify loading for ocean transport and
- improving the nuclear, biological and chemical protection system.

In the turret sector the following changes are being made:

- laser protection for all optical devices and components,
- installation of an optical hinge in the TZF [turret sighting telescope],
- improvements in the ammunition storage holder sector,
- installation of new trunnion bearings and
- improved mounting of the elevation cylinder.

#### Application of New Camouflage Paint

Enhancing passive protection by applying a new camouflage paint must be seen as another measure to upgrade combat effectiveness. This paint consists of tricolored types of spots in green, brown and black. The new camouflage paint decreases the detectability of the Leopard 1 substantially and thus increases its survivability and combat effectiveness.

#### Conversion of the Communication System to the New Generation of Radio Equipment

In the context of the second army radio conversion the Leopard 1 tanks are also being equipped with the new SEM 80/90 A/VFH radio equipment. The new equipment is modular in design. It is smaller and has only about one-third the weight of the old generation. The following must be addressed as additional essential innovations:

- automatic channel selection with 16 channels combined in one channel group,
- digital transmission of the radio signals between the radios,
- extensive use of integrated highly integrated semiconductor circuits,
- protection from NEMP and
- self-testing device for the radio equipment. By pushing a button the operator can check the operational readiness of his radio equipment.

The new generation of radio equipment includes the following improvements which also contribute to enhancing the combat effectiveness of the weapon system of the Leopard 1 and the armor branch:

- improving the quality of radio circuits, with them the armored units and formations can be commanded with greater certainty in combat,

- enemy detection, jamming and monitoring of our radio circuits is made difficult,

- protection from NEMP, and

- self-testing device for radio equipment, the modular design and the exchange of components which is provided for result in substantially higher availability of the radio equipment of the Leopard 1.

#### Development and Introduction of Improved and New Ammunition

The effective firepower factor of the Leopard 1 is improved by the development and introduction of improved and new ammunition. The APFSDS type of ammunition was introduced as a successor to the current APDS(KE) ammunition. In contrast to the traditional APDS a higher ballistic coefficient was achieved in the case of APFSDS (DM23) and a different penetration material was used. A higher penetration performance of the projectile results from these changes in the projectile.

The HEAT and HEP types of ammunition which are used at present will be replaced by an HE ammunition which must still be developed. This will reduce the 105-mm caliber tank ammunition to two kinds.

#### Introduction of New High-Speed Smoke Grenades (SNWK)

Since the introduction of the current smoke grenades the threat has changed. Among other things, shorter reaction times have become essential which have resulted in the new development of high-speed smoke grenades. The SNWK can definitely lay the artificial smokescreen faster than has been the case. The first SNWK model has been introduced, other models are in the development stage.

The new SNWK will result in enhancing the passive protection of the Leopard 1.

#### Other Possible Measures to Enhance the Combat Effectiveness of the Leopard 1

##### Development of an Electrooptically Covering Smoke and Decoy System

Armored vehicles today are threatened by a large palette of weapon systems from which they must be protected, for example, by enemy battle tanks, helicopters with main guns and missiles, terminally guided artillery shells and antitank guided missiles. Beyond that, reconnaissance resources in the area of target acquisition, identification and target tracking are also substantially improved.

In order to meet the threat through new weapon systems and reconnaissance resources developmental work is also in progress in the camouflage and deception sector. The Federal Office of Military Technology and Procurement and the industry are currently developing a smoke which covers the following sectors:

--the visible,

--IR,

--radar and

--laser.

These individual components can be located in a smoke grenade and be fired from a launcher. But other smoke delivery systems, for example smoke generators, are also conceivable.

In order to be able to neutralize the effect of new kinds of reconnaissance resources and target equipment and protect oneself from the effect of new weapon systems, it must be possible for the new system

--to lay in front of our own battle tanks a sufficiently large smokescreen with electrooptically covering smoke in an extremely short time,

--to produce over our battle tanks a smoke cloud with electrooptically covering smoke and

--to set out decoys which can attract homing ammunition.

With such a smoke and deception system it is possible to achieve a cost-favorable combat effectiveness upgrading of all armored vehicles. In the event of defense such a system can more than pay for itself after the first successful use.

#### Studies for New Additional Turret Armor

Change in the threat, for example through new enemy ammunition developments, had required enhancement of the ballistic protection of the Leopard 1 weapon system. The Federal Office of Military Technology and Procurement and the industry have implemented first studies on new additional turret armor for the Leopard 1. Thought is being given to a new turret gun shield and to protective packets with shock absorber mounts. Development of a new TZP is continuing.

#### Possibility of Installing the Leopard 2 120-mm Smooth Bore Gun

The effective firepower factor can if needed be raised in the Leopard 1 to the level of the Leopard 2. This possibility is primarily of interest to Leopard user countries which do not intend to introduce the Leopard 2 and want to extend further the utilization phase of the Leopard 1. Several countries have

announced interest in a combat effectiveness upgrading with the 120-mm BK [main gun]. Thereupon, the Rheinmetall Co started a conversion development. The first prototype, a Leopard 1 which was loaned from the German army, has been equipped with the 120-mm weapon system of the Leopard 2 and the new EMES 18 fire control system. Factory testing was successfully carried out with this battle tank. Possible use in the German army will presumably not be decided upon until after thorough testing of all possibilities for increasing performance in the 105-mm caliber.

#### Installation Studies on a Fire Suppression System

The capability of the Leopard 1 crew to survive can be decisively improved by the installation of a fire suppression system. Studies by the industries concerned showed that a high percentage of the hits to be expected can result in setting the fuel and hydraulic oil on fire and thus would trigger explosion-like fires. These fires would have devastating consequences for the crew from internal injuries, severe burns, suffocation and poisoning.

Tests run by the industry showed that a lightning reaction and suppression of these fires is possible and thus offers the battle tank crew given such hits an excellent chance of surviving. One such fire suppression system is ready for series manufacture for the Leopard 2. Additional installation studies are planned for the Leopard 1.

#### Concluding Observations

The measures which were described in this article on upgrading combat effectiveness will enable the Leopard 1 weapon system to cope with the future threat beyond the year 2000 for specific operational uses.

In like manner, other weapon systems of the German army are also being rapidly and in a cost-favorable way adapted to the emerging threat through combat effectiveness upgrading. Some examples of this are cited in the following:

--Marder armored personnel carrier:

- +improvements in the undercarriage and turret sectors,
- +installing a jet water cleaning system for the tank driver's periscope and
- +installing the new A/VHF generation of radio equipment.

Beyond that a part of the Marder armored personnel carrier is equipped with thermal imagers.

--Jaguar 1 tank destroyer, combat effectiveness upgrading by

- +retrofitting a noise suppression system which the detection equipment of the HOT guided missile makes nonjammable,

- +development and introduction of an improved HOT 2 guided missile and
- +retrofitting a thermal imager.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the gun-equipped tank destroyer to the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer by

- +modifying the undercarriage of the gun-equipped tank destroyer,
- +equipping the US TOW antitank weapon with the AN/TAS-4 US thermal imager and a newly developed installation kit and
- +installing an external and substitute power supply.

Further combat effectiveness upgrading of the TOW antitank weapon of the Jaguar 2 tank destroyer by

- +introducing the new more efficient TOW 2 guided missile,
- +enhancing jamming resistance,
- +enhancing hit probability under limited visibility and
- +increasing the range

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the Luchs armored reconnaissance vehicle by

- +installing a thermal imager,
- +modifying the vehicle hull which among other things will result in improved flotation capability.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the M 109G PzH [armored howitzer] to the M 109A3G PzH by

- +installing a German barrel (modified FH 155-1), thus able to expend all kinds of 155-mm ammunition and increasing the range of the PzH to 24 km and with extended-range projectiles to 30 km, respectively,

- +installation of a metric hydraulic system (Leopard 1) for the azimuth transmission of the turret. This increases the reliability and availability of the PzH and

- +installation of a US refitting kit in the undercarriage and turret, in this way the supportability of the PzH from the US supply is guaranteed for the future.

--Combat effectiveness upgrading of the M110SF/M107SF gun howitzer to the M110A2SF howitzer by

- +installing a new 203-mm barrel with greater loading space, thus with the capability to expend all kinds of 203-mm ammunition, including the one under




development with the strengthened ninth charge, increasing the range to 22.7 km and with extended-range projectiles to 30 km, respectively, enhancing the effect on the target and increasing barrel lifetime,

+addition of a new muzzle brake in order not to exceed the maximum barrel recoil when using the strengthened ninth charge,

+improving the undercarriage, hydraulics and the weapon system, thus increasing the stability under load and the availability of the howitzers and guaranteeing further supportability,

+retrofitting with German weather protection for the normally open crew compartment, thus making operation of the weapon system in bad weather more endurable.

Figure 2: Design of the EMES 18 Fire Control System and Component Location in the Turret



Key:

- |                                    |                                    |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Gun positioner                  | 10. Adapter, test and logic module |
| 2. Main sighting telescope         | 11. Field adjustment collimator    |
| 3. Computer control unit           | 12. Gunner's control unit          |
| 4. HZF eyepiece, commandant        | 13. Pulse washing system           |
| 5. WBG auxiliary control unit      | 14. Vertical sensor                |
| 6. Periscope accessory, commandant | 15. Fire control computer          |
| 7. Monoblock electronics           | 16. Loader control unit            |
| 8. Gunner's control handle         | 17. Laser electronics              |
| 9. WBG electronics                 | 18. Laser pushbutton, commandant   |

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# PACK MULES, MOUNTAINEERING SKILLS MARK ELITE ALPINE UNIT

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 19 Oct 85 p 3

[Article by Kurt Kister: An Elite Corps That Rides Mules: Mountain Infantry: Deterrent Under the Sign of the Edelweiss--Why This Tradition-Rich Division Still Plays an Important Role in the National Defense in an Age of Remote-Controlled Rockets]

[Text] Bad Reichenhall, in October

Lots of things in life are fun--but does climbing around at 7:45 in the morning in the pouring rain count as one of them? For want of an alternative, my right foot is standing in a waterfall about as thick as my arm, the left one is feeling around for a hole in the rock, and the rock slide helmet and chest strap are binding like crazy, while I exert painstaking effort to work my way up just a little bit higher in this slippery rock slide on the Untersberg. It's good to have troop leader Staff Sergeant Dieter Pietta there, when he urges us on with an encouraging, "we're getting there!" In moments like that, one is briefly inclined to forget one's baser instincts for a moment.

For the soldiers who are climbing the Untersberg today with Staff Sergeant Pietta, their deputy platoon leader, this doesn't seem to be a problem. To be sure, they are also soaked to the skin and freezing, as they have to stop because the guy ahead of them can't make any progress. Nevertheless they obviously are having fun with this jaunt, even if they "don't have to work too hard," as one private put it. In truth, for the route chosen, the Untersberg climb reaches about a degree of II on the Alpine difficulty scale and is actually part of the standard repertoire of the 231st Alpine platoon of the Reichenhall Mountain Infantry Battalion. It doesn't even begin to get tricky, and therefore interesting, for most of these guys until it reaches a III+. With unmistakable pride, Colonel Winfried Dunkel, Chief of Staff for the Mountain Division, declares that, "The Alpine platoons are the elite of the Mountain Infantry Battalion."

## Protection against Armored Attacks?

For the not quite 200 members of the four Alpine platoons in the Mountain Division (and hence in the entire Bundeswehr), the General Staffer's statement is certainly a nice complement. Who wouldn't want to belong to an elite corps whose characteristics are also admired by civilians--namely, the capability of

accomplishing maximum athletic performance? On the other hand, climbing dizzying heights is not necessarily part of the original assignment of the Bundeswehr. That, as everyone knows, is supposed to consist of producing security by providing a deterrent to a "potential aggressor" by virtue of their defense capability. Yet, as long ago as February 1975, then Defense Minister Georg Leber, much to the distress of the mountain soldiers, observed that "we can't keep off armored attacks from the East with mules and mountain-climbing boots." Nevertheless, 10 years after this basic revelation, there is still a Mountain Infantry Division. And, so far as technology and equipment are concerned, it is even stronger than ever. What's the explanation for this, since the Federal Republic hasn't gotten very much more mountainous in the last few years and our Alpine neighbor Austria hasn't evolved into a potential aggressor?

Anyone who takes more than a cursory look at the organization of the 1st Mountain Infantry Division can quickly determine that the overwhelming number of its units and soldiers are only externally connected with the mountains by virtue of the Edelweiss that they wear on their arm patches and berets. A "normal" army armored division, for instance, is equipped with an average of 300 battle tanks and more than 170 armored personnel carriers, which are organized into two armored brigades and one armored infantry brigade. In contrast, the 1st Mountain Infantry Division in its present structure has 20 percent more battle tanks and nearly as many armored personnel carriers. Although Chief of Staff Dunkel won't discuss numbers, he does definitely confirm that "most of the division is oriented toward mechanized and mobile conduct of operations."

At the beginning of this year the Mountain Infantry Division even received significant, official reinforcement. The 56th Home Defense Brigade was assigned to the division, which contributed considerably to its armored strength. With this brigade, the Mountain Division includes an armored brigade and an armored infantry brigade, both of standard strength, as well as the Home Defense major mechanized formation. If things were to get serious, these three brigades are supposed to defend East Bavaria, a portion of which can be readily traversed with tanks. Their strength corresponds more or less to that of other Bundeswehr divisions.

The 23rd Mountain Infantry Brigade provides the fine distinction that sets the division off from the rest of the army; it is not just the only mountain infantry brigade in the Bundeswehr, it actually constitutes the only justification for calling this the Mountain Infantry Division. "Without us," says one officer in the brigade, "the 1st Mountain Infantry Division would have become the 8th Armored Division."

The results of this plan were impressive: A deluge of Bavarian traditionalists engulfed the numbers game in Bonn: veterans organizations, soldiers on active duty, citizens and even Franz Josef Strauss bombarded the Hardthoehe with the demand that they distance themselves from a course of action that "shows they have no sense of history." The Ministry agreed to compromise by maintaining the division in the future as the 1st (8th) Mountain Division. Soldiers and officers knew at that point that they had won the battle and simply ignored the interjected parentheses. Finally, in 1982 the then army inspector cancelled the whole renumbering procedure: Since then they are again quite officially the 1st Mountain Division.

The mountain soldiers are embroiled in a very similar conflict again today, one that is difficult to reconstruct rationally. The anonymous defense bureaucracy wants to tell them what they should wear. For only the Bavarian Division wears knee breeches and ski pants, a short uniform jacket ("mountain jacket"), spats, and a mountain-style cap. Hardly any of these articles of clothing--with the possible exception of the spats--makes any sense in daily service. Colonel Dunkel surmises that someone in Bonn must have asked himself whether it wouldn't be possible to get the soldiers in the Mountain Division, who still have access to this special equipment, to conform their appearance to that of the rest of the army. Then the testing order went out--and "troop tests" have already been conducted by individual units in the Mountain Infantry Brigade. What this means is that the infantry are testing out whether they can climb just as well in long pants as in knee breeches and whether they really need spats with long pants or perhaps only with the knee breeches or maybe not at all. For the outsider, this is all a bit confusing, but the passion which characterizes the barracks discussions in Berchtesgaden, Reichenhall and Mittenwald is an indication that we must be dealing with an existential question here.

What makes the matter even more complicated is the fact that they are also contesting with Bonn how much of the special uniform issue is going to be given to the 56th Home Defense Brigade. At Division Staff in Garmisch, they would like to see the Brigade get as much as possible, "because, after all, they belong to us now." The Hardthoehe, on the other hand, is more on the mulish side, so it looks as if plenty of telexes will be going back and forth between the Rhine and the edge of the Alps. To be sure--as evidenced my military history since 1915--mountain infantry men are enormously tough and steadfast. That, and the fact that the mountain infantrymen are also very proud of themselves (Colonel Dunkel: "We are an elite troop based on performance, spirit, inner attitude, and external appearance."), will make the uniform battle drastically more difficult for the progressives in Bonn.

Tradition in the Mountain Troop includes not only their caps with the Edelweiss emblem, but above all and most especially their pack animals. Fifty-four pack animals, among them 33 mules, 18 Haflinger horses, and 2 Norwegian fjord horses, have survived the transformation to "Army Classification 4." They are all together now in the 230th Mountain Pack Animal Company in Bad Reichenhall, and, in the age of remote-controlled rockets and tornadoes they are at least as exotic as sailing ships in the navy. Veterinarian Staff Sergeant Major Wolfram Noreisch, the company commander of this unit, likes to call his company the "Gorch Fock of the army." The four-legged soldiers are an extremely popular object of visits from all kinds of prominent people. The spectrum ranges from Ex-Federal President Carstens to all Defense Ministers to the great-granddaddy of all mountain fanatics, Luis Trenker, who wished a "heartfelt, mulish greeting" to "the good old mule-skinners" in the guest book at Reichenhall.

If you doubt the military rationale for the pack animals, the mountain infantrymen are just as passionate [on this topic] as they were regarding the division number and the uniform questions. "What the animals carry," says Colonel Werner, commander of the Mountain Infantry Brigade, would otherwise have to be carried on the backs of soldiers." Frequently enough, there are situations in the

mountains where a helicopter is no help, and vehicles are damned to immobility for lack of roads. Even in Bonn, where they would have gladly demobilized the pack animals 7 years ago, there has been a change in the direction the wind is blowing. "The pack animal," says army spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Rudiger Drews, "is a safe and proven means of transportation." Besides that, we can't deny the four-legged creatures a certain cost effectiveness: At a purchase price of 500 marks each mule serves for an average of 20 years. Service contracts with two lodges alone in the Reichenhall area earn at least 15,000 marks a year. Where else is there a Bundeswehr unit tha' is bringing money into the treasury?

#### Their Thoughts are of an After-Ski Toddy

If, however, the tone is set for the Mountain Division by its three mechanized brigades, which differ neither in their assignment nor in their equipment from any other army division--where then is the rationale for maintaining four Mountain Infantry Battalions, with their Alpine platoons and a company of pack animals? The reason, according to Brigade Commander Werner, is obvious, "it is the military-geographical location of the Federal Republic: In the Bavarian region we have borders which are "moderately mountainous and Alpine in character": "In this region we need specially trained troops." Especially on the east border of Bavaria, that is, in the Bavarian Forest, an infantry brigade with armored defense capability could hold off the enemy "in difficult terrain and unfavorable weather," explained the colonel. Hence we can't just abandon the "know-how of mountain combat." Besides this, indeed we have to consider the fact that priority is given to securing the eastern border, although an enemy attack from the south, that is in the Alps, cannot be entirely ruled out. However, in large parts of the Bavarian Forest, as well as in the Alps, "you can't get anywhere in vehicles," according to Garmisch Chief of Staff Dunkel: "In conducting indigenous operations of this kind, we need special people, specifically, our Mountain Infantry Battalion.

As it goes in the army, the guys who are the center of the controversy aren't wracking their brains overly much over these kinds of operative problems and threat scenarios. Staff Sergeant Pietta of the 231st Alpine Platoon is dealing with concrete problems among the crags of the Untersberg. Right now he is calling the attention of his men to watch out for the countless mountain salamanders, which the damp weather drives from their hiding places. "Look out and don't tromp on the critters." Nor are the thoughts of his climbing soldiers, loaded down with knapsacks and rifles, drenched and on their feet since four in the morning, on the east border of the Federal Republic, but rather an hour's climb further on up in the bar of the Stoehr House, where they can purchase an especially comforting, hot after-ski toddy. This drink is really one of those things that are fun in life, and after a few glasses, you ask yourself whether there isn't some shorter way through the slippery, muddy, wet untersberg wall.

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EIMLER: OBSOLETE MUNITIONS REMAIN PROBLEM FOR AIR FORCE

Bonn GENERAL-ANZEIGER in German 29 Nov 85 p 3

[Article by Karl-Heinz Hahslach: "Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Complains About Obsolescent Munitions: 'Equipped With WW I Flying Arrows'"]

[Text] Bonn--The Luftwaffe has the most modern types of aircraft; however, their armament leaves a lot to be desired. Luftwaffe Chief of Staff Eberhard Eimler complains that the effectiveness of his branch of the service is impaired by obsolescent munitions.

As Eimler puts it, the pilots are flying excellent weapons carriers like the Tornado, but these are, to use an exaggerated phrase, "equipped with World War I flying arrows."

Falling Behind

"We need modern munitions," the general emphasized. However, he continued, the production of new "third generation" bombs and missiles, which have been developed since the early 1980s as standoff weapons, have fallen behind the construction of up to date modern combat aircraft.

Faced with additional missions, brought about by such tasks as attacking the second echelon of enemy forces in the depth of enemy territory (FOFA), he claims to be quite worried as to whether "the things will need tomorrow are available on today's market."

He made a point of noting that the FOFA concept, repeatedly touted by NATO Commander-in-Chief Bernard Rogers, is nothing new for the German Air Force.

The Tornado, says Eimler, was specifically developed to provide more effective interdiction in the depth of enemy territory. But, he continues, the effectiveness of the most penetrating carrier system is impaired if it is forced to use weapons of the second, or even the first, generation (iron bombs from the 1940s).

Eimler believes that his service is getting the necessary funds from the defense budget to procure modern ammunition, to the extent available on the

market. A "considerable share" of it is provided with the DM 15 billion in Luftwaffe plans extending "deep into the 1990s."

Beyond that, funds for improving reconnaissance capabilities are provided also; these capabilities are presently considered deficient in the Bundeswehr plan.

The chief of staff regrets that the requirement of reconnaissance aircraft, proposed by his service and fully agreed to in the ministry of defense, has never been met.

However, he says, this deficiency could be eliminated if the Luftwaffe were able to add to its 80 RF-4E Phantom reconnaissance aircraft some specially equipped Tornados which are intended for reconnaissance and electronic warfare.

These ECR Tornados, he says, are urgently needed because in electronic warfare too there is a "tremendous need for catching up." The ECR Tornado, 40 of which should be procured at a cost of more than DM 3 billion as far as the Luftwaffe is concerned, is "conceptually well thought out" and by asking for them he is not "shooting from the hip," says Eimler.

Asked whether the Luftwaffe has sufficient numbers of aircraft to fulfill its mission, the general said: "The bottom threshold is where we are today." He refused to comment on the fact that the total number of aircraft, compared with the inventory of the early 1960s, has been cut in half, as is evident from reading the White Books.

#### Decision of the Planning Group

Eimler called attention to the fact however that the air defense is becoming more conventional as a result of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group's decision to cut the number of nuclear battlefield weapons drastically.

Without commenting in greater detail on the worry indicated in the Bundeswehr plan that too many Tornados might be used as nuclear weapons carriers, he said: "All the flying carriers which we set aside for nuclear purposes are of course subtracted from the conventional combat effectiveness."

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## NAVY'S EXPERIENCE WITH SHIP-BASED HELICOPTERS REVIEWED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 pp 36-39

[Article by Jueigen Ehle: "Use of Helicopters from Onboard the Frigate 122"]

[Text] Since 1981 The Sea Lynx MK 88 weapon system has been integrated into the Federal Germany Navy. This was the first ship-based airplane to be introduced into the navy. Some 12 Sea Lynx helicopters have been added to the "Count Zeppelin" 3rd naval air group in Nordholz. Two others will be delivered by the British company Westland by the end of 1986. Lt Capt Juergen Ehle, Sea Lynx pilot and training officer for the onboard helicopter crews headquartered with the MFG [naval air group] 3 airborne group points out that the use of the onboard helicopter from a land base and from onboard a frigate requires meticulous organization in respect to personnel and logistics. After 4 years of onboard flight operation the helicopter crews have demonstrated their value in numerous short and long-term operations and need not fear international comparison.

### Onboard Helicopter Components: 18 Soldiers

Thorough coordination and planning of helicopter operations is important to the extent that the onboard helicopters (BHS) are stationed in Nordholz and the frigates are homeported in Wilhelmshaven. The plan calls for shifting the helicopter components from Nordholz to Wilhelmshaven; nonetheless, this cannot be expected before the beginning of the 1990's. The flight personnel of the onboard helicopters belongs to the 3rd squadron in the MFG.

The onboard helicopter squadron which is assigned to the airborne group of the MFG 3 is a very young unit which was established in 1981 with the addition of the first Sea Lynx.

The maximum manning of the BHS squadron consists at present of 30 helicopter commanding officers (HFO) and 18 helicopter position finding masters (HOM) with the rank the chief petty officers.

The technical group of the MFG 3 provides the technical personnel for servicing and repairing the onboard helicopters.

If the helicopters are not onboard, then operations are mostly flown from the Nordholz land base in the North Sea/German Bay operations sector.

Normally 5 pilots, 3 HOM and 10 BHS technicians, thus a total of 18 soldiers of the MFG 3 are used to embark on 1 or the 6 class F-122 frigates. The 10 BHS technicians comprise the onboard maintenance group.

Material, replacements parts and tools for operations at sea which are independent of the land base are transported from Nordholz to Wilhelmshaven prior to embarkation.

As a rule two BHS should embark. For reasons of the operational mission on the one hand and technical availability on the other only one BHS is also put on board or made available, respectively, of course with appropriate reduction in the number of flight and technical personnel.

The BHS crew consists of two pilots and one HOM.

Onboard the frigate the helicopter personnel of the MFG 3 comprises the main section (HA) 500 which is commanded by the helicopter operations officer (HEO), the most senior and also most experienced pilot.

The HA 500 consists of sections 510 and 520. While the flight personnel belongs to section 510, the onboard maintenance group comprises section 520 which is led by the technical flight officer (LTO). During embarkation the personnel of the MFG 3 is under the ship's commanding officer.

#### Hard Training for Helicopter Crews

Flight operations from floating platforms assume intensive flight training, especially to guarantee safe flight operations during night operations.

Flight training to become an onboard helicopter pilot consists of the following main areas:

After English language courses and selective flight schooling the approximately 7-month long basic flight training begins at Fort Rucker, a training site for U.S. army helicopter pilots in southern Alabama. Training is done in the TH-55 and Bell UH-1H airplane models.

Basic training is followed by the Europeanizing phase in the Bell UH-1D with the 64th helicopter transport squadron of the Luftwaffe in Ahlhorn. Here mainly flying in the special geophysical conditions of Germany is learned.

Upon completion of this course, which lasts about 8 months, the young pilot in the blue uniform returns to the arms of the navy. Now flight retraining to the naval helicopter begins in the MFG 3 in Nordholz. After technical-theoretical courses practical handling of the Sea Lynx MK 88 is next taught, from exact flying of the traffic circuit to practicing emergency procedures. Following instrument flight training the young navy pilot is confronted for the first time with flying at sea. The flight operations ("procedures") for submarine chasing and fundamentals of the tactical operation, which include safe handling of the onboard radar and TANS (Tactical Air Navigation System)-computer, then comprise the main areas of the practical part of the retraining.

However, the high point of the practical retraining is the training for deck landings. After deck landing training on land on a simulated flight deck ("dummy deck") with the Dutch Navy in De Kooy, deck landing training at sea begins on a 122 frigate.

At least 60 landings, which are practiced in different wind directions and velocities, are required before the helicopter commanding officer is qualified for daytime deck landings (DLQ day). Now for the first time he can be included as a replacement pilot in onboard flight service. Then he is primarily supposed to gain experience with deck landings in different weather situations and various kinds of seas. If he masters safe landings during the day, then deck-landing at night is begun during which at least 40 landings are practiced.

The crowning conclusion is then the first "solo flight" (that is, a flight with a copilot, but without a flight instructor) at night during which the frigate is approached a number of times for deck landings. After achieving qualification for nighttime deck landings (DLQ night) the helicopter commanding officer is fully operational.

In order to maintain his operational status and level of training the pilot must annually complete a broadly based flying program in the context of the Tactical Combat Training Program (TCTP). After a theoretical beginning the HOM receive practical training at the MFG 3 in Nordholz and during operations on the frigates.

The training of the onboard helicopter crews is always focused on the diverse operational spectrum of the Sea Lynx.

#### Tasks of the Onboard Helicopter

The onboard helicopter is used to carry out three primary and two secondary tasks. The primary tasks include:

--Submarine chasing and antisubmarine warfare

In this role the onboard helicopter can discover, localize, classify and attack underwater targets. He has use of dunking sonar which so far has produced excellent results. As armament, among others, two torpedoes can be carried.

--Target data transmission

The BHS, with the help of its radar broadens the radar horizon of the ship or the unit. In this connection the TANS navigation computer plays a decisive role in the storage, processing and relaying of radar contacts.

--Reconnaissance

The speed, maneuverability and the operational radius of the helicopter make it possible for the crew to quickly reconnoiter a specific area or object.



The secondary tasks include:

--Sea rescue service

For this operational role a rescue winch is installed which can handle loads up to 272 kg.

--Transport

To implement transport tasks the helicopter is equipped with a load hook with which loads up to 1,360 kg, the weight of a medium size car, can be lifted.

An essential characteristic of the operational philosophy of the navy for the BHS is the double design of the controls. In other navies the Sea Lynx is flown with controls of single design. The cockpit crew consists then of a pilot and an observer who is responsible for the tactical operation of the BHS.

In the German design on the other hand, the cockpit crew consists of two pilots who can fly from both sides of the BHS. They are trained to the point that they can be used alternately at the flying and tactical position in the cockpit.

Typical Operation from Onboard the Frigate

A typical onboard flight operation is to be described using the example of a rather long maneuver in the context of a Standing Naval Force Atlantic Operation (STANAVFORLANT) in which the frigate "Rheinland-Pfalz" with two onboard helicopters participated from April to August of this year. Participation in the STANAVFORLANT meant the first long-term use of the helicopter personnel in an international unit.

After waking up at 0430 the operation briefing begins at 0500. Parallel with the briefing the onboard maintenance group carries out the preflight checks on the helicopter. At 0545: the helicopter crew once again checks the condition of the BHS. Shortly after that the turbines, which put out 1,120 hp each, are started. Essential information such as, for example, the coordinates of the present position and of the HRP (helicopter reference point), to which all transmitted target data refer in terms of direction-finding bearing and distance, as well as course and travel of ship are fed into the TANS computer.

At 0600 sharp the BHS starts. The fly co (flight coordinator) in the BHS control station, a minitower located next to the hangar with a view of the flight deck, monitors the orderly course of the starting process. The mission of the operation consists in searching for submarines in an 8 to 10 nautical mile sector ahead of the unit. After 2 hours in the air the BHS lands. It is equipped with a harpoon for decklandings. This hydraulically activated "grabber" hooks onto the matched landing grid onboard the frigate and thus keeps the helicopter on deck.

A flight deck master (FDM) gives the pilot precisely established marshaling signals for starting and landing. This proves to be a great help essentially in the landing process in order to "hit" the landing grid exactly!

immediately after landing the refueling hose is hooked up and the BHS is refueled with the rotor running. This procedure is called in airman's jargon "RRR" (= rotor running refueling). At the same time the pilots receive important information about the situation via teleletter (internal communication like between ship and helicopter) the operations center. Some 5 minutes later the BHS starts again in order to continue the mission. One hour before the planned landing of the BHS the second helicopter crew is briefed in the operations center on the current situation and the weather.

After 1 and 1/2 hours in the air the BHS is recalled from its sector in order to support a Canadian helicopter during the rest of its flight time in the search for a submarine since the latter has reported sonar contact. Some 30 minutes later the BHS is back on deck. It is refueled and serviced. In the Caribbean Sea the outside temperatures are now over 30°C. Men and material are exposed to high climatic stresses.

The second BHS crew is used for the next 4 hours of antisubmarine warfare. The helicopter lands in the late afternoon for the last time this day, is again refueled, serviced, washed and given maintenance and finally put into the hangar. If no repair has to be made the service hours in the hangar end at 2000.

#### Experiences with Onboard Helicopters

After the first 4 years of flight operations with the Sea Lynx MK 88, after years of building up the BHS squadron and intensive training of the crews it is possible today to set forth a positive performance balance sheet which holds its own in international comparisons. Good performances were achieved during maneuvers such as, for example, British Basic Open Sea Training (BOST), but also during 4 to 5-month long-term missions. In 1984 personnel and helicopters of the MFG 3 participated in the INDIK foreign training cruise of the frigate Niedersachsen. From April to the end of the year there were and continue to be onboard helicopters on the frigates Rheinland-Pfalz and Bremen in the context of the STANAVFORLANT.

Today the MFG 3 is proud of the fact that in the case of the importance of the performance which has been shown to date in onboard flight operations the primary goal of having flown without accident has been achieved.

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MILITARY

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### THIRD GENERATION ANTITANK MISSILE ENTERS DEFINITION PHASE

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Nov 85 p 72

[Text] On the basis of an appropriate agreement by the governments of Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Euromissile Dynamics Group (EMDG) has developed two antitank missile systems of the third generation which are supposed to be able to combat effectively even the armored vehicles expected in the nineties. Besides the long-range missile system PARS 3LR for armored vehicles and helicopters, an infantry weapon system for medium range, PARS 3MR, is also being developed to combat targets up to 2,000 m. This weapon system should be introduced by the NATO partners at the beginning of the next decade.

PARS 3MR is currently in the definition phase, in which an optimal design of the weapon system is being worked out as a basis for impending development. The work is essentially being performed by the parent companies of the EMG, that is Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, and MBB. In study teams, they are working out solutions for the munition and the weapons systems.

#### Munition

The missile is used in direct attack, like previous antitank guided missiles. The missiles are equipped with a tandem hollow-charge combat head, which is supposed to penetrate all passive and active armored targets of the nineties. The missile is guided to the target by guide-beam steering. For this purpose it has a suitable receiver which uses the coding of the guide beam to determine the coordinates of the missile in the guide beam.

The trajectory of the missile is corrected with two control jets. As with MILAN and HOT, the missile is mounted in a firing tube and thus has a munitions character.

#### Weapons Systems

PARS 3MR is supposed to be deployable from the ground and from vehicles. The portable weapon system - it is transported and stored in two carrying

loads - consists of a sight, a guide-beam projector, a ramp, a directional unit, as well as a tripod. For its use from a vehicle, the tripod is removed and the weapon system is set on a special vehicle adapter, in an easy manual operation. This adapter has available the same interfaces as the tripod.

If the weapon system is to be deployed under tank protection, the sighting and guide-beam units are integrated into a compact turret.

One objective of the development is to make the weapon system as small and light as possible; furthermore, its handling should be simple. Thus the weapon system has many easily replaceable units which are connected together by means of fast-action interlocks and simple screw connections.

### Portable Weapon System

The portable weapon system consists of several subassemblies which partly are also used in other weapon systems.

### Guide-Beam Projector

The missile is steered through an optical guide beam. This guide beam takes care that a spatial optical modulation is produced in a direction of the desired trajectory of the missile. This modulation is received by the receiver in the missile. Together with the optical sight, the guide-beam projector is integrated in one housing.

Since a guide-beam steering system has previously already been investigated, two additional methods are currently being investigated by the infrared specialty firms of the two conglomerates (SAT, Eltro, BAe, and TRT, Zeiss, GEC Avioniks).

### Sighting Units

By means of the optical sight, the gunner sets an aiming point on the target. If the view is restricted, a heat-image unit is also used. This unit is set on the weapons systems. The visible image generated by the heat-image unit is mirrored into the optical sight.

### Ramp

The ramp is used to take up the munition and to fire the missile. For this purpose it contains a device to guide and seal the munition tube, an ignition generator, as well as a precise mechanical interface to secure the harmonization of the munition axis and the sighting axis. When installed in vehicles, the ramp is designed so as to permit carrying along the ammunition during the entire run.

## Aiming Unit

As regards the aiming unit, a manual control was chosen for lateral aiming and a servocontrol was chosen for altitude aiming. Both were optimized with a view to minimal sighting noise. Aircraft targets can also be pursued with the aiming unit.

## Tripod

A tripod is provided to set up the weapon system in the terrain reliably and stably. At this time, a tripod is being investigated which is adjustable in height, as well as a smaller tripod which also permits fastening on masonry and the like.

## Integrated Weapon System

In the turret version, the sighting and guide-beam units are installed in an external mount. The optical connection to the gunner is here established by means of a periscope. The operating section for the weapon system is affixed below the periscope within arm's reach of the gunner. The compact tower has four launches which are disposed symmetrically to the sighting units and the guide-beam projector. The turret is protected with armored plates against shrapnel and hand-weapons ammunition. The altitudinal lateral drive of the turret is effected by digitally controlled electric motors. The sighting and steering units can be installed into and removed from the turret very quickly; thus alternative use of these devices in the portable and integrated weapon system is possible.

Loading of the launches and the armor or ABC protection is included within the study.

## Only Small Numbers of Units for the German Army?

The PARS 3LR is supposed to be used in rather large numbers in the German army on the tank-pursuit-helicopter defense car and on the PAH-2. By contrast, according to present plans, the PARS 3MR, as a decided infantry weapon, is to be deployed only in limited number by special units. For antitank combat at ranges up to 2,000 m, the German army has decided for the antitank car that is equipped with the "fire-and-forget" 120 mm onboard gun. Nevertheless, it should be considered whether the PARS 3 MR could not be introduced in larger numbers as an effective flexible antitank weapon.

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MILITARY

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## HIGH ENERGY LASER POTENTIAL FOR AIR DEFENSE DEMONSTRATED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 85 pp 77-80

[Article by Erhard Heckmann: "Air Defense by High Energy Laser, Demonstration by MBB and Diehl"]

[Text] It is really unusual when industry and government inform the public concerning a technical development which is still in the laboratory phase - or more precisely in the component phase but which, on the other hand, promises many applications in conventional defense. In a time when participation in the American SDI program is being discussed controversially, the mention of the word high-energy laser immediately calls forth associations with its strategic application as a missile defense weapon. In contrast to this, the researches of the firms MBB and Diehl, supported by the BMVg (Defense Department) with about 25 million DM, in addition to inhouse expenditures on the part of industry, aim for tactical use of the high-energy laser. Consequently, this report will discuss the work that has been done, will indicate examples of military applications, will, by way of examples, answer the question how German research compares internationally, and will indicate the steps that must be taken in order to convert scientific and engineering results into military hardware.


Rarely has a discovery from physics been converted more rapidly into products than the laser. In 1960, T.H. Maiman from Hughes Aircraft presented the ruby laser to the public. Today, the laser has replaced the stereoscopic range finder in military application. Since the end of the seventies, we have the laser target illuminator, laser-guided weapons, laser as a welding and cutting means in human medicine, lasers in production for the alignment of workpieces and machinery, as well as for cutting. The laser beam is used as a data medium, in holography for materials testing, for picture improvement, and for pattern recognition. And thus it is natural that enterprises with high-tech claims cannot overlook the laser.

At MBB two developmental directions appeared quite early: on the one hand the low-energy laser for medical technology - this field is being operated

in an independent subsidiary - and the high-energy laser, which is the concern of a working team since the beginning of the seventies. This working team is part of the business group on defense technology. Quite early, a decision was made here in favor of the carbon dioxide laser. Dr. G. Born, manager of the working team, today points proudly to the correctness of this decision. The objective of the research and technology is to obtain a secure technical base for the evaluation of future high-energy laser weapons.

Already now, the importance of the high-energy laser as a tactical defense weapon against aircraft and to blind the sensors of tank vehicles is becoming important. The land-bound "laser gun" is a purely defensive weapon. The linear propagation of its laser beam makes it possible only to fight targets which enter into one's own territory.


The action principle of all beam weapons, among which the high-energy laser is one, is simple. High power must be created locally so as to transfer it in a tight bundle through the atmosphere to the target. There it acts destructively through heat.



HEL: Gas Dynamic CO<sub>2</sub> Laser: Basic Structure

Key:

1. Fuel
2. Oxidizer
3. Burner
4. Laser beam
5. Jets
6. Resonator mirrors
7. Diffuser
8. Exhaust



HEL: High Energy Laser Weapon System on a Land Vehicle: Basic Structure  
Key:

- |                                |                                |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Focusing optics and tracker | 7. Elevator arm                |
| 2. Plattform                   | 8. Range finding system        |
| 3. HEL-beam                    | 9. Reflection from the target  |
| 4. Laser                       | 10. Reflection from the target |
| 5. Exhaust gas/exhaust heat    | 11. Transmission telescope     |
| 6. Supply tank                 | 12. HEL-beam                   |

### The Gas Dynamic Carbon Dioxide Laser

Component studies precede every development of a new weapon system. The most important components of the "laser gun" are the high energy laser (HEL) itself and its associated optics. The fuel for the CO<sub>2</sub> laser is a hydrocarbon which, together with a nitrogen-containing oxygen carrier, is atomized in a nozzle and is burned. Then the gas flows through a comb of very fine Laval jets. Here it decompresses and is put into an inversion state necessary for the laser action. Stimulated emission and the coupling out of the laser beams take place in a resonator. The laser beam emerges perpendicular to the direction of the gas flow. In brief, the laser is a rectangular rocket propulsion system with a series-connected resonator. The used-up gas mixture is exhausted into the atmosphere by means of a diffuser. With the CO<sub>2</sub> laser, the exhaust gas is nontoxic, a most important point for its tactical deployment. However, the high exhaust gas temperature is a disadvantage.

The wavelength of the CO<sub>2</sub> laser beam is in the range of heat picture units, around 10.6  $\mu\text{m}$ . The CO<sub>2</sub> laser is a product of rocket technology and optics. The newly coined word "synergy" suggests itself here. And thus, the business area of space travel also has its share in the HEL.

An important feature of the gas dynamic laser generator is its delivered power, which is proportional to the amount of fuel utilized. The affords the capability of very easily enlarging the system without using complicated and not fully realistic model equations. The present demonstration laser has a power of a few hundred kilowatts. Its jet comb has a width of about 1 meter. The size required for a weapons application will be discussed later.

#### Laser Optics

The laser generator as such is only one component within a total system. Just as important is the corresponding optics to couple out the laser beam, to focus it on the target, and to maintain the target. A concave mirror with a diameter of 1 meter can be calculated as the transmitter output (laser power in the MW range) to transmit and focus the required power. At a range of 10 km, this power is able to burn through the skin of an aircraft within 1 second. In order to compensate for atmospheric turbulences, blooming (heating up of air molecules which cause the beam to spread), as well as other deformations of the laser beam within and without the system, its wave front must constantly be optimized in a closed control loop by utilizing the speed of light of the laser beam. This means that the optical components must be constantly matched to the given conditions. It should be mentioned here that no lenses are used in high energy laser technology. They would be destroyed by the laser beam. Instead, mirrors are used, in our case mirrors whose surface can be changed. Since the required change can be calculated from the influence of the interfering factors, one speaks of adaptive optics or of an active mirror. This is achieved by disposing a large number of piezoelectric positioning elements on the back side of the mirror, which is traversed by fine cooling channels. These positioning elements are inductively activated. Among the examples demonstrated were mirrors with 19 such positioning elements, i.e. a central positioning element surrounded by 2 rings with 6 and 12 tappets each. Compared to rigid optics, adaptive optics doubles the range by compensating interferences. In many tests, various materials were tried out.

With other applications, too, it is to be expected that adaptive optics will represent an economical solution where the production of large precision-ground mirrors is too expensive or where a weight saving is necessary. When tracking a target by a laser beam, the laser beam itself is used as a sensor element in a closed control loop. Here one uses the reflection differences at the target or one uses difference methods where the deviations of the laser beam center from the target marks is used as the control signal. Such a process was demonstrated by Diehl with a run-about aircraft model, where the laser beam was set fixed on a target mark as a light point. Only when the target mark vanished by turning the model, did the laser jump over to the next point of maximum reflection.

Studies have also been performed concerning its effect on the target. With the present laboratory model, it was possible to burn through centimeter-thick titanium and aluminum sheets at several meters range within 1 second. In order to simulate the action on a flying target as realistically as possible, an air jet corresponding to Mach 1 was here generated perpendicular to the laser direction. It here appeared that the metal was ablated in oval form by the air jet. The actual burn-through spot, however, was circular.

Sheet metal naturally represents the hardest targets. The materials of which sensors are composed have proven much more sensitive to laser radiation. Even destroying the surface of the window material general is sufficient to make the sensor inoperative.

#### The HEL Air Defense Weapon

MBB and Diehl are not only concerned with component studies but in parallel to this also with application studies. According to the work division, MBB is responsible for the laser part and Diehl for the beam guidance.

As an air defense weapon, a HEL system offers the following advantages compared to conventional gun and missile systems:

- the HEL air defense weapon works without inertia;

- the liberated power is transmitted directly to the target and only to the target. One thus obtains a narrowly selected target attack;

- the target is attacked with the speed of light, aiming calculations and the associated inaccuracies and delays are obviated;

- rapid target change;

- cheap ammunition; the fuel (hydrocarbon and oxygen carrier) is the ammunition;

- simple remunitioning = tank filling;

- no minimum firing range;

- no different ammunition is required for various types of targets;

- action on the target depends only on the irradiation time;

- deployment also against unmanned objects, against which one possibly would not use expensive guided missiles without taking into account the consequences;

- the procurement of a war supply of ammunition is obviated. This point is decisive for the costs of the weapon system.



MBB and Diehl Companies propose a tank chassis with an elevatable platform for air defense. The platform carries a focusing mirror of 1 meter diameter and the tracker, i.e. the swivel mechanics and electronics. Below this is a transverse arm which holds the passive target location system which makes possible the simultaneous tracking of many targets. By using an elevatable platform, the action range can be increased. Due to the quick reaction time from target acquisition until the action at the target with the laser weapon, targets which appear only briefly and then vanish into the ground shadow can also be attacked. A LEOPARD 2 frame is proposed as the vehicle. In place of the turret, the supply container for the fuel, the oxygen carrier and water (for cooling) as well as the laser itself are disposed thereon. To create the laser power in the megawatt range, the jet comb of the gas generator would be about 2 meters long and 40 cm high. The mass of the total system (without chassis) is about 20 tons. A two-man crew is regarded as adequate.

Naturally, a HEL air defense system will not replace gun and missile systems but only will be able to supplement them. The reason for this principally is the main disadvantage of the laser, its impairment by fog and humidity. Although a low-lying cloud cover cannot be penetrated, its suspected presence will still force the opponent to fly at greater altitudes, because: there are interference measures against missiles that are guided by radar and by IR, but not against lasers. Other conceivable applications of the HEL weapon system would be close-range protection of ships against sea-target missiles and target location RPVs as well as the protection of radar installations against antiradar missiles.

#### International Comparison

Naturally, in the development of a defense technology, the question arises again and again: Where do we stand on an international comparison? As was explained by Bernd Wilz, correspondent for the artillery in the defense committee, and one of the strongest proponents of HEL development, the Soviets have also been busy not only with many decades of developments for strategic applications but also with tactical HEL applications. It is expected that corresponding weapon systems may be deployable within a few years.

At the beginning of the seventies, the Americans concerned themselves with the CO<sub>2</sub> laser and have also installed such a laser in their airborne laser laboratory, a Boeing NKC-135. However, the U.S. Army apparently made a transition to halogen lasers, for example the deuterium-fluoride laser and the iodine-oxygen laser. These do indeed deliver a higher energy density than the CO<sub>2</sub> laser, but their exhaust gases are diabolically toxic. In March 1985, the American HEL research was subsumed within the SDI program. Taking into account all freely accessible sources, one can say that the researches of MBB and Diehl represent the world peak. In France, several companies and the state air-travel research agency ONERA are concerning themselves with similar developments. Apparently there already exists close contact at least on the official side. Collaboration in a German-French

context thus lies close at hand. On the other hand, the high energy laser could become the centerpiece of a conventional defense in a transatlantic cooperation.

#### Future Tasks

Due to its distinctively high defensive power, the question now arises how such a task can be pushed as rapidly as possible from armaments research to a systems contract. Although the expenditure for development, production, and maintenance of a deployable system cannot yet be estimated, the next step must be taken soon, namely the integration of the components in an HEL demonstrator. Only in this way will reliable cost-effectiveness estimates for a future weapon system become possible. The objective also must be to include these researches within the federal defense planning.

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STATUS OF COMBAT ROBOT DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATION SURVEYED

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Dec 1985 pp 82-87

[Article by Col Friedrich Egger: "Robot Deployment in the Army"]

[Excerpt] Although the idea of having machines perform human activities is not new, it has recently become more and more permanent, even in the area of defense. The reasons for this attitude are the opportunities which have been opened up in this area, especially by the electronics industry. The motives are ideas ranging from the protection of people against dangerous activities, and supplementing the work force with machines, as personnel shortages become more conspicuous, to the total replacement of human workers, with the result that eventually they may even become superfluous. Certainly an uneasy prospect. If these ideas generally apply to many areas, e.g., to automatic assembly line techniques in industry, which would in turn expect more precise execution in its production processes and would at the same time become more independent of human pressures, defense technology presently offers an especially interesting experimental field for this type of automation. Precisely in this area, all the factors coalesce which favor the deployment of robots, namely, the opportunity to compensate for the population decline, i.e., for the reduction in manpower requirements; compensation for the lack of human intelligence, which is mentioned again and again--where the justifiable question arises, whether people are becoming more stupid; protection against frequently senseless hazardous situations, which is actually the most sympathetic factor. The following paper expresses the opinions of Col Friedrich Egger, general staff, engineer, as the section chief, Command and Control VI 5, chairman of the army study group, which generates tactical requirements.

## Definition and History

The major wars of this century also move robots into armaments technology and implement them as remotely activated explosive charges.

Besides many experimental models, the "Goliath" became famous, especially in the Warsaw uprising of 1944, where both the attackers and defenders used this robot successfully and reached a peak with it in the battle around the stock exchange. After the Second World War industrial robots became more and more important because of the shortage of personnel, but at first scarcely any activities could be observed in the armaments sector.

Only beginning with the seventies, interest again appeared because of new technological possibilities. Now, in the middle of the eighties, almost euphoric ideas have been let loose.

## Activities

Occasioned by this situation, many committees have now concerned themselves with this material, either because of their own initiative or under contract. Impressive researches have become public. As far as armaments technology is concerned, the bulk of these proposals surely reach the committee that is responsible for army armaments planning within the Federal Department of Defense.

Their content is now contained in the following application possibilities for robot deployment in the army. The most important activities will here be listed once again:

NATO, in one of its working teams, is concerned with "robots in the battlefield" and is working out a study on this point.

FINABEL, the European armaments committee, likewise intends to perform a study.

The subdepartment Rue VI is concerned on a national level with pioneer ideas. It became a special armaments element in the research and technology concept.

Hamburg Bw University presented creative ideas to the secretary of state.

The Office for Studies and Training of the Federal Defense Department and the IABG produced initial brief studies for robot deployment in the army.

The following companies: Eng. Office Abels, Munster; DFVLR, Oberpfaffenhofen; Dornier, Friedrichshafen, EFGAN (Research Institute for Patent Recognition) Ettlingen; ESG, Munich; GIT (Society for Engineering Technology), Essen; GST (Society for Systems Engineering mbH); IITB (Fraunhofer Institute), Karlsruhe; MBB, Munich-Ottobrunn; Pietsch (IBP),

Ettlingen; Siemens, Munich; Wegmann, Kassel; AEG, Ulm; Diehl, Nuremberg; SEL, Stuttgart, made valuable contributions. This listing makes no claim for completeness.

Now, to be able to treat the opportunities of "robot deployment in the army" without euphoria, one must specify what is understood thereby. A sharp separation between already customary industrial robots and future military automats cannot be made on a technical basis.

Differences arise only in terms of purpose. If one side tries to achieve higher production, the objective of the other side is to protect people and, perhaps as a further consequence, to replace them. The army also is raising the question concerning the integral area, that is the limits from-to, within which robots should be used. It has decided the following:

as the lower limit, every automatic process as remote control or as automatic weapons release,

as the upper limit, to include within robot technology all technological possibilities that may appear, right up to intelligent systems of experts.

According to this definition, the army is already deep in robotization, and evidence for this will be presented below. The broad integral span will also be subdivided as indeed has already been done in the study groups, where this subject was treated as a component proper to the army, namely:

reconnaissance with the component areas of reconnaissance and electronic warfare

command with the component areas of command systems and FmVdDst (not further identified)

combat with the component areas of armored combat troops, light combat troops, and territorial army

combat support with the component areas of fire support and land and water mobility

deployment support with the component areas of ABC defense, camouflage and concealment, and logistics.

In terms of these systematics, the ideas of the army regarding "robot deployment" will now be considered in more detail. Every project will be evaluated according to its idea, degree of fulfillment of tactical requirements, and a technical implementation criterion.



## Application Possibilities

### Reconnaissance

The most comprehensive possible and in-depth information gathering process and its immediate transmission are the most important criteria of the troop commander for directing the combat.

Reconnaissance means, therefore, have special significance since they must penetrate the enemy space and at the same time must be exposed to as little risk as possible. The idea of using reconnaissance robots for this purpose has now already been transformed into reality and continues to occupy a broad space in the tactical requirements for future systems. The reconnaissance drones CL 89, CL 289, and KZO (mini-aircraft for target location) are unmanned, automatically controlled monitoring organs and, to an adequate extent, they already fulfill the requirements imposed on them.

They can be used economically only for specific location-finding purposes - the army here speaks of secondary reconnaissance. This implies a further requirement for primary reconnaissance means, which are not yet available. Two possibilities appear for closing this gap:

Is there a robot eye which can permanently visualize the enemy battlefield from a great height? The ideas for implementation have already matured technically to considerable extent with the ARGUS system, where an unmanned helicopter platform, controlled with a laser beam rider and equipped with radar eyes, could fulfill this requirement up to a height of 3,000 meters. A problem here is the vulnerability of this system since it must work actively and thus can easily be acquired by the enemy. At this time, this vulnerability is being investigated more closely in studies.

This vulnerability would not exist with the second possibility, a system that is diametrically opposite to ARGUS. It has a remote espionage robot, also known under the designation of ground sensor. The espionage units are well camouflaged and are introduced in the terrain. They work with a passive sensor combination. Their capabilities include:

- distinguishing real and caterpillar vehicles by means of seismic measurements,

- distinguishing engine noises by means of acoustic measurements,

- distinguishing wheel and roller spacings by means of infrared measurements.

In this way, they can even identify precisely the enemy units and can transmit instantly the movement of columns. However, a critical point with these robots is their placement in the enemy space.

In a further sense, "electronic warfar (EloKa)" is also part of reconnaissance. The HELAS system (Siemens Company) is a first step towards the automated rapid acquisition and evaluation of electromagnetic radiations from the enemy.

The system comprises the following components:

- telecommunications and electronic reconnaissance (FmEloAufkl),
- electronic support measures (EloUM),
- electronic countermeasures (EloGM).

It would certainly be the precursor for a future EloKa system of similar form.

#### Command

Information processing and the presentation of the decision of the troop commander as visible elements of the command process will be highly automated in the near future by the command system HEROS (army command information system for computer-supported operational command in the staffs). With its components - computer, printer, memory, data input and output unit, as well as position display unit - in individual command posts and their radio or optical waveguide linkage, they will

- improve the preconditions for commanding one's own forces and for using the means of the reconnaissance unit and

- secure a more rapid information flow than previously between the command posts of different command levels (Brig-Div-Corps) and equivalent command levels (Main and Rear).

The army will procure a planning simulation system for command training. In this connection one will fall back on experience that was already gained in the early seventies with the OR plan-game models. The question here arises whether this does not already involve an entry into the "expert systems" which recently have been conjured up so frequently.

A revealing glance into this material, which is still felt to be a black box, shall attempt to clarify this statement.

The OR plan games with computer assistance already now are able to simulate combat of the associated weapons in correspondence with the war picture. The application of probability calculations (Lancaster equation, Monte Carlo method) help to make decisions in terms of comparing the fighting power of weapons systems. Corresponding to the scenario chosen and to the command level, the game elements (weapon system - component unit - unit - formation - large formation - are controlled with updated and conditional instructions according to their deployment principles. The digitalized terrain, subdivided into grids, is introduced in accord with accessibility and obstacle value.

The elements of combat support, such as artillery, pioneers, and air defense, are considered factorially. Reconnaissance and logistics are subsumed harmonically into the entire event by means of supplementary models. Restricted visual conditions (day/night, dirty battlefield), weather, and seasonal conditions are likewise imaged together with their effects. The interplay of all these components finds its representation and evaluation in the loss developments of the two parties (RED and BLUE) as well as in changes of space domination.

Simulations of this type have already for some time been used for decision making. The results are also becoming more and more valuable through constant improvements of the models. But they cannot make the actual decision and will always remain only decision aids. Even if one could answer the disputed question, how far one can go in automation for certain investigations.

For training, it certainly makes more sense to let the battle run in the computer only with a time limit. By means of short-term changes of position, the command officer is forced to make new decisions as often as possible. One should therefore have an "open" game. This is the point of view of the soldiers. Many scientists, however, prefer a complete simulation, which runs automatically until a battle has been decided, and without the possibility of intervention by command elements. Here one thinks of a "closed system." Surely, such an uninfluencible simulation could be used meaningfully for investigations of defense planning (e.g. GDP plans), but it requires a level of intelligence on the part of the computer system which at this time is still a Utopia.

## Combat

In the combat area, there still exists at this time the greatest gap with respect to the utilization of automats or even robots. Apart from considerations and test models for automatic weapons loading for tank guns, robot technology has up to now hardly initiated any activities in the armored combat troops, which now as before dominate the army equipment. This may be disappointing, but it is understandably based on the medium-term emphasis of army equipment, the combat car of the nineties with its interconnection to the conventional war picture, to which the enemy also still feels committed.

Regardless of this, a thinking process has begun for the years after 2000, which tries to break out from the concatenation of conventional ideas. The return of the future combat tank into the preliminary phase, and the instruction to the secretary of state for armaments, to impose new requirements on this armored combat car of 2000 with the tactical most modern technologies, surely is a first step towards including combat automats in their considerations.

Wegmann Company, besides many other institutions, has concerned itself with possibilities whose content concerns a combat automat. In rough form, some solution possibilities will be indicated;

The concept of a remotely controlled combat tank with little protection, controlled by a highly protected crew transport car, puts protection of the human person into the center.

A string of tanks with three remotely controlled combat tanks and one controlling MTW (crew transport car) principally emphasizes the saving of personnel.

A two-man combat tank with remotely controlled munition transport as satellite tries to solve logistical problems.

A string of tanks with four combat tanks and four remotely controlled munition transports increases the protection, savings, and logistics effect.

These rough examples clearly show that the field here has not yet been covered. Precisely from the areas of the relevant industries, the army is expecting further stimulus and would be happy to include this in the work of its study teams.

#### Combat Support

The implementation status of robot technology in combat support can be evaluated more positively.

First as regards firing support: The end-phase controlled artillery munition (SADARM) is already in the introduction stage. Besides this, a tactical requirement for a combat drone system is currently being worked on with high priority. This unmanned mini-aircraft is equipped with an effective combat head and is to be used in squadrons to combat marching columns of armored units of the second level up to a level of 70 km in the enemy terrain from the VRV (forward edge of the battle area). The technical flight requirements and the equipment with an effective combat head already now can be achieved without any problem. But the necessary sensor apparatus is still lagging behind and harbors unsolved problems as regards target acquisition, resistance, and vulnerability. Nevertheless, this project is standing at the center point of army planning.

#### Pioneer Support

Mine combat by robot technology has acquired great significance. Here finally are some possibilities for overcoming nearly 100 years of stagnation.

The jump from the static mine to the dynamic mine (directional mines) guarantees an upwards evaluation of defensive mine combat. Tank and helicopter defensive mines are no longer waiting for contact to be triggered. But they use sophisticated sensors, with an acoustic and infrared basis, (ZIRA of Honeywell Company) operating over larger distances and equipped with selective capacity, to search out their targets autonomously.



Connected with spatially active explosive liquids, the dynamic mines are to be used for a spatial blockage system which likewise automatically compacts the isochrones and causes enemy movements to suffocate in viscosity.

The actual entry into robot technology, however, is sought by the army in terms of a remotely controlled mine-sweeping automat. A LEOPARD chassis, which already can be remotely controlled forms the basis for this. The introduction of a special element "robot technology" in the research and technology concept should provide the preconditions for implementation.

#### Deployment Support/Logistics

The components of deployment support suggest themselves especially favorably for robotization.

In ABC defense, it certainly is in accord with the times to use "remotely controlled automats" for staying in irradiated terrain, whether it be for measurement purposes or for decontamination. Atomic research has already set a mark in this connection, and has done a first step towards implementation with a robot fire department.

The smoke-screen tactics of the Warsaw Pact and our own studies confirm again and again that a lag exists in the area of "camouflage and concealment," in which the German army at one time occupied a leading position. Remotely controlled smoke pots could outrun enemy fire during counterattack operations and could conceal the vulnerable approach phase. The result of the study yielded a 50 percent reduction of losses under such preconditions as compared to an open approach.

In this connection, one must also think about dummies. These are designed as the cheapest deception robots and are pyrotechnically manipulated. Equipped with the best visual means, they provide no means to differentiate them from a true combat vehicle.

In logistics, one wishes to implement assembly line-like supply operations with robot columns, in similar fashion as was already described under the combat chapter.

The repair is very closely connected with industry and already now is using the automation that is applicable there.

#### The Research and Technology Concept (R and T Concept)

The most important instrument for all preliminary phase activities is the newly introduced research and technology concept of the main armaments department in the BMVg. Last year, a test run was performed with this and, beginning this year, it is supposed to guide all research activities. The state secretary for armaments intends to increase the means for research if this guarantees that utilization costs can be saved. Seven hundred million DM have been provided for 1986. Since "robot deployment in the army" on



a large scale is still in a preliminary phase, it is only from the R and T barrel that means can be furnished for further research in this area.

The procedure of the R and T concept accords an important influence to the user. The persons of the component fighting forces who are charged with the guiding concepts can specify the central points by correlating measures and can force these points on the committee for guiding concepts in the main armaments department. The means will then be distributed by the latter within its technical working team, which consists of so-called element reporters. For robot technology, this specification of central points in the guiding concept was implemented as "inhibition and promotion of mobility". It was introduced into the R and T management in collaboration with the responsible committee.

### International Collaboration

International collaboration in the robot area is still in its very beginnings. Great Britain and France have announced great interest in an exchange of ideas. Initial discussions on this point will take place during the next bilateral negotiations. The United States has begun intensively with development in all areas, and they are already pressing for specific collaboration. As a first step in this connection, instruction was provided in the U.S. projects, among which the following are to be mentioned as the most important:

- a reconnaissance robot vehicle,
- a training device with artificial intelligence,
- a tactical robot vehicle (weapons carrier),
- an ABC reconnaissance robot,
- a battlefield smoke-screening system,
- an automatic munitions supply point.

Independently of one another, the United States and GE have developed similar ideas.

No details are known about the opposite side. But one must start from the idea that activities of the same type are in progress there also.

### Summary

If the definition for "robot technology in the army" is accepted, the activities are already in the middle of this material, in terms of the examples we have cited. A further penetration, deepening, and expansion are being attempted within the framework of the R and T concept. International collaboration, especially with the allies, is apparent.

As a guideline we propose:

Personnel savings must be taken into account for demographic reasons.

The main motive for robotization, however, remains protection of the soldier.

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

#### AIRBORNE INFANTRY FOCUSES ON LIGHT INFANTRY, ANTITANK ROLES

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Aug 85 pp 26-31

[Article by Inge Dose-Krohn: "Special Task Applications: The Airborne Division"]

[Text] It is an elite unit in the Army, the 1st airborne division--the only division of this kind in the Bundeswehr's largest military service. Yet its commander, Maj Gen Christoph-Adolf Fuerus, accepts the concept of elite for his men only if it is used by soldiers of other units in recognition of the performance of the paratroopers. On the other hand, anyone who characterizes himself that way is in deep trouble with the commander. He does not like self-praise.

The recruit who wants to join the 8,000-man airborne division is investigated at the district selective service offices against high standards in respect to his suitability as a paratrooper. But mainly this guarantees the division that only soldiers who are really suitable for the infantry will be admitted. For this large unit is the only division in the Bundeswehr that is in fact infantry-heavy. And all operations require the highest level of physical performance. Thus, only soldiers who meet the criteria are useful here.

The men with the diving eagle on the bordeaux-red baret appear--or rather, drop in where "the fire is." They reinforce antitank defense in threatened sectors, block the enemy who has broken through, hold key positions, close gaps which the attacker has torn in their defensive forces, or protect open flanks. They liberate occupied villages, retake airports or harbors which have fallen into enemy hands. Since the paratrooper forces--as the Bundeswehr in general--are also defensive forces, raid-type operations behind enemy lines are also possible if these should have advanced into FRG territory.

The official definition of mission and character reads as follows: The units of the division are organized, equipped and trained so that they are especially suited to airborne operations with air landings, also units in jump operations. Their use makes it possible for the command to quickly impact the course of a battle, even at great distances, and thus to gain or maintain freedom of action. With airborne operation airborne units in the advanced combat organization with command units and combat units are landed or dropped

by parachute in the deployment area in such a way that they can begin fighting without delay.

The brigades are the airmobile combat support force of the three German corps. As large units--organized and motorized primarily as infantry--they are deployed within a limited time by air transport, or in special situations by land march. Thus, the corps can rapidly deploy combat forces over average and great distances, natural obstacles, destroyed or contaminated terrain, and adjust their own operations to every unexpectedly changing situation.

Even for the fast attack force, the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF), which in times of tension is suppose to contribute to credible deterrence along the "weak flanks" of NATO, the 1st airborne division, with a reinforced paratrooper battalion and other units, provides the largest share of the German contingent for whose planning and peacetime training it is also responsible.

The mission of being able to begin fighting without delay at the point of deployment means that in airborne operations the soldier himself carries all the heavy equipment, that the TOW weapon systems and 20-mm automatic gun on motor trucks (KRAKA) are landed at the same time from C-160 TRANSALL transport planes and CH-53 or UH-1D helicopters. In jump operations the soldier must depend solely on his personal equipment. Of course, in a national defense emergency this kind of operation is resorted to only in a limited way. The jumper hanging on his parachute quickly becomes a target par excellence.

In general, paratroopers in combat are unprotected in a way that scarcely any other soldier is. There is no armor anywhere. Their KRAKA which they brought along in their transport planes are only open vehicles and quasi fully exposed until they can disappear in covered terrain. No matter how operationally strong such a unit is, this vulnerability has coined for it such terms as "soft target" or "one-way weapon."

Yet these times will soon be over. The WIESEL, a light armored weapons carrier which can be transported by air and which, on tracks, carries the chief weapon systems of the division--TOW and 20-mm automatic gun--is suppose to undergo operational testing starting in 1986 at the airborne and air transport school in Altenstadt/Schongau. After vacillating for years the decision has now been made in favor of the vehicle developed by Porsche. It must still be equipped with a diesel engine like all Bundeswehr vehicles, primarily for environmental considerations. Effective 1989 the WIESEL is to become a part of the division and replace 312 KRAKA.

Next year the decision will be made about a new wheeled vehicle which is likewise transportable by air and will replace the remaining 484 motor trucks in the large unit. For only until 1988/1989 is the supply of replacement parts for the KRAKA certain. Completion of outfitting with both new vehicles is planned for 1993. But the supply gap which will occur starting in 1988 for the existing motor trucks will be closed this way: the vehicles which have been taken out of service will be scavenged to maintain the others.

Priority will also be given to the airborne soldiers' night vision equipment. Yet this year a start is to be made on equipping the TOW antitank guided missile systems with modern efficient night vision equipment. And better times, that is, safer times, are dawning for the jumpers. In the FRG a three-canopy parachute was developed which consists of 3 individual parachutes which are each 36 m<sup>2</sup> in size. In a national defense emergency this can decrease the jump height to 80 meters and substantially reduce the jumpers' period of vulnerability in the air. In peacetime, for safety reasons the jump height is about 250 meters. In any event these are 150 meters less than is required at present for a jump using the old type T 10 parachute. Introduction of the three-canopy parachute should be started this year.

All this will even further increase the combat capability of the 1st airborne division. With the introduction of army structure 4 even in this large unit it had almost doubled because it was possible to increase the operational paratrooper battalions from six to nine on the one hand, and on the other the number of antitank guided missile systems increased substantially.

WEHRTECHNIK discussed with division commander Maj Gen Christoph-Adolf Fuerus the reorganization of the division, its deployment, task, and combat readiness.

[Question] The airborne division and its brigades were organized in 1982 according to army structure 4. What have been your experiences with that?

[Answer] Our experience of almost 3 years now has shown that this organization is optimal in the brigades. We now mix paratrooper and antitank units in the same battalion just as we then normally deploy them together. Previously they were in separate battalions. I consider the organization that we currently have better than previously. It has proven its worth. When we receive new weapon systems such as the WIESEL or new wheeled vehicles, then we will have to review the organization once again. We have long since been involved in rationally determining things. But so far I have not yet been given any valid argument that necessarily requires a new organization for us. And in this I am proceeding only on the basis of very thorough testing and review because every reorganization causes considerably uneasiness among the troops and keeps us from the very necessary training.

The question of the threat was the basis of the considerations on the new structure of the airborne unit. We still believe that the enemy will attack with battle tanks and accompanying infantry. Furthermore, we naturally also proceeded on the basis of our predominant types of terrain. Thus, the mix of antitank units and foot infantry--which in a defensive battle must dig in because of the limited protection that it has--is the one which seems to us to be the most purposeful at the battalion level. Basically we have antitank strength because of the MILAN, but mainly because of the TOW. But these antitank guided missiles will be only very rarely used alone without infantry protection. Thus, there is better cooperation when both are in one battalion.

[Question] What are the tasks of the division staff in peacetime and in a national defense emergency?



[Answer] The staff here in Bruchsal commands the entire airborne division, basically consisting of the three brigades, brigade 25 in the Black Forest--headquarters in Calw und Nagold--brigade 26 in the Saarland with its headquarters in Saarlouis as well as in Merzig and Lebach, and then brigade 27 with headquarters in Lippstadt and garrison cities Wildeshausen and Iserlohn. In addition, there are engineer units in Passau, Coblenz, and Minden. This deployment from Passau to Wildeshausen covers therefore about 800 km. The engineer companies are of course under my command only in a national defense emergency. But we share them in our exercises. Naturally, for my assisting command supervision it is often awkward when the units are so widely dispersed in the FRG. Yet this stationing from north to south is naturally connected to deployment in a national defense emergency.

[Question] How are the airborne brigades deployed in a national defense emergency, in battalions or self-contained?

[Answer] Deployment by brigade--of course within a limited time, this is a part of the structure of our logistics--is basically possible, conceivable and also a goal. I think nothing of introducing battalions for reinforcement anywhere. For the brigade, primarily the paratrooper forces, cannot fully develop its combat capability. Of course, this brigade, if it takes over a separate combat sector, must be reinforced by combat support troops. That is a condition sine qua non. Here I am thinking of artillery, antitank helicopters as well as of air defense and engineers.

[Question] How do these brigades get to their deployment location?

[Answer] If appropriate helicopter transport space is available quickly and in adequate quantity, then we also strive for an airborne operation, either with CH-53's or UN-1D's, but in the case of large-scale operations we also think of the Luftwaffe's C-160 TRANSALL. But an airborne operation makes sense only with distances of more than 120 km. Of course, a really separate combat sector will be the exception for the brigade. For we naturally strive to deploy the airborne brigades in a deployment division's sector with the primary goal of freeing up mechanized units in order to have them available at another location where they are more urgently needed.

[Question] Do you have adequate transport space for such an airborne operation?

[Answer] We can fly a brigade in with the most important and most combat-capable units in two waves. Additional forces, especially from the logistics sector, follow as the ground echelon.

[Question] As replacement for the KRAKA the airborne division will receive two different types of vehicles, the armored tracked vehicle WIESEL on the one hand, and a wheeled vehicle which is yet to be developed on the other. Why?

[Answer] At the time the KRAKA was developed exclusively as a transport vehicle, not as a carrier vehicle for weapon systems. In retrospect, because



there was still no new one developed the KRAKA was overburdened more and more and this transport vehicle was even "pushed up" to being a weapons carrier. Today it carries not only mortars, but also the 20-mm gun and the TWO weapon system. This overburdens the vehicle. Porsche developed the WIESEL. But then Chief of Staff Glanz "put into motion" for us a very new system, a different wheeled vehicle, the Mercedes terrain vehicle. Thus, there were two competing systems. Last year we in this division itself carried out the comparison operational test for cross country capability between the WIESEL and the wheeled vehicle. This produced some results. Even if experts today claim that wheeled vehicles, with all-wheel drive and differential lock, have the same cross country capability as tracked vehicles, it simply is not true. After the capability of being transported by air--our most important requirement--had also been tested and firing trials relative to the vibration effect of the vehicle had been made, it turned out that this wheeled vehicle did not satisfy the important military-tactical requirements. The decision was definitively in favor of the WIESEL. The funds have been released for Porsche so that the company can now finish developing the prototypes. But we are clear about the fact that it is a weapons carrier with armor which can only be so strong, so that we remain within the 3-ton weight limit for air transportability. But we are still better protected against enemy weapons with it than with a wheeled vehicle. But I must add that the WIESEL alone does not yet satisfy the desires and needs of the paratroopers because we have the KRAKA in all companies. Thus at the moment there is intensive consideration of which wheeled vehicle can replace the other KRAKA. The tactical requirements will be fully developed yet this year and the funds for this KRAKA replacement have been taken into consideration in the budget plans.


[Question] Do the airborne forces occasionally have recruiting worries?

[Answer] Not at all. Actually there are always more individuals liable for military service who will also accept induction far from home, something that otherwise is not at all so popular among our young soldiers if they can only become paratroopers. Although the jump operation in a national defense emergency remains the exception, jump training does have some importance for the unit. With this training it develops noticeably high motivation and comparable will to perform. Of course, that is not the only factor, but the training which is carried out overall under combatlike conditions naturally does weld together. But the paratrooper course, which as a rule is completed unit by unit separately between the 4th and 6th month of training, is certainly a large motivation factor. The paratrooper does not like to be sent home while his six group comrades endure the demands.

Of course, motivation is not a criterion for this training. It is driven from necessity in combat.

The course itself is naturally a very great experience for all soldiers. For each has to first summon up his courage for the first "live" jump and for the most part also in all other jumps to throw his heart out first and then follow with his body.

Figure: Organization of an Airborne (LL) Brigade; (▲ = staffed)  
The 4th paratrooper battalion is staffed in peacetime.



Key:

1. Airborne headquarters company
2. Airborne mortar company, 16 mortars
3. Airborne engineer company
4. Airborne medical company
5. Airborne supply company
6. Paratrooper battalion, 20 TOW, 8 MILAN, 12 field guns
7. Headquarters and service company
8. Paratrooper company
9. Antitank paratrooper company

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## OFFICER TRAINING FOR ARMY HELICOPTER FORCE REVIEWED

### Flight Officer Course

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Aug 85 p 482

[Article by Capt Wolfgang Melon: "Pilot Training"]

[Text] The noncommissioned officer candidate's training course begins with "preflight training" which requires improving English skills (achieving performance level B) and in which the fundamentals of flying theory are to be taught. As a rule officers/officer candidates traditionally achieved these goals during their training course (university, army officer's school).

In the future, in view of the reorganization of training to become an officer (effective upon entering the service on 1 July 1985) officer candidates will start flying earlier because training takes place in the third service year instead of after completing university study. Only after basic schooling does the (then) officer start study at one of the Bundeswehr's universities.

The start into the flying specialty is done either in the Alouette II helicopter type at the army aviation combat training school or--on a lesser scale--in the UH-1D in the United States.

The flight student completes about 100 hours flying time before he has earned the military pilot's license for helicopters after passing a "check flight." He is now in a position to fly a helicopter independently and according to regulations. In the subsequent flight-tactical training flying is taught in operation. After completion of this training the "Combat Training Program" (CTP) is completed in the unit/squadron, a program which contains specific flight maneuvers and the entire operational spectrum for the type of helicopter in question. After an additional check flight "CR" (combat ready) status is awarded. The pilot has become an operations pilot in an army aviation squadron.

However, as a rule, that still does not mean completion of the training phase. The army aviation squadrons of the divisions and corps changed over to the new BO-105M liaison helicopter. Today BO-105M's are in operation in the corps squadrons of all three corps, the division squadrons of the 2nd corps and in the 6th army aviation regiment.

Pilots who had had flight experience can receive additional training in the BO-105P antitank helicopter. After special tactical training coupled with HOT marksmanship training they are fully combat-ready as PAH [antitank helicopter] pilots in one of the PAH regiments.

Transport helicopter pilots undergo the longest training course. After completing Alouette training and further school in the LTH UH-1D instrument flight training takes place with the object of flying a helicopter exclusively by instruments under almost any weather conditions. Helicopter pilots who completed their basic education in the United States must get accustomed to the different weather conditions in Germany through followup training at the army aviation combat training school (HFlgWaS) and also earn IFR [instrument flight rules] certification there (so-called Europeanizing).


In the flight-tactical training in the UH-1D it is then a question of mastering the weapon system on the battlefield under almost all kinds of weather conditions by visual flight. Only especially experienced helicopter pilots, who have completed all training in the UH-1D helicopter type are given the opportunity to fly the CH-53, the largest helicopter in army aviation.

However, the training possibilities for flight personnel in army aviation are still not exhausted; for every type of helicopter it is possible to earn flight instruction certification (FLB) which permits the holder to train flight students.

Since every helicopter pilot must annually demonstrate his abilities in a test flight, officers who have pilot testing certification are needed to do this (LUeB). Following repair, technically defective helicopters are tested by an NB [flight checking certified] pilot for faultless operation.

For reasons of air safety all these authorizations apply only for one type of helicopter.

## Training Course for Army Aviation Pilots



### Key:

- |                                     |  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Flight-tactical training CH-53   | 10. Basic helicopter training Alouette II                      |
| 2. Additional training MTH CH-53    | 11. Follow-up training at army aviation combat training school |
| 3. Flight-tactical training BO-105P | 12. Basic helicopter training in the United States (ENT)       |
| 4. Instrument flying training       | 13. Preflight training; length of training in weeks            |
| 5. Flight-tactical training LTH     |  |
| 6. Additional training BO-105M      |  |
| 7. Additional training PAH BO-105P  |  |
| 8. Additional training LTH UH-1D    |  |
| 9. Flight-tactical training II      |  |



# Technical Officer Training

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German Aug 85 p 483

[Article by Maj Dieter Hahne: "Training Technical Flight Personnel"]

[Text] The task of training army aviation technical flight personnel--achieving as high a level as possible of combat readiness for the flying equipment-- requires technically highly qualified soldiers of all specialties. This training must be done in the most diverse technical areas of aircraft technology and must be achieved in concert with general military training because the military tasks of the commander, trainer and teacher must also be performed by the long-term army aviation soldier. Figure 1 shows the large variety of technical areas in aircraft technology.

Training series are required in accordance with the technical areas. At the same time consideration must be given for the various specialties to the fact that on the one hand the specialist is supposed to achieve the necessary depth of expert knowledge in his training and on the other hand the future commander must be trained sufficiently comprehensively.

These requirements for technical training are met by a training system which is developed on ATN [military occupation certification] stages; this system is borne primarily by the Luftwaffe's technical schools. This system is supplemented by the training areas which must be performed in army aviation:

--ATN 8 training in the context of basic training,

--ATN 8 and ATN 7 training in the Alouette II helicopter (engine, airframe and equipment),

--training at the work site (AAP) and

--training in the type of helicopter.

Figure 2 gives a clear picture of the time relationship and rank/specialty structure.

Technical flight officers in the military service receive additional training to become certified technicians (2 years).

Technical flight officers in field service complete study at the Bundeswehr's advanced school (3 years). This study is supplemented by technical training in the officer's training course B, practical training in the unit and type training at the Luftwaffe's technical schools.

The most important problems in technical flight training can likewise be seen in Figure 2. These are the modest technical training of persons liable to military service and the long training periods for key technical flight personnel in the specialty of noncommissioned officers.

The fact that in the future, aircraft (for example PAH-2) which are assigned to the field forces will, because of self-testing devices, improved materials, modular construction, certainly be easier to service and repair than existing equipment also influences training. It will perhaps be possible to shape it more simply for the maintenance personnel. In the repair sector, however, even higher demands will have to be placed on expert knowledge. Thus, the length of training for this personnel will increase even more and as a result the field troops will be even more burdened than has been the case. A workable path to a solution is to distinguish between technical and military training, between commander, trainer and teacher and the skilled specialist.




Figure 1. Technical Areas in Aircraft Technology

Key:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Airframe</li> <li>2. Engine</li> <li>3. Hydraulics</li> <li>4. Aircraft metalworker</li> <li>5. Aircraft painter/upholsterer</li> <li>6. Ground service equipment</li> <li>7. Aircraft technology</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Aircraft equipment    Aircraft</li> <li>                                  Eli/-Instruments</li> <li>9. Flight equipment</li> <li>10. Aircraft replacement parts supply</li> <li>11. Aircraft radio</li> <li>12. Aircraft navigation</li> <li>13. Flight control systems</li> <li>14. Weapon systems</li> </ul> |
|--|--|




Figure 2. Training System Established on ATN Stages

Key:

1. Training time in weeks
2. Length of training in the ATN stage depends on technical area
3. +tester training without auxiliary tester Time (26 weeks)
4. +additional ATN's
5. Individuals liable to military service
6. Noncommissioned officers/subcontractors in the technical areas
7. Staff sergeant-master sergeant in the technical areas
8. Staff sergeant-master sergeant, lieutenant/captain (FD) [field services], accompanying flight personnel
9. Staff sergeant-master sergeant, lieutenant/lieutenant colonel (FD), tester

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MILITARY

FRANCE

## DEBATE CONTINUES ON STATE OF FRENCH ARMY

### Dissatisfaction Expressed in Public

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 23 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Germain Chambost]

[Text] It would be dishonest to maintain that harmony currently reigns in the relationship between the government and the military. But it would be just as tendentious to contend that a conflict is brewing.

A general denounces the decrepit state of the combat tanks assigned to him. An active-duty Air Force colonel publishes a highly critical book on the Manta operation in Chad under a pseudonym (Spartacus). (1) (It was announced that a book denouncing the lack of preparedness of our armed forces and written by Air Force General Andre Dubroca is scheduled for release in the near future. However, General Dubroca left the military service 2 years ago.) French officers are implicated in a shady operation, the sabotage of a ship belonging to the environmental group Greenpeace. They now find themselves behind the bars of a New Zealand jail.

Three events in 1985 that, among others, have left their special mark on relations between the armed forces and the political administration to which they are subordinated, and which could imply that dissatisfaction--the ever-present "malaise"--exists today in the army. Or, more accurately, that it exists within the armed forces, because the military do not constitute a homogeneous community. But to deduce from this that these military men contest the political powers in office, therefore the Socialist party...

Of course, it would be rash to assume that the most complete harmony currently reigns between the government and the military. But it would also be dishonest to state that a conflict is brewing. Either that or the men in uniform whom we interviewed--in the Navy, the Army, the Air Force, the police, stationed both in Paris and especially in the Southwest, from Bordeaux to Pau, from Toulouse to Cognac--are masters of deceit. Understandably, all of the active duty military personnel whom we interviewed asked to remain anonymous. Nothing unusual about this. Their duty is to maintain silence, they know the consequences of speaking to a reporter, even if it is only to confirm that, in the final analysis, they are not particularly unhappy about the conditions under which they serve.

In fact, this comes as no surprise to them. For example, none of the individuals we interviewed protested against the sanctions imposed on Air Force Colonel Gerard Arnaubec for criticizing his direct superiors while hiding behind the pseudonym of Spartacus.

The opinions on General Arnold and the tank issue reflect more variation. The fact that his allegations were construed by the public as a revelation is a subject of vast amusement in the military, particularly among members of the tank corps. "Everyone knows that our AMX 30s are obsolete. We have been saying it for 10 years, this dates back to before the current administration. But it was not up to him to make these statements. His superiors were there to relay the information to the minister..." maintains a commandant in the Pau region. Asked to comment on this statement, an adjutant replied that he understood the general: "I agree that the people need to be told."

As usual, the military community presents a unanimous front only when facing a particular issue. In the Greenpeace affair, the military all faced an issue. Even though Commandant Mafart and Captain Prieur may wear stripes, they hardly belong to the military community anymore, except maybe from afar. Yet they may be the perfect symbol of the "virtues" the military recognizes as its own: a sense of duty, discretion. Mafart and Prieur were acting on orders, they were more or less sent to ride for a fall, and nevertheless they "shut up." On the other hand, admittedly, the military have trouble understanding why the new Defense minister, Paul Quiles, requested television coverage of his telephone conversation with Dominique Prieur. The people we interviewed were unanimous in their expression of astonishment, if not outrage: "A clumsy move on the part of a politician..." commented a paratrooper from Mont-de-Marsan, a lover of combat (and proud of it), a "man of action" who sees his own reflection in the Turenge due in terms of motivation. "Discretion is the only thing..."

Charles Hernu did not contradict this statement during his appearance on the television program "Face the Nation" aired on France Inter on 25 November 1985.

Ah, Hernu! Francois Mitterrand is rumored to have told friends that the former Defense minister was "limited, but the military like Charles..." The second part of this sentence reflects an undisputable fact. Hernu's departure left all military employees in a more or less orphaned state. And it is not due to chance alone that more outbreaks of dissatisfaction occurred following the minister's resignation in the wake of the Greenpeace incident. Opinions range from "a simple, uncomplicated guy like us..." according a Navy officer to this heartfelt praise from a Toulouse policewoman: "I don't think Mr Quiles knows much. But Charles Hernu, what a great minister, what a competent man..." through this somewhat astonishing confession from an Army staff colonel in the Southwest: "True, he didn't get us a penny more. But he liked us..." If even colonels want to be liked, nowadays, where are we headed?

"His greatest achievement?" queried an officer. "You want me to tell you what was his greatest achievement?..." After some thought: "He dispelled fears about the armed forces' ability to survive with the Socialists, side by side with those dudes. He kept it from degenerating into chaos..." Then, after giving the question a great deal of thought: "The Army is not anti-Socialist."



It is anti-disorganization. It needs clear directions. Look at what happened in New Caledonia. The only time the police openly protested was because they spent all of their time waiting for orders that never came. But that wasn't Hernu's fault. It was Pisani..."

The current outbreaks could therefore also be explained by a feeling of confusion, of an absence of government which is perceived or assumed to be in a suspended state until the legislative elections. The administration is no longer governing with as firm a hand. It should also be recalled that certain military men never let slip an opportunity to make their mark when a political event is so near. They clamor for more funds, hoping that the candidates will take this bait. It is a fact that, in the words of our officer, the military faces a problem of not enough "bread." Like many other sectors of the French community.

#### Defense Allocations Questioned

Bordeaux SUD-OUEST in French 24 Dec 85 p 2

[Article by Germain Chambost]

[Text] France cannot continue to support all of its forces at the existing levels.

On 2 December, in commemoration of the Saint Cyr festival, a hundred or so officers gathered for the traditional feast at Nield Palace, headquarters of the 11th Paratroop Division in Toulouse. The "Spartacus" affair (see yesterday's edition of SUD-OUEST) was given the floor, or rather laid on the table. This affair is of direct concern to the paratroopers--they are all familiar with Chad. "There were a few snickers," related a witness. "That's it..." No virulent criticism of the administration; the officers in attendance kept their opinions to themselves. The traditional role played by these "paras" has suffered a blow. Many Leftists still consider them as so many participants in a potential coup, but they strictly want to remain Republican. The slogan "You are the nation's soldiers..." is drummed into interns at the Pau school for airborne troops.

Not that a soldier doesn't experience some unhappy moments during his career. These are an accepted fact. One does not pass judgment. Even in front of friends. "During a meeting of the reserves at the camp in Souges in 1984," reminisced Jacques Lafond, a commandant who left the Army last summer, "the officers of the paratroop cavalry lecturing at the seminars refused to address the political side of the subject. They limited their comments strictly to business matters..." (1) (Jacques Lafond is working to organize in Bordeaux a study group on defense problems. This phrase should be construed in its broadest sense since it does not exclude any position, even that of the "civil dissuasion" so dear to some movements with few militaristic sympathies.) In fact, the critical opinions voiced in recent months have emanated from military personnel who have experienced problems in the field.

The Air Force believes it is at a disadvantage from a budget standpoint, relative to the Navy ("The Navy played their cards right, the minister swears only

by them..." commented a young general). And it is true that deliveries of its combat planes have been significantly delayed during the past 4 years.

The infantry and tank corps are asking questions, as evidenced in the case of General Arnold. Or by the criticism which accompanied the establishment of the FAR (Rapid Action Force) for which helicopters were taken from certain regiments, "borrowing from Peter to pay Paul." Because both could not be equipped due to lack of funds. "In the past," reported a staff officer, "the active regiments stored their out-of-date equipment for use by the reserves. Today, we take this equipment out of storage and re-issue it to the active forces..." The crisis has come to that.

"It is true that this has obliged us to better manage our allocations. And it is normal that we should participate in the national effort," admits the same staff officer. "We have reduced our staff in addition to making equipment cutbacks. But today, we no longer know what to do. They cannot continue to ask us to accomplish the same tasks as before without giving us the means..."

Perhaps this is one of the causes of any potential dissatisfaction. The Rapid Action Force, the brainchild and the major achievement of the current administration, is not likely to want for the basics. Designed to be prepared for action in the European theater and overseas (even if some argue that it is not likely to properly accomplish two missions that are so different), the FAR will be equipped with men, supplies and the latest weapons. But alongside the FAR? "We run the risk of creating an Army, an Armed Forces that works at two different speeds," warns a colonel. "Therein lies the greatest risk at present."

From a paratroop officer: "It is true that in the FAR, we are somewhat spoiled, from the mission and equipment standpoint, even if it has nothing to do with the aviators. Go visit an Air Force base, tell me something new! But although our needs are met in terms of the missions assigned to us, this does not mean that we have become blind to the truth. Because of inadequate means (in general--equipment, training facilities) supplied in inadequate quantities, segregation will develop within the constituent elements of the armed forces. This will result in a sort of segregation among the men. It is very serious..."

Mery, the former chief of staff of the Armed Forces rumored to be close to Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, denounced this risk himself during a seminar held at the Senate on 18 November 1985. He mentioned a possible break "in the cohesion of our military machine." According to a commandant, "Basically, Mery is right. However, he forgets to mention that the process in question is not a new phenomenon, that it dates back to before the Socialists' rise to power. It started a long time ago. When the general was the chief of staff of the Armed Forces..."

The debate can therefore not be reduced to a controversy between the current opposition and majority in which one side is very quick to promise to correct the errors allegedly committed by the other. In any event, the economic situation will not permit it. Military equipment is becoming increasingly expensive; its inflation rates are unrelated to current inflation rates. It is therefore ridiculous and even dishonest to summarily argue that yearly increases in the defense budget always outpace inflation. As if a tank or a combat aircraft could be compared to a household's market basket.

Decisions and choices must be made. All the aviators, paratroopers and sailors we interviewed were quick to recognize this. But are they ready to bear the consequences? That is less certain. They are made in the image of representatives of other social groups, protesting in good faith when they are deprived of what they perceive as necessities.

The country is still living on the tail end of an era when expansion blurred errors of choice, erased differences between such and such a branch of the armed forces, and allowed nearly every need to be met. This is no longer the case today.

Today, we have the right to ask for answers to some questions: Can France afford 2 nuclear aircraft carriers (and why), 450 combat planes (for what missions), 1,000 or 2,000 tanks (what for)? Should France continue to maintain a strategic nuclear force, a tactical nuclear force even if it is called a pre-strategic force, overseas forces, the military draft, etc.?

Faced with the facts, the answer is no. Not all at the same time. But who will dare cut into it? And, first of all, who will dare raise the issue? Unfortunately, this problem may degenerate into a mere electoral campaign theme during the months to come, thus eluding the in-depth scrutiny it merits.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

BRIEFS

IRAQ ORDERS MIRAGE F-1'S--The Iraqi Air Force has ordered a further delivery from Dassault of 24 Mirage F-1's, which will be delivered in the next 18 months. At the same time, Iraq has returned to France the five Super Etendard's that were leased from the French Navy for 2 years in mid-1983. This is the third consecutive order from Iraq for the F-1; two previous lots were ordered in 1980 [60 aircraft] and in 1982 [29 aircraft]. These 89 aircraft of the first two lots already have been delivered and presently represent the cutting edge of the Iraqi Air Force. The five Super Etendard's that had been rented to attack the Iranian oil terminal in Kharq with AM.39 EXOCET missiles have been returned following the completion of the conversion program for the 89 F-1's to make them suitable for arms transport. The 24 F-1's of the current order will be delivered ready to use the Exocet. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 14] /8309

CSO: 3528/59

MILITARY

ITALY

BRIEFS

UNDERWATER COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM--Telesub Lanterna of La Spezia, which specializes in underwater telephone and radio transmitting systems, has produced an ultrasound underwater intercommunications system which allows divers to contact surface units. The equipment is composed of two units, a surface transmitter-receiver with a transmission range of up to 2 miles and supplied with rechargeable batteries that can operate for approximately 40 hours, and an underwater transmitter consisting of a holster, transducer, earphone, and microphone. The system is designed to withstand depth pressures up to 100 m, can operate within a range of approximately 1 mile, and is supplied with rechargeable batteries with an endurance of about 30 hours. Both units work in single sideband [SSB] and have automatic volume control. The acoustic frequency transducer also is produced by Telesub Lanterna and, in effect, is an underwater loudspeaker, already adopted by the Italian Navy. It permits the monitoring of sounds in water with the naked ear with high fidelity and intelligibility up to approximately 50 m from the installation point. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 10] /8309

CSO: 3528/59



MILITARY

SWITZERLAND

BRIEFS

ADVANCED TRAINER FINALISTS SELECTED--The Swiss Air Force has selected the Hawk of BAE and the Alpha Jet of Dassault/Dornier as finalists in its competition for a new advanced trainer which is destined to replace the present Venom aircraft at the beginning of the 1990's. The Aermacchi MB-399 and Casa C-101, which were also competing, therefore have been eliminated. The final selection of a winner is expected in the second half of 1987. [Text] [Chiavari RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA in Italian No 1, Jan 86 p 14] /8309

CSO: 3528/59

ECONOMIC

AUSTRIA

## POSITION, VIEWS OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH INSTITUTES

### Role of Economic Institutes

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 10 Dec 85 p 11

/Article by Matthaus Kattinger: "International Economic Trend Institutes. II Austria. In Vienna the Economic Researchers Are Only Supposed to Analyze, but Not Criticize"/

/Text/ Vienna. Austria's province of economic research institutes, which also regularly make economic forecasts, is very small. Two institutes in all, the Institute for Economic Research (WiFo) and the Institute for Higher Studies (IHS) make forecasts about the future development of the Austrian economy. Certainly there are many common interests and ties, but in terms of conception the institutes are very different.

Unlike the five German institutes, which have moved out of the federal capital, the center of economic policy, the two Austrian institutes have their headquarters in Vienna, the Austrian center of all political activity. A further difference from the German institutes is that the WiFo institute in particular has a much stronger connection with economic policy and with those who carry out policy, although it strives for independence in statements and methods.

The peculiarities of both institutes can best be shown by comparing them. The IHS emerged from the American Ford Foundation. It is conceived as an institute for post-graduate studies. The main emphasis is therefore on the training of students, so-called scholars, who after two years of studies, are trained and employed in applied research. Participation in research projects during tenure as a scholar is an unalterable requirement.

The IHS houses five departments in all: economics, political science, sociology, industrial management as well as mathematics and computer science. In principle the institute is accustomed to temporary employment only. The assistants receive two-year contracts which, just as those of the department heads, can be but do not have to be extended.

The work at the IHS is part of a preparation for a career which continues usually with the Austrian National Bank, in the competing WiFo institute or in a professorship. The IHS then is rather a theoretically oriented institute of basic research which also carries on applied research (and conducts contract projects), whereas the WiFo institute, for all practical purposes, is almost exclusively active in applied research.

The emphases of the WiFo institute's work traditionally reside in the analysis and forecasting of economic trends. More and more in the past decade and a half fundamental studies in the area of structural and monetary policy have been carried out. A further WiFo emphasis which has come about in the past five years is the analysis of economic policy instruments, as most recently, for example, in exhaustive studies of the system of encouraging investments.

Close ties between the institutes exist most of all in the personnel area. Thus the present chief of the IHS, Professor Hans Seidel, was active in a leading post in the WiFo institute for practically 20 years. Starting in 1961, Seidel was the second WiFo chief after Dr Franz Nemschak, and from 1972 to 1980, Seidel was in charge of WiFo. Then at the end of 1980, Seidel, who was considered politically neutral, received and accepted the socialist government's offer to join the Ministry of Finance as State Secretary to fill the economic policy vacuum left by the departure of Hannes Androsch--whom Federal Chancellor Bruno Kreisky had forced out--and by the relative inexperience in these matters of the new chief Herbert Salcher.

His deputy, Helmut Kramer, a Voralberg native, has been managing the affairs of WiFo since then. When Seidel's political career was nearing its end, Anatol Rapoport, who had been called to Vienna from his North American teaching post, was simply relieved of his duties with not entirely elegant tricks and with typically Viennese gradeur ("Your desk is needed"). Since 1 January 1984, Seidel has been managing "the competition."

Clear dependencies and spheres are also apparent in the financing of both institutes, WiFo, which has existed since 1927 and was constituted as a private association, has about 90 collaborators at its disposal (of those a few active only part-time, but there are no free lance collaborators) and a budget of 60 million Austrian schillings (DM 8.6 million) for 1985. Of that about 20 million schillings are provided by the main financier, the Federal Government. Other important "payers" are the Austrian National Bank, the social partners (that is the Federation of Labor Unions, the Workers Association, the Federal Chamber, the Agricultural Association), the federal states and several large associations such as industrial federations, bank and savings and loan federations or the holding company of nationalized industries. Two thirds of the budget are met by these contributions, and the remaining third comes from contracts and published reports.

The experts of the institute are expected to analyze and predict, but not to criticize or hand out grades.

Since the departure of the Ford Foundation at the end of the sixties, the IHS has been maintained by three large underwriters. With a total budget of a little less than 35 million schillings (DM 5 million), the largest portion comes from the Ministry of Science. In addition, the Austrian National Bank and the municipality of Vienna are welcome backers. Between 20 and 25 percent of the budget has to be financed through contract work.

The president of the institute is National Bank President Stephen Koren; the vice-president is Science Minister Heinz Fischer.

With regard to financing, according to institute expert Seidel, "the WiFo chief has much more freedom, because the board of trustees does not importune him and wishes to be convened only once a year for a board meeting or general meeting, whereas in the IHS the board of trustees has conceded, under its statutes, fundamentally greater powers, and they also include, however, worries about financing."

For all the competition in prognoses and the competition of experts between both institutes, there have not been any "body locks" as of yet. The prognoses resemble each other more and more (not last of all because exemplary achievements of the other institute are referred to, as in the WiFo investment test). And the two institutes have finally been persuaded not to hold their respective quarterly revisions of prognoses in press conferences which follow right after the other (at the WiFo institute, by the way), but rather to put together a joint press conference on their prognoses.

One can only hope that the institutes will be spared a long period of austerity as in 1981 and 1982, and in 1983 as well, when for virtually three-quarters the press conferences on prognoses were overshadowed by the question crucial to everything, "Is it coming now, the recovery, or is it not coming?" And, from the viewpoint of the institutes, the motto of one industrialist continues to be applicable: "If only economic policy were as good as the prognoses..."

(Cf. also the first part, "France," in the HANDELSBLATT of 2930 November 1985)

#### Economic Prognoses

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 10 Dec 85 p 11

(Unattributed report: "Austria/Economic Researchers Remain Optimistic. Investments Are Going To Be the Impetus to Growth")

/Text/ Vienna. Austria's economic data are looking hopeful. Economic growth stands at 3 percent--combined with a clear reduction in the rate of inflation to 3.2 percent, a notable growth in business activity and an even balance of trade.

These cheerful prognoses for the current year, which both economic research institutes presented with only slight differences, are supposed to be continued in 1986 as well. Austria is in the fourth year of an admittedly moderate but generally solid recovery.

The predictions for 1986 are: a growth of at least 2.5 percent, an inflation rate of about 3 percent and an unemployment rate climbing slightly to 4.9 percent (after 4.7 percent this year, although the 5 percent mark had been feared for 1985).

Investments to be financed almost exclusively from cash flow will become the mainstay of the economic trend. The most eager of all to invest is industry, which intends to invest 15 to 20 percent more in 1986 than in 1985. And that comes after two years, 1984 and 1985 that is, in which two-digit growth rates had already been registered. Well-founded optimism was expressed in all the surveys of industrialists.

With a real growth of 2 percent, private consumption will make a somewhat less important contribution to growth. The export economy's prospects are no longer quite as favorable as in the years 1984 and 1985 (with real increases of 10 and 11 percent in the export of goods), but they are still expected to come to 7 percent in 1986 as well. In light of a predicted value for the dollar of 17 Austrian schillings (DM 2.43) for the coming year, Austria's US export business will decline and be compensated for with increased deliveries to Western Europe and especially here to the Federal Republic.

Structural problems will continue to exist even though there were increases in the share of markets in 1985, whereby in this regard it certainly became evident in the most recent past that these market successes had to be bought largely with price reductions. Seen from the perspective of labor costs, Austria is being put under pressure because of German wage policy. For that reason, labor costs might rise at a faster rate in Austria in 1986 than in the Federal Republic.

The development in unemployment during the winter months is being watched with definite concern. If a seasonal peak was reached in 1985 with 198,000 unemployed in January, then during the winter of 1986 it might climb in any event to more than 200,000, probably even 210,000 unemployed (7.5 percent).

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

#### FIRMS EXPLOIT OPENINGS IN YUGOSLAV MARKET

Milan ESPANSIONE in Italian No 188, Jan 86 pp 149, 152

[Article by Luigi Orescano: "Yugoslavia: A More Aligned Import"]

[Text] The skis on which Ingmar Stenmark won his last world slalom title were made in Yugoslavia. They are made by Elan, a technologically advanced company, and are exported to half the world. But such competition is not born in Belgrade. Behind Elan is a joint venture with an Austrian industrial group which has invested in Yugoslavia to unite its technology with the low production costs of the Serbo-Croatian industries, and above all to enter without "clearing" into all the CEMA countries [the cooperation organization of socialist countries] where skiing is not only a hobby or sport, but also an ancient tradition and where they can find markets even for skis unsalable in the West.

In 1986 even an Italian company, Simod of Legnaro [Padua], is present in Yugoslavia with a large industrial joint venture. "And we will also produce sports footwear," emphasizes Vittorio Morandin, Simod technical director. "Who knows, we may also win a world championship." Simod is a footwear manufacturer with four factories between Padua and Pescara, 330 employees, and gross sales of more than 100 billion lire. For more than 20 years, virtually since it was established, Simod has sold to CEMA and particularly to Belgrade, thanks also to the profound and direct knowledge of that marketplace which businessman Paolo Sinigaglia possesses. The joint venture [for 32 percent] with Kostana of Vranie in Macedonia will give life to three factories producing sports footwear and boots, with employment for some 600 workers. The financial commitment, which officially is "top secret," nevertheless will be substantial, at least 30 billion lire. "To invest in Yugoslavia today is less risky than at one time," says Aldo Romoli, president of the Italian-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce. "Belgrade has passed an important reform of the legislation on joint ventures which gives preferential treatment to foreign investors. It is not a comprehensive reform because the innovations still place too many ties on the decision-making autonomy of the foreign entrepreneur, but it is already a good step forward."

A reform that has the taste of an economic SOS was launched by Belgrade toward the EEC precisely during the negotiations--which should be concluded before June--on the renewal of the general agreement with the Community. The Yugoslav trade deficit at the end of August 1985 reached 2 trillion lire, foreign debts were almost 35 trillion, and the inflation rate was 79 percent. Under these conditions, Yugoslavia cannot buy even one-tenth of the know-how from the West that would be necessary to restore its own products to competitiveness. Therefore, the only road that remains is that of opening itself to foreign investments.

And the innovations are notable. The foreign partner that produces for exportation will have to give to the state only 54 percent of the prized foreign currency that is obtained. Half of the profits, whatever they amount to, may be re-exported at any time and it is only required that the other half be reinvested or in any case spent in Yugoslavia. The new law allows negotiating of the joint venture contract, which since 1985 can be stipulated even in the language of the foreign partner other than in Serbo-Croatian, to take place in a third country. The new law also permits the foreign partner to invest in the form of production equipment and know-how without actually paying money and limiting itself to the transfer into Yugoslavia of production lines already utilized and superseded. It is also exempt from all obligations that do not directly concern the production function [military and social taxes and so on].

"We will go to produce in Macedonia because we believe in general demand in Yugoslavia," Morandin explains once again, "but also because we will reinforce our presence in the Eastern countries where the Yugoslav origin of a product constitutes an ideal visiting card." Yugoslavia, notwithstanding its deficit balance sheet, boasts of a commercial "first," the leadership in exports of manufactured goods to almost all the nonaligned nations and to many Third World countries in the Mediterranean region. "Whoever invests in Yugoslavia aiming at exports," Romoli comments, "makes no error. But neither does he who has hopes in the domestic market." Belgrade's exchanges with CEMA and with the EEC reveal the double soul of the country. Some 50 percent of Yugoslav foreign trade is concentrated in CEMA, the other half in the West and in the developing countries. Nevertheless, since prized currency to buy petroleum does not come from the East, Belgrade tries to sell more to the EEC. In Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Istria a powerful cultural ally of the West is growing: television. Within the limits of per capita income, Yugoslavs of the Adriatic and Central European regions are directing themselves even more toward Western products. Judging by Italian-Yugoslav trade tables, along with the greater quantity of imports controlled by the state [machinery, chemical products, semi-finished products], it appears that even other types of goods, such as meat, automobiles, and fabrics, are purchased from Italy, reflecting the spontaneous demands of the final consumer.

If trade is considered to be in an actual phase of stagnation, the reason lies essentially in the extremely negative trade balance of payments which compels Belgrade to put a brake on imports and to push for "countertrade." However, Belgrade does this without offering in exchange a sufficient variety of products and, above all, without having at its disposition a central clearing office which

could act as middleman with the West for the various exchange consignments offered or requested by local companies. Therefore, although Italy remains fourth among the countries which supply Yugoslavia, and although consumers are favorably disposed inward the "made in Italy" label, access to the market remains difficult. The two commercial channels most often used are the "autonomous accounts," that is, the local clearing agreements stipulated between companies and Italian and Yugoslav entities in the border areas [all in Friuli-Venice Giulia]; or the many Italian traders specializing in this market who act as intermediaries. This involves mostly "countertraders" or companies that represent Yugoslav trade groups and which also work as middlemen [like the Italian Centrocoop, a general trading company in Milan]. To rely on these specialized operators is very often the fastest way of sounding out the Yugoslav market for compensation exchanges or even through cash payments without first exposing oneself to the high costs of trade fairs, business trips, or direct representation [a list of some of the main traders is attached]. Finally, guidance can be very useful as can, in certain cases, using as intermediary the various Italian-Yugoslav commercial institutions active in Italy. The three offices of the Italian-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce are in Milan [Via Cernaia 9; telephone 02-650861], Trieste [Piazza Borsa 14; telephone 040-60445], and Udine [Via Morpurgo 4; telephone 0432-206541].

<u>Name</u>	<u>Sector</u>	<u>Address</u>
Bamil	Skins-fabrics	Via Vittor Pisani 19, Milano 02-6554397
Centroproduct	Citrus fruits	Via Agnello 2, Milano, 02-8810
Chemoll	Chemicals, plastics	Via Lanzone 6, Milano, 028057641
Chim-Metal	Chemicals, plastics	Via Pirelli 27, Milano, 02-7601
Emi	Mechanical, molds	Via Boscovich 14, Milano, 02-653158
Euroimport	Chemicals	Via Rodano 6, Milano, 02-2154741
Ferrochimetal	Chemicals, mechanical	Via Vittor Pisani 26, Milano, 02-653041
Grecotex	Textiles	Foro Buonaparte 63, Milano, 02-870948
Italseit	Synthetic fibers	Via Palazzi 2/A, Milano, 02-2870101
Jakil Andrea	Food	Foro Buonaparte 68, Milano, 02-3452121
Okura & Co. Italia	Agricultural machinery, food, footwear	Piazza del Liberty 8, Milano, 02-798262
Onmia Nuova	Industrial machinery	Piazza Repubblica 9, Milano, 02-650421
Oropa Trade	Yarns, clothing	Via Boscovich 61, Milano 02-270193
Pellitalia	Skins	Via Merlo 1, Pandino [CR], 0371-90012
Proital	Textiles, metallurgical	Via Vittor Pisani 28, Milano, 02-6557537
Samita	Plastics, rubber	Via Maniago 11, Milano, 02-2154967
Tolma	Chemicals, plastics	Piazza Duca D'Aosta 12, Milano, 02-6703441
RiRi	Steel products, mechanics, elec- tronics, wood, tobacco, accessories	Via Rotondi 6, Milano, 02-4983441
Sochital	Chemicals, ferti- lizers, insecti- cides, plastics, fodder	Via Roentgen 18, Milano, 02-8353952
Vatta	General trading	Largo Domodossola 1, Milano, 02-344465; Via San Nicolo 4, Milano, 02-64393
Magis International	General trading	Via Boccaccio 19, Milano, 02-4696672
Metalka	Nonferrous metals	Via Vittor Pisani 22, Milano, 02-6595637

The table lists some of the main trading firms operating in Italy for Yugoslavia. Most are firms that specialize in countertrade contracts, or companies that represent Yugoslav trading groups and that also work as middlemen.

/8309

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ECONOMIC

ITALY

OBSTACLES TO TRADE WITH BALKAN COUNTRIES

Milan ESPANSIONE in Italian No 188, Jan 86 pp 152-153

[Article by Sergio Luciano: "The Balkans Are Beautiful When You Manage To Sell"]

[Text] Each week the Romanian soccer coupon includes six A Series games of the Italian championship. The actions of Juventus decide the destination of the meager premiums offered as prizes by the Bucharest Government. In short, the "made in Italy" label, even in sports, is well liked in Romania as it is also in Bulgaria where, without being such great fans, they appreciate other offerings such as the cuisine [negotiations are under way for the opening of a chain of Italian restaurants in Sofia], and the hospitality [a pool of Italian companies are restructuring the great Pliska Hotel in the capital].

In short, Bulgaria and Romania, the two CEMA countries [the economic cooperation organization of socialist countries] ostensibly farthest away from the Mediterranean in terms of culture and economic relations, are united by a growing interest in Italian products. This is increased, in the Romanian case, by the affinity of language which facilitates direct contacts and, in the case of Bulgaria, by a long tradition of commercial exchanges. "But be aware that this interest in Italy and in its products does not make access to the two Balkan markets easier for our exporters," observes Sergio Padova, president of Francescato of Milan, a trading company specializing in the chemicals sector and in trade with the East. "Secondly, Bulgaria and Romania have only superficial affinities. In reality they are two completely different markets in mentality, organization, and channels of commercial access." For example, Bulgaria is considered a difficult country to conquer commercially, but trustworthy and regular in its demand. It was not by chance that until 4 years ago Italy was in first place, after the Soviet Union, in the list of countries commercially most active with Sofia. On the other hand, Romania traditionally is considered one of the least reliable countries, not to be trusted in the formality and times of payment, delivery of goods, and quality of product. However, for some time relations with Bucharest have been improving for the few Italian companies which operate there [in 1984 the Italian Exchange Control Office registered exports for just 122 billion lire] thanks to a law which forbids the banks from opening lines of credit for imports for state entities which do not demonstrate their solvency. In Bulgaria, problems of this kind have never occurred due to a strict regulation which discharges onto the banks, and indirectly onto the state coffers, the settling of any foreign debt



contracted by a commercial organization which ultimately does not pay. Trade relations between Italy and Bulgaria have suffered from the diplomatic crises linked to the Farsetti case [the trade unionist tried in Sofia for espionage] and then to the Antonov case, that is, to the suspected implication of the Bulgarian secret service in the attempt on the Pope's life by the Turk, Ali Agca. Only this year has this trend in trade been reversed and begun to recover, increasing by 40 percent in the first 9 months. This was emphasized by Petr Russev, the Bulgarian deputy minister for industry, in a business trip to Milan at the beginning of last December. Russev promised the broadest disclosure through the Italian-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce of the investment programs that will be passed with the next 5-year plan [1986-1990] now being discussed by the legislature in Sofia. "Knowing the 5-year plans," confirms Lacesar Kostadinov, director of Conor Italiana, an Italian-Bulgarian mixed [50-50] company which carries out general trading in Milan, "it is easier for the Italian exporters to present themselves in Bulgaria with the right offer at the right moment." But through which channels is commercial penetration more rapid and certain? "The majority of Italian companies which have stable business relations with Sofia," Kostadinov explains, "have direct agencies in Bulgarian territory. Then there are the mixed trading companies, like Conor which I direct, always created through mutual willingness and therefore very well accredited among the Bulgarian state organisms. Then there are the trade fairs: to succeed in taking part in these fairs means a 50-percent chance of getting the business. Finally, there are the Italian trading companies." Therefore, the mere middlemen are not the owners of the field in Bulgaria. Even in Sofia, as in all the Eastern capitals, personal friendships with the bureaucrats who decide on foreign purchases count very much, but it is difficult to find and keep them. Above all, with exports from Italy to Bulgaria amounting to only 243 billion [in 1984], traders do not feel very attracted to the Bulgarian marketplace. "Even in Moscow it is difficult to establish and maintain important direct business relations," explains Padova [Francescato], "but at least there the volumes of trade are very great and therefore interesting. In Bulgaria or Romania the difficulties are numerous and the results are in any case modest." At this moment Sofia is interested in creating joint ventures with Italian companies and in increasing civil construction, goods which are in big demand. "In order to reactivate this exchange we are willing to collaborate with the trading companies but we are aiming, above all, at the trade fairs and the activity of the Italian-Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce," reveals Anghel Anghelov, head of the Bulgarian Trade Office in Milan. "In May, at the National Trade Fair in Plovdiv," he explains, "we are organizing with ICE of Sofia a pavilion that will be called 'Italy Produces' or otherwise 'Agro Italia,' for which we have already chosen almost all the companies." The organization of the Italian delegation at Plovdiv is managed by Randine, a transport company from Milan. It is better for the exhibitors to transport materials and samples in abundance down there because the trade fair often is the center where the principal contracts for public supplies are actually concluded. "There is at least a good reason for coming to Bulgaria to sell: Our imports from Italy are destined to increase, if for no other reason than to return to traditional volumes. However, there is space in the market," Anghelov adds. And the payment for the supplies: "Almost always cash, and in lire; the countertrade is diminishing because Sofia has currency problems like many other CEMA countries, and not of liquidity. Of the socialist countries it has the highest private savings index."

The economic situation in Romania is more difficult. The country is undergoing a big energy crisis and consequently, a monetary one. Compensation exchanges are not specifically imposed, at least for the products which Bucharest considers indispensable, but they are much more preferred. In this market those who operate with confidence are principally the specialized "countertraders," and three mixed Italian-Romanian companies formed in the last few years to consolidate exchanges of some products: Dalpex [petroleum and derivatives], Romital [chemicals], and Sorimpex [construction]. "Romania buys a lot of carbon coke, refractory materials, and abrasive materials in Italy. They are by now standard imports and therefore certain," explains Dan George Mocanu, director of Sorimpex of Milan. "On the other hand, Italy buys primarily petroleum products, followed by textiles, lumber, and furniture. The possibilities of developing Italian exports are not enormous, but they exist. The current 5-year plan anticipates the restructuring of a large part of Romanian industry and, therefore, the importation of machinery and technology. That could be the most promising sector for Italian industry." Mocanu was born in Bucharest, where he graduated and worked for a long time as a Ministry of Foreign Trade official. He moved with his family to Milan some 2 1/2 years ago in order to direct Sorimpex as Romanian representative; he has learned Italian very well. "Romania does not enjoy a good reputation in the commercial world but the truth is that it is an easy market to penetrate; it is enough to propose oneself. Moreover, the Italians start off with an advantage; they are seen everywhere with extreme favor." For Mocanu the shortest way to propose a business affair to Bucharest is to actually go through one of the mixed companies or through a Romanian trade office in Italy. The trading companies count, but they are not very active or well connected. "Write nice things about Romania," he concludes, "we are very often unjustly and badly described. For example, the direct dialing system. It is true that this is not possible for everyone, but it is enough to ask SIP for a connection to the Fonex network and the telephone connection become direct. The dialing code: 004000."

<u>Name</u>	<u>Country</u>		<u>CEMA</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>Address</u>
	<u>Bulgaria</u>	<u>Romania</u>			
Assi	X		X	Footwear, vehicles	Via Leonardo 6, Vigevano [Pavia]; 031-82592
Borowetz Italiana	X		X	General trading	Via Gianturco 5, Roma; 3602859
Conor Italiana	X			General trading	Piazza Duca d'Aosta 8, Milano; 02-2716046
Dalpex		X		Petroleum, related products	Via Leonardo 10/A, Livorno; 0586-21194
D.B. Fibres	X			Paper, related products	Via Durini 26, Milano; 02-700782
Ferro e acciaio	X		X	Iron metallurgy	Via Saldini 35, Milano; 7385341
Francescato	X	X	X	Chemicals, related products	Via Morgagni 22, Milano; 02-200725
Goelner		X	X	General trading	Banhaofstrasse 63, 4125 Riehen [Switzerland]; 004161-675800
Magis International	X	X	X	Chemical, related products	Via Boccaccio 10, Milano; 02-469672
Mineraria	X	X	X	Chemicals, amianthus	Via Morgagni 22, Milano; 02-271727
Neolab		X	X	Scientific equipment	Sala Longobardi 2, Milano; 02-872410
Nicomac	X			Pharmaceutical machinery	Via Pascoli 60, Milano; 02-2360043
Oropa trade		X		Yarns, clothing	Via Boscovich 61, Milano; 02-270193
Romital		X		Chemicals, related products	Via Fara 28, Milano; 02-6702403
Sorimpex		X		Refractive construction materials	Viale Majno 38, Milano; 02-270691
Swissital	X			General trading	Piazza dei Martiri 5-2, Bologna; 051-522753
Comagital	X			Tooling machinery	Via Manzoni 31, Milano; 02-65377

Here are some of the principal commercial intermediary companies which operate with Bulgaria and Romania. Notwithstanding the overcoming of diplomatic difficulties with Sofia and the increase in trade with Bucharest, notable difficulties still persist in business relations.

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